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Abstract
Women's sexual refusals are central to both conservative and/or religious
campaigns to curb and control sexuality, and to feminist campaigns for sexual
freedom. While public health messages implore young women to 'Just Say No'
to premarital/teenage sex, the feminist 'No Means No' campaign tries to ensure
that women's refusals are not ignored or disregarded. Drawing on data from 15
focus groups with 58 female, heterosexual, school (age range 16-18) and
university student (age range 18-50; modal age 20:8) volunteers, I discuss
women's talk about saying 'no' in relation to three existing social scientific
theories: miscommunication theoiy, emotion work theory and sexual script
theory. Each of these theories suggests a different explanation for women's (lack
of) sexual refusals: women do not say 'no' clearly enough; women are reluctant
to say 'no' because they are protecting their male partner from feelings of
rejection; or cultural expectations dictate that women should refuse sex while
men should continue to initiate sex.
I provide two competing approaches to analysing these three theories. The first
(essentialist) approach treats women's talk as transparent evidence of real world
events or of psychological phenomenon (i.e. women miscommunicate or
women do perform emotion work). The second (constructed) approach treats
women's talk as produced in a particular interactional setting in order to serve
particular interactional functions. This thesis expands feminist debates about the
relative value of essentialism and social constructionism for understanding
women's lives and for advancing theory. The majority of feminists, including
those who identify their work as social constructionist, adopt an essentialist
approach to data analysis. This thesis contributes to the development of feminist
psychology both by investigating women's accounts of refusing sex, and by
critically evaluating these two different epistemological approaches to analysing
qualitative data.
Chapter One
Feminist Psychologies and
Young Women's Sexuality
Chapter One: Feminist Psychologies and Young Women's Sexuality
Feminists have fought for women's right to live "Free from all uninvited touch of
man" since the advent of first wave feminism in the early 1900s (in Jeffreys,
1985: 5; see Woistenholme Elmy, 1909; Hamilton, 1892, and Jeffreys, 1985 for a
review of these campaigns). During the 'second wave' (from the early 1970s
onwards) feminists were at the forefront of challenging male sexual practices,
including: sexual harassment (MacKinnon, 1979), prostitution (Millet, 1973;
Barry, 1979), pornography (Lederer, 1980; Dworkin, 1981; Kappeler, 1986) and
child sexual abuse (Armstrong, 1978; Rush, 1977; Russell, 1984). But perhaps
the issue which has most united feminist theorising and activism, is rape (see
Griffin, 1971; Medea and Thompson, 1974; Brownmiller, 1975; and Russell,
1975 & 1982 for classic 'second wave' texts).
Women's right to refuse sexual activity has been at the heart of feminist
campaigns for women's sexual freedom and safety. In these campaigns refusing
sex has become synonymous with saying 'no'. Nowhere is this more apparent
than in relation to rape where whether or not women say 'no' has become central
to distinguishing between sexual assault and 'normal' sex. In court the
distinction between consent and non-consent to sex rests upon whether the
woman said 'no' and whether she has the bruises to 'prove' that she was forced
(Foley, 1995). Feminist campaigns have focused on establishing women's right
to refuse sex, at any time and under any circumstances, and on ensuring that a
woman is heard when she says 'no'. The feminist 'No Means No' campaign was
developed to ensure that a woman is taken seriously when she says 'no'. The
campaign included slogans such as 'What part of no don't you understand?' and
'Whatever we wear, wherever we go, yes means yes, and no means no' to destroy
the popular myth that women 'play hard to get' or 'ask for it' by wearing short
skirts. The recent 'Zero Tolerance' campaign in which posters attacking various
aspects of violence against women (including child sexual abuse, domestic
violence and rape) were featured on buses, public buildings, shops and pubs in
Edinburgh included one poster which read 'When they say no, they mean no.
Some men don't listen'. It is a testament to such feminist activism that 'No
Means No' is probably one of the most commonly associated phrases with rape
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prevention. This focus on saying 'no' has then been prevalent in feminist
activism but has been only an implicit feature in feminist academic research. Of
the vast range of feminist research on sexual violence, only a handful have
explicitly focused on issues around saying 'no' (e.g. Gavey, 1992; Lewin, 1985).
Feminists are not the only ones who are concerned about young women saying
'no'. Young people are being encouraged to 'Just Say No' to a whole range of
activities including: drug taking (Jones et a!., 1995; Englander-Golden et a!.,
1986), drinking (Stumphauzer, 1983) and smoking (McConnon, 1990; Reardon
et al., 1989). Recently this 'Just Say No' message has been most closely
associated with encouraging sexual abstinence. While feminists assert women's
right to say 'no' to undesired sexual activity, conservative and religious groups
assert the need to encourage young women to say 'no' to sex irrespective of their
own desires. Such groups are driven not by a concern for women's sexual
freedom and autonomy but by a desire to curb and control teenage sexuality.
Concerned about increasing levels of teenage sexual activity, and the (apparent)
decline in sexual morality which this signals, organisations such as Christian
Action, Research and Education (CARE) in the UK and the National Chastity
Association in North America have developed sex education campaigns which
encourage sexual abstinence and the preservation of virginity. Psychologists, too,
have been less concerned about establishing the right of women to say 'no' and
have been more concerned with investigating the ability of young women to
refuse sexual activities. These researchers have attempted to pinpoint the
particular psychological variables (such as low self-esteem and low self-efficacy)
which constrain a woman's ability to say 'no' and often recommend the
implementation of education programs which teach 'sexual refusal skills' and
ways of saying 'no' effectively (e.g. Howard and McCabe, 1990; Warzak et a!.,
1995).
Clearly then, issues around saying 'no' have been central both to academic
research and to public debates on young women's sexuality, and are of relevance
to both feminist and non-feminist work. My own research is conducted within
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the framework of feminist psychology, and brings young women together in
focus group discussions to talk about their hopes, fears and expectations around
saying 'no' to sex. By focusing exclusively on young women's accounts of
sexual refusal my research makes explicit feminist concerns about saying 'no'. In
so doing, this thesis has three major contributions to make to feminist
psychology.
First, it forms part of a feminist psychology tradition of re-placing women in a
discipline which seeks to ignore or to marginalise our experiences. Feminist
psychology is a rich and varied discipline which has arisen primarily out of a
desire to transform and challenge mainstream psychology. An important part of
this disciplinary upheaval has involved demonstrating the ways in which
psychology has marginalised or ignored women, producing both sexist and
androcentric theories and practice. Feminist psychologists have transformed
psychology by investigating previously unexplored and marginalised aspects of
women's lives - such as abortion, menstruation, mothering, sexual violence, and
menopause, to name but a few. In the first part of this chapter (section 1.1) 1
briefly review the ways in which feminists have demonstrated psychology's
exclusion of women and women's lives. 1 see my own thesis as firmly located
within this feminist practice of re-placing women into a discipline in which they
have been under erasure.
Second, this thesis contributes to epistemological debates about the relative
value of essentialist and social constructionist approaches to psychology from a
feminist perspective. In particular, I explore the costs and benefits for feminists
of producing essentialist (transparent) or constructed readings of qualitative data.
In this chapter (section 1.2)1 introduce the umbrella concepts of essentialism and
social constructionism and discuss how current feminist epistemological
positions relate to these frameworks.
Third, by exploring issues around saying 'no' to sex this thesis contributes to the
existing literature on young women's sexuality and sexual negotiations (a brief
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discussion of this literature is presented in section 1.3). I focus on how young
women themselves talk about refusing sex: how they say 'no', when they say
'no', why they say 'no', and also why they don't say 'no'. As well as providing
empirical data on the under-explored area of young women's sexual refusals, this
thesis investigates the utility (for feminists) of three existing psychological and
sociological theories (miscommunication, emotion work and sexual scripts)
which are used to explain the prevalence of date rape and unwanted sex.
In addition to these three key contributions which I outline in this first chapter,
this thesis also makes important contributions to feminist debates about method
and also to the focus group literature more generally. These are discussed in
detail in chapter two.
11 Feminist Psychology: Re-Placing Women
Psychologists have claimed to tell many truths about women's lives: that we are
biologically suited to some jobs (usually lower status and lower paid) than those
suited to men (Wilson, 1994; Thorndike 1906); that we possess maternal
instincts (Thorndike, 1914a & b); that if we are separated from our children they
will be psychologically damaged (Rutter, 1972; Bowlby, 1971; Harlow, 1974);
that we are less morally developed or sophisticated than men (Kohlberg, 1966);
and that we precipitate rape by the way we dress or act (Ainir, 1971). Many of
these 'truths' hold women responsible for our own oppression and engage in
often implicit, and sometimes explicit, woman-blaming. Psychology is used to
legitimate oppressive and misogynistic practices. As Celia Kitzinger puts it,
psychology is a discipline which labels women as:
intellectually and morally inferior when we comply
with patriarchal models of femininity, and mad when we
refuse; a discipline deeply implicated in the enforcement
of compulsory heterosexuality and the pathologizing of
lesbians; a discipline which blames women for our own
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oppression, locating the cause of men's violence against
us in their inadequate mothers, seductive daughters,
collusive or masochistic wives. (Kitzinger, 1991: 49).
Feminists have mounted a fierce and sustained critique of mainstream
psychological theory and practice since the turn of the century (Wooley, 1910;
Hollingworth, 1916, Calkin, 1896). This critique became more vigorous still with
the rise of second wave feminism in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Chesler,
1972; Sherif 1979; Weisstein, 1971; Parlee, 1979). But feminists have not been
alone in this critique. The so-called 'crisis in psychology' (Armistead, 1974;
Parker and Shotter, 1990; Pancer, 1997), is the result of sustained challenge from
a range of perspectives, including social constructionism (Gergen, 1973; Harré,
1979; Shotter, 1984), discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards,
and Potter, 1992; Burman and Parker, 1993), post-structuralism and
postmodemism (Hollway, 1989; Walkerdine, 1996), and aspects of community
psychology (Prilleltensky and Nelson, 1997) which have become collectively
known as 'critical psychology' (Fox and Prilleltensky, 1997; Ibàñez and fniguez,
1997). In the 1990s the feminist critique is as strong as ever. Contemporary
feminist psychologists argue that psychology is a discipline designed to "flatten,
depoliticize and individualize" (Fine and Gordon, 1991: 19) and is "deeply
implicated in the patriarchal control of women" (Wilkinson, 1997: 253).
Feminist critiques of psychology have been well documented elsewhere
(Kitzinger and Perkins, 1993; Ussher, 1992), and it is not my intention to
duplicate this work. Rather, I focus briefly on the key themes of this critique
which have exposed the androcentric and sexist nature of mainstream
psychology. Psychology perpetuates androcentrism by making women invisible,
by using male experience as the norm, and by pathologising women's
experience It is these features of psychology that necessitate a feminist
overhauling of the discipline.
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1.1.1 Making Women Invisible
Psychology as it has heretofore been defined and
portrayed has effectively screened women, women's
concerns, and women's work from visibility (Bohan,
1992:1).
Women have been excluded from, and marginalised within, psychology in three
important ways. Psychology has created (i) the invisibility of women
psychologists, (ii) the invisibility of women research participants, and (iii) the
invisibility of women's experiences.
(i) The Invisibility of Women as Psychologists
While the contributions of early male psychologists (e.g. Freud, Watson,
Thorndike) are seen as laying the foundations of modem psychology and as an
essential component of undergraduate courses, early feminist psychologists have
been largely ignored. Women's contributions to theory and research have been
written out of the history of psychology as they have in other disciplines (see
Lemer, 1979; Spender, 1982). Early women psychologists, such as those
included in the first edition of American Men of Science (Cantrell, 1906), have
been reclaimed by some 'second wave' feminists as 'foremothers' of psychology
(cf. Russo, 1983, see also O'Connell and Russo, 1980, Stevens and Gardner,
1982). This is an important strategy for writing women into psychology and for
establishing our presence and activity in the development, growth and
establishment of psychology as a discipline. Although things are improving, it is
still the case that within British psychology although over 80% of undergraduates
are female, women make up less than 20% of the teaching staff, and within
clinical psychology while women fill almost all trainee posts they account for
less than 25% of the top grade posts (Wilkinson, 1996a: 102).
S
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(ii) The Invisibility of Women as Research Participants
Women are often invisible in psychological research both as participants and as
researchers. Psychologists study men much more often than they study women
(Dan and Beckman, 1972; Holmes and Jorgensen, 1972; Greengrass and Stewart,
1973; Grady, 1981; Wallston and Grady, 1985). Many of the most influential
theories in psychology have been developed by men using all-male samples
including: Kohlberg's (1966) theory of moral development; Tajfel and Turner's
(1979) theory of social categorisation; Erikson's (1980) theory of identity
development; and McClelland et ats (1953) theory of achievement motivation.
Women are not considered suitable subjects for particular areas of study and are
often avoided so as not to introduce 'nuisance' variables to research. Most
studies of aggression, for example, use only male participants. When women are
used as subjects in aggression research they are more likely to be given paper and
pencil tests rather than the behavioural measures used with men (Froth,
Macauley and Thome, 1977); apparently researchers do not want to use methods
that would physically hurt women participants (Prescott, 1978). One researcher
justified the use of a male-only sample by saying "I manipulated anxiety and I
franidy couldn't bring myself to do this with college girls" (Prescott and Foster,
1974). Studies of interpersonal attraction, by contrast, are more likely to use
female participants (McKenna and Kessler, 1977). Women's invisibility within
psychological research is exacerbated by an alarming tendency within
mainstream psychology to present research fmdings (as recorded and analysed by
male researchers using male subjects) as representative of the norm of human
experience. For example, a 1984 report from the National Institute on Ageing
containing details of a large scale study of men was entitled "Normal Human
Ageing" implying that the findings are equally applicable to both men and
women (cited in Tavris, 1992).
(iii) The Invisibility of Women's Experiences
Psychology is also a 'womanless' discipline because it has considered women's
lives and experiences too unimportant, uninteresting, and marginal to study
9
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(Crawford and Marecek, 1989). Feminists have identified. sex bias in the kinds of
topics psychologists have researched and the kinds of research which have been
deemed interesting (Grady, 1981). Psychologists have been criticised for
assuming that those topics of interest to white, males are 'basic', while topics
relevant to other groups are 'specialised' or 'applied' (Denmark et al., 1988).
The ways in which questions are asked also fail to address important aspects of
women's lives. Carol Gilligan (1982), for example, has questioned the way in
which successful development has been couched in terms of autonomy and
detachment which obscures the importance of relationship and connection in
women's lives. Reflecting on the state of research on the 'transition from school
to work' Christine Griffin attributes the focus on education, the labour market,
and leisure (at the expense of investigating issues around domestic work and
family) to the tendency of psychologists to focus almost exclusively on the
experiences of young men (Griffin, 1986). Feminist psychologists have
attempted to redress this imbalance by posing questions of importance to women
and by exploring specifically female issues such as menstruation, menopause,
childbearing and mothering, abortion, eating disorders, mastectomy, career
breaks, sexual harassment and rape.
Psychology has, then, excluded women from its research, has restricted their
access to the upper echelons of its infrastructure, and has ignored the
contributions of those women who have been key figures in the development of
the discipline. Women's lives have been underrepresented, disregarded and
marginalised. It is against this background that feminist psychologists have
sought to refocus attention upon women - a strategy neatly summarised in the
notion that feminist scholarship is research "on, by and for women" (Stanley and
Wise, 1983: 17).
1.1.2 Male Experience as the Norm
When results (based on male samples and conducted by male researchers) are
found not to apply to women, it is often assumed that there is something wrong
10
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with women. Rather than extending, altering or modifring the theory, male
psychologists assume that women don't quite 'measure up' to the (male)
standard. Feminists argue that this standard is based on a norm for male
behaviour and any attempt to fit women into this standard results in a
'mismeasure' of women (Tavris, 1992; 1993). Traditional psychological studies
depict women as deviant, as suffering from low self-esteem, low self-confidence,
and a lack of autonomy, independence and a separate sense of self - a pretty
damning picture of the female psyche! Often, feminists argue, these assessments
of women are made in comparison to a male norm. Taking male experiences as
the norm against which women are judged results in a serious distortion of
women's abilities and experiences. A classic example is McClelland et aL's
(1953) popular and influential theory of 'Achievement Motivation'. This theory
which, like so many others, was based entirely on research with men used the
projective Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) to study achievement motivation.
Male participants were given deliberately ambiguous pictures and asked to make
up stories about them. Stories which featured themes of hard work, striving for
success, and rewards for good performance score high for achievement
motivation. Once developed the theory and associated methodology were applied
to both male and female participants. Unfortunately, although the TAT scores
successfully predicted the achievement behaviour of men, they failed to do so for
women. Despite this potentially embarrassing inconvenience neither the theory
or the method was seen as in need of alteration, rather women's different
responses were interpreted as indicating a lack of motivation (Veroff Wilcox
and Atkinson, 1953). In other words, it was women, not the theory, which were
apparently in need of 'fixing'. In this case, then, women are evaluated in relation
to a norm for behaviour generated by research based solely on men in which
achievement is defined in stereotypically male terms. This tendency is reflected
across the board in psychology where researchers pose questions from within a
male framework informed by male expectations. The study of leadership, for
example, has been defined in terms of dominance, aggression and other
stereotypically male traits, rather than - as Denmark et a!, (1988) suggest - in
terms of ability to negotiate or resolve conflicts. Similarly Hare-Mustin and
11
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Maracek (1990) point out that there is a large amount of social scientific
literature which addresses the psychological disadvantages of children with
working mothers, but few studies consider the psychological benefits of having a
working mother, or the psychological damage caused by working fathers.
One of the most famous feminist studies exposing psychology's use of male
experience as the norm is Carol Gilligan's (1982) exposé of androcentric bias in
one of the most respected moral development theories of the time developed by
Lawrence Kohlberg (1966) on an all-male sample. When Kohlberg's framework
was subsequently used to assess the moral development of both boys and girls,
many researchers found that girls were less morally developed than boys - a
finding challenged by Gilligan who argues that the responses given by male
participants became the norm by which girls and women were later evaluated. In
her international best-seller In a Different Voice, Gilligan argues that by applying
Kohlberg's androcentric theory, based on male norms to women's and girls'
responses, a whole host of sophisticated moral judgements based on
relationships, connection to others, and communication (women's 'different
voice') are left unrecognised. Men and women have, she argues, different but
equally valid ways of conceptualising moral dilemmas and of talking about
moral issues and women's voices which are obscured by Kohlberg's androcentric
approach.
A popular feminist technique for highlighting androcentrism of the kind
described above, involves hypothesising how men would 'measure up' if
women's experiences were taken as the norm. For example, Gloria Steinem
provides a tongue-in-cheek reversal of Freudian theories by pointing to worrying
trends in 'Womb Envy', 'Testyria' and 'Breast Castration Anxiety' in men
(Steinem, 1994: 49). Similarly, according to Carol Tavris (1992; 1993), if
women's experiences were taken as the norm, men could be described as more
conceited than women, as overvaluing the work they do, as unrealistic in
assessing their abilities, and as having difficulty forming and maintaining
attachments.
12
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It is clear, then, that by generalising from theories based on studies of men, and
by using male norms to evaluate women, psychology both distorts and
misrepresents women's experiences and fails adequately to address women's
lives. Feminist researchers drawing on these theories may be faced with male
defined and designed frameworks for studying behaviour which, despite claiming
to be universally relevant, fail adequately to account for female experience.
1.1.3 Pathologising Women
Androcentrism defines males and male experience as a
neutral standard or norm and females and female
experience as deviation from that norm (Bern, 1993:
233).
As may have become clear from the previous section, when the experiences of
men are taken as the measure of what is normal, experiences which differ from
this norm (as many women's experiences do) are deemed deviant or abnormal.
Feminist researchers studying sex differences have drawn attention to the ways in
which differences between the sexes are often interpreted as female deficiencies
(e.g. Hyde, 1994). For example, the majority of studies on field dependence!
independence reviewed by Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) report that boys are more
field-independent (i.e. better able to perceive objects embedded in a context)
than are girls. This ability is interpreted as desirable by the researchers and so
boys are said to perform better on the task. The possible values of being field
dependent, such as being more sensitive to context, are ignored and so girls are
assumed to be deficient or lacking in some way.
Nowhere is the practice of pathologising women more apparent than in the area
of psychiatric evaluations. Paula Caplan and Maureen Gans' account of the
inclusion of what they describe as the "virtually misogynistic" diagnostic
category of the 'Self-Defeating Personality Disorder' (SDPD) in the Diagnosic
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and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is particularly telling. This
manual plays a crucial role in clinical judgements about who is normal and who
is not. Caplan documents the lack of empirical data to support the inclusion of
SDPD and calls for its removal as a diagnostic category. She argues that the
'symptoms' of SDPD (e.g. 'Chooses people and situations that lead to
disappointment, failure or mistreatment', 'Engages in excessive self-sacrifice',
'Rejects or renders ineffective the attempts of others to help him or her', or
'Fails to accomplish tasks crucial to his or her personal objectives despite
demonstrated ability to do so') are, despite the careful gender-neutrality of the
language, precisely those which identify the traditional female victim of male
violence. The category of SDPD, she argues, "is dangerously victim-blaming,
implying that suffering people - and especially women - consciously or
unconsciously bring their suffering on themselves" (Caplan and Gans, 1991:
263). Tn addition to being supported by only very flimsy empirical evidence,
Caplan also notes that many of the criteria for diagnosing SDPD correspond to
the coping mechanisms often used by victims of violence. Psychologists, then,
pathologise women when they make biased evaluations which masquerade as
professional practice.
Psychology's tendency to pathologise women results not only from the biases of
individual researchers and practitioners but also from its tendency to locate
explanations for behaviour inside the heads of women. In a scathing critique of
psychology Carolyn Wood Sherif (1968/1992:133) comments that "If one were
to design a theory to keep women in inferior position and lowered worth, none is
more suitable than one locating the causes of women's behaviour and problems
inside the woman". Psychology is accused of 'context-stripping' - for relying on
explanations which emphasise individual psychology at the expense of social
factors. When men have problems (drug and alcohol abuse, narcissism, sexual
abuse, violence) psychologists typically seek external explanations (e.g. it's
because of their upbringing or environment) rather than relying upon
explanations which assume an inherently flawed male psychology. By contrast
many of women's problems are said to be the result of female psychology
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(Cannetto, 1992). For example, Paula Nicolson points out that many
psychologists describe depression after childbirth as an individual psychological
problem in the mother rather than due to adverse material conditions (Nicolson,
1986). Feminists have pointed out that contextual factors (i.e. factors external to
the individual) can have an important impact on women's mental health but that
these factors are routinely overlooked by psychiatrists who look for individual
factors. In particular women who have been victims of sexual abuse or
interpersonal violence suffer high rates of mental illness but psychiatrists rarely
consider such factors when making a diagnosis (Brown, 1986). Similarly, Wendy
Hollway is critical of the ways in which psychologists "have been trained to
think in terms of the individual" (Holiway, 1991: 31). Individualised solutions to
eradicate women managers' poor performance, for example, including initiatives
such as assertiveness training, are offered by psychologists. Such an approach
obscures contextual factors (such as discrimination) which might better explain
women's 'poor performance'. By locating the explanation for behaviour inside
the individual, psychology engages in woman-blaming. The oppressive social,
economic and political context which feminists hold responsible for the
condition of women is ignored in malestream psychology.
Feminist psychologists have also been critical of
the harm that psychology (and the popularization
of psychological ideas) has wrought in women's
lives: primarily (but not exclusively) through the
location of responsibility - and also pathology -
within the individual, to the neglect of social and
political oppression. (Wilkinson, 1991 a: 8).
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The absence of analyses of power and social context within traditional
psychology is heavily criticised by feminists who consider an analysis of power
to be central to feminist psychology. In sum then, feminists have exposed
psychology's androcentric biases including the ways in which it makes women
invisible in the discipline, treats male experiences as the norm by which women
are evaluated, and by pathologising women by providing individualised
explanations for behaviour and producing analyses devoid of social context.
Psychology's ability to resist this sustained criticism and to remain steadfast in
its approach has frustrated feminists, who have attributed this resilience to the
highly institutionalised structure of psychology relative to other disciplines
(Wilkinson, 1997).
Psychology, then, is complicit in the oppression of women. Feminists seeking to
end this oppression and to change women's lives disagree about whether this is
best achieved by dismantling or transforming the discipline. The relationship
between feminism and psychology has been variously described as
"incompatible" (Wilkinson, 1991b: 201; Kitzinger, 1990: 120), as forming
"uneasy partners" (Ussher, 1990: 54), as potentially "enriching" (Lott, 1985) or
"revitalizing" (Shaver and Henrick, 1987), and as "antipsychology" (Squire,
1990: 76; Kitzinger and Perkins, 1993: 21). Some warn of the dangers inherent in
an alliance between feminism and psychology, including the "psychologization"
(Hollway, 1991) and "depoliticization" (Kitzinger, C. 1990, 1991) of feminism.
Many feminists have trained in but then moved out of psychology (see Sharpe
and Jefferson, 1990 for two personal accounts of leaving the discipline) while
others have attempted to improve, reshape, or otherwise restructure psychology.
Initially this transformation involved exposing psychology's biased and
oppressive practices (such as those presented above), but continually challenging
mainstream psychology means devoting time, energy and other resources to
addressing an agenda which has not arisen out of feminist concerns or women's
experience. Feminist psychologists are increasingly urged to move beyond
critique of mainstream psychology and towards pursuing our own areas of
interest rather than just reacting against mainstream psychology (Wilkinson,
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1991b). Feminists are involved in developing new theories, epistemologies and
methods in psychology and are making interventions into institutional practices
such as professional bodies (Walsh, 1985; Pyke and Stark-Adamec, 1981;
Wilkinson and Burns, 1990) and academic programs. So far, debates about how
successful feminist interventions have been in transforming the discipline are
characterised by disagreement and contradiction. In a recent review Michelle
Fine and Susan Merle Gordon (1991: 20) see little to be optimistic about, and
conclude that "[w]hen feminism and psychology mate, our evidence has found
that feminism seems to bear only recessive genes". Similarly, Sue Wilkinson
suggests that the impact of feminism on psychology has "not been substantial"
(Wilkinson, 1991b: 199). Conversely, in a more optimistic assessment Mary
Roth Walsh (1993) points to the development of specific journals publishing
feminist research (e.g. Sex Roles, Psychology of Women Quarterly, and
Feminism & Psychology), the inclusion of feminist psychology in more
mainstream psychology journals, and the publication of psychology of women
textbooks, as evidence of feminism's success. Regardless of the degree of
success, most feminist psychologists agree that we have "far to go" (Worrell and
Etaugh, 1994: 448, see also Wilkinson, 1996).
In this thesis, I hope to contribute both to feminist transformations of psychology
and to the development of feminist theory and research practice by making
innovations at the empirical, epistemological, and methodological level. In this
thesis, by focusing solely on women's experience, I attempt to re-place women in
psychology. I do not compare young women to young men but instead take
young women's experiences as valid and meaningful in their own right. Of
central importance in this thesis is an examination of the ways in which analyses
from different epistemological approaches are either complicit in portraying
young women as passive victims, as deficient, or as unintelligent, or are
successful in challenging such negative images presenting instead analyses
which recognise young women's resourcefulness and strength.
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1.2 Epistemology: Essentialism and Social Constructionism
The second major contribution to psychological knowledge made by this thesis is
in relation to epistemology. Epistemology is the study of knowledge systems:
what assumptions form the basis of knowledge, who knows what, about whom,
and how these knowledge claims are legitimated. There are two competing
frameworks which inform epistemological positions taken by both feminists and
non-feminists alike: essentialism and social constructionism. Essentialism and
social constructionism can be understood as opposite poles of a continuum of
epistemological theorising. In this section I describe how these two poles differ
on three specific dimensions: (i) their understanding of the origin of social
phenomena; (ii) their relationship to science; and (iii) their methodological
approach. Finally, in section (iv) I also look at how essentialism and social
constructionism relate to the specific epistemological positions developed by
feminists (i.e. feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint and feminist social
constructionism). By arguing that essentialism and social constructionism form a
continuum I do not mean to imply that these approaches are compatible or that
the differences between them can be resolved (see Kitzinger 1995 for a more
detailed explanation of why these two approaches remain incompatible). Rather I
mean only to indicate that researchers often adopt positions which can not be
clearly summarised by either label.
1.2.1 The Origins of Social Phenomena
Essentialists and social constructionists differ in their understanding of the
origins of social phenomena - i.e. how we come to behave the way that we do.
Vivien Burr (1995: 19) describes the essentialist approach as "a way of
understanding the world that sees things (including human beings) as having
their own particular essence or nature". For example, according to Crawford
(1995: 8) research on sex differences in conimunication is often essentialist
because it suggests that "women speak in particular ways because they are
women" (emphasis in original) - it is the location of these characteristics within
18
Chapter One: Feminist Psychologies and Young Women's Sexuality
the individual which distinguishes them as essentialist. Psychological
phenomena like personality, IQ, memoly, emotions, attitudes, and prejudice are
seen as an essential part of any individual and as located within the individual.
Often, at its extreme, an essentialist approach assumes that the particular features
of individuals have a biological base. Describing essentialist approaches to
sexuality, for example, Leonore Tiefer (1995: 7) argues that they share the
assumption that "once you 'strip away' all the cultural and historical trappings,
the essence of sexuality that is left is biology". This does iQ mean (although it is
commonly assumed to be the case) that essentialists rely on biological
explanations. Essentialists are keen to document the influence and importance of
culture and socialisation on behaviour, but assume that there is a pre-social
essence which is enhanced or modified by such social factors. For example,
essentialists may recognise the importance of cultural factors in shaping sex role
behaviour and may even conclude that culture dictates appropriate behaviour for
males and females. However, essentialist approaches start from the assumption
that there is a distinct 'maleness' and 'femaleness' upon which these cultural
factors operate. The aim of research conducted from within an essentialist
framework is to discover, as closely and as accurately as possible, the true nature
of this essence when cultural factors have been controlled for.
By contrast, social constructionists see the origin of social phenomena not as
located within the individual, but as constructed through social processes and
interactions. Social constructionists challenge the fundamental assumption that
there is a core, essential, basic human essence which is acultural and ahistorical.
Rather, social constructionists look at the ways in which the language we use and
the categories we employ construct the world in particular ways. These
constructions are both culturally and historically specific. The difference
between essentialist and social constructionist ways of looking at the origin of
social phenomena is described by Janis Bohan (1993: 7) as parallel to the
difference between describing a person as friendly, and a conversation as
friendly:
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In the former case, 'friendly' is construed as a trait of the
person, an 'essential' component to her or his personality.
In the latter, 'friendly' describes the nature of the
interaction occurring between or among people. Friendly
here has a particular meaning that is agreed upon by the
participants, that is compatible with its meaning to their
social reference groups, and that is reaffirmed by the
process of engaging in this interaction.
Rather than seeing social phenomena as pre-existing, internal essences, social
constructionists see the nature of social reality as continually re-negotiated and
re-worked in interaction. Rather than (for example) seeing emotions as distinct
qualities of individuals, social constructionists look at the ways in which social
life is organised in terms of distinct emotional states which are socially and
historically specific and which serve certain ideological functions (see for
example the contributions to Harré, 1986). As such, social constructionists
challenge the very notions by which essentialists seek to explain the world.
Therefore, the aim of social constructionism is not to discover the true nature of
social phenomena but to examine the processes by which people make sense of
their world.
1.2.2 The Relationship to Science
Essentialists and social constructionists also differ in their relationship to
science. For essentialists the way to achieve their goal (of revealing the 'truth'
about social phenomena) is by adopting the philosophy and methods of science.
According to essentialists there is one social reality which is observable and
measurable. In order to know what individuals really think, feel, or behave we
can observe, control and manipulate variables, until by following logic and
deduction we can establish (say) the real or essential differences between men
and women. The social constructionist approach extends to science its general
approach to exposing taken-for-granted knowledge. Social constructionists see
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science as "socially constituted and historically determined, arguing that our
notions about what it is to 'do' science, what 'count' as facts, and what
constitutes as 'good' scientific practice are the products of a particular place,
time and culture in which they are embedded": as such, social constructionism
throws into question the veiy nature of science itself (Kitzinger, 1987: 188).
Social constructionism, argues Gergen, must "eschew the empiricist account of
scientific knowledge" and the "traditional Western conception of objective,
individualistic, altruistic knowledge" (Gergen, 1985: 271). Constructionists also
reject the language of discovery used by essentialists to describe the development
of their particular research area which is characterised as 'up the mountain'
story or saga (e.g. Kitzinger, 1987; Rorty, 1980), where contemporary research is
seen as progressively more sophisticated and progressively less hampered by bias
and prejudice and progressively closer to the 'truth'. Instead, social
constructionist work should, argues Gergen (1985: 273) be judged on its ability
to "invite, compel, stimulate, or delight the audience".
1.2.3 The Methodological Approach
The third, and final, dimension upon which essentialists and social
constructionists differ (and this is the one which is of greatest interest in this
thesis) is their methodological approach. By methodology I refer not only to the
particular choice of method, but also to the "theory and analysis of how research
should proceed, how research questions might be addressed, and the criteria
against which research findings might be evaluated" (Maynard, 1994: 14).
According to essentialists the aim of research is to discover the 'truth' about
social reality. Reality, as they perceive it, is located within the individual and the
job of the researcher is observe, probe and question individuals so that they
reveal their 'frue' nature. Essentialists, then, adopt one of two different models
for psychological investigation: the model of participant-as-informant, or the
model of participant-as-psychological-subject. In the first model participants are
treated as informants on social reality. How people respond to questionnaires,
perform in experiments, or talk about themselves in interviews is seen as
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providing direct evidence about their social world or internal attributes. Of
course, this information may not always be entirely accurate; researchers are
concerned about possible biases and distortions - the ecological validity of
experiments, social desirability in questionnaires and interviewer bias, for
example, are all factors which must, as far as possible, be controlled for and their
effects minimised. It is not, then, that essentialists naively assume that the data
they collect maps perfectly and unproblematically onto social reality. But they do
assume that this represents the researcher's 'best guess' - the most accurate
knowledge they could possibly collect. In the second model, the model of
participant-as-psychological-subject, participants' understandings of their social
world are seen as 'filtered' through their individual psychologies. Participants
provide information about their social world, but this is a world which is 'real to
them' and may or may not map on to 'objective' reality. Participants' responses
to data collection tools are seen to reveal more about participants' own
understandings, beliefs, values, mental and psychological states, than about
social reality. These two approaches differ in their understanding of what,
exactly, they are trying to uncover (i.e. social reality or participants'
understandings of reality) but are similar in their understanding of the purpose of
research - i.e. to uncover the truth about essential attributes located within the
individual. They have in common the view that people's responses are a medium
through which social phenomena are made available to the researcher's gaze. I
refer to this approach as based on a transparent reading of research data and this
is a term which I return to and explain in more detail in the following chapter.
I have already commented that methodology refers to more than just the choice
of method and it is important to note essentialist research can use either
qualitative or quantitative methods. It is commonly assumed that essentiaiists use
only quantitative methods, while constructionists use qualitative methods.
Although essentialists may be more likely to use quantitative methods (which
afford the researcher greater control and consequently more 'accurate' results)
essentialists may also use qualitative methods. Both qualitative and quantitative
data is open to the kinds of transparent readings outlined above. Indeed,
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exploring the ways in which qualitative research can be analysed in essentialist
ways is one of the key themes of this thesis.
As I noted earlier (section 1.2.1) social constructionists see the origin of social
phenomena as located not within the individual but as constructed through social
interaction. Consequently, social interactions of all kinds are of interest to the
social constructionist (Burr, 1995). In particular, social constructionists pay close
attention to the role of discourse/narratives/talk/language in the negotiation and
construction of realities, and to the ways in which language categorises and
organises how we understand the social world. This may mean mapping the ways
in which particular words have been used across cultures or across historical
periods (e.g. Harré, 1986; Weeks, 1981). Celia Kitzinger (1987) highlights the
difference between essentialist and social constructionist methods of inquiry
when she argues that they require answers to completely different sets of
questions about sexual identity. Essentialists, she argues, aim to discover "truths"
about homosexuals and lesbians; what 'causes' homosexuality, whether
homosexuals differ from heterosexuals and in what ways, or (in a heterosexist
discipline) whether or not the homosexual is 'sick'. By contrast, social
constructionists look at the discursive practices and narrative forms by which
homosexuality is constructed as different or as sickness. Similarly, for social
constructionist approaches to the self "the question becomes not what is the true
nature of the self, but how is the self talked about, how is it theorised in
discourse?" (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). With the focus on talk and social
interaction, social constructionists use primarily qualitative methods and they
adopt a different model for research. Rather than seeing participants as
informants or as psychological subjects, social constructionists use a model of
participant-as-social-interactor. Instead of seeing the things people say in
interviews or focus groups as revealing essential attributes or beliefs, social
constructionists treat what people say as talk. Language and participants' talk is
not seen simply as a way for people to express their inner thoughts, feeling,
personalities etc. Rather, language is seen as a form of action. According to
Gergen the terms with which we describe ourselves and our experiences are
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"social artefacts, products of historically situated interchanges among people"
(1985: 267). Much of social constructionism is concerned with identifying the
vocabularies with which different people describe their experiences (e.g,
Kitzinger, 1987), or the ways in which particular vocabularies have developed
over time and in particular historical contexts (McIntosh, 1968; Gergen, 1973;
Weeks, 1981; TOlolyan, 1989), or the ways in which language constructs
experiences differently across cultures (Heelas and Lock, 1981; Harr, 1989).
1.2.4 Feminist Epistemological Perspectives
Feminist commentators have divided feminist epistemological approaches into
three different positions: (i) feminist positivist approach; (ii) feminist standpoint
approach; and (iii) feminist social constructionist approach (e.g. Oleson, 1994;
Riger, 1992; Harding, 1987). I briefly discuss each of these in relation to
essentialism and social constructionism.
(i) The Feminist Positivist Approach
Of the three epistemological positions, the feminist positivist approach is most
clearly essentialist. This approach is characterised by feminist work on sex
differences such as that of Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin, Janet Hyde and
Alice Eagly, and by studies of sex typing such as early work on androgyny by
Sandra Bern. Feminist empiricist literature can be most often found amongst the
pages of Psychology of Women Quarterly and Sex Roles.
Feminist positivist researchers conceptualise social phenomena as originating
from biology or psychodynamics, and as located within the individual. I illustrate
this with reference to Sandra Bern's work on 'androgyny' - one of the most
influential pieces of feminist work of the 1970s and one which is still popular
within mainstream psychology. The concept of androgyny was developed by
feminist psychologist Sandra Bern (1974, 1975) to provide an alternative to
traditional theories of sex typing in personality. Traditional theories were rigidly
sex typed so that women were psychologically healthy only if they possessed
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stereotypically feminine traits, and men were seen as psychologically healthy
only if they possessed stereotypically masculine traits. Androgyny is "the
blending or baiancing of psychological traits that are stereotyped as masculine or
feminine" (Unger and Crawford, 1992: 52). Bern proposed that androgynous
people should be seen as the new ideal in psychological health and functioning,
those people with a healthy balance of both masculine and feminine traits are the
most well-adjusted. Bern's theory of androgyny is essentialist because these
traits, whether masculine or feminine, are located within the individual. Rather
than challenging the idea that men and women possess particular traits or
personality characteristics Bern proposed that individuals possess a mixture of
both masculine and feminine traits. However, the notion of androgyny does not
challenge the idea that people possess psychological traits which are located
within the individual and which develop out of biological factors or through
socialisation.
Feminist positivists closely follow the scientific method adopted by mainstream
psychology. A recent editorial of the Psychology of Women Quarterly reiterates
this commitment when it described the journal as "a research journal with an
empirical scientific tradition" in which "[s]cientific theories and methods are
powerful tools for generating knowledge in the service of feminist goals" (Russo,
1995: 1). In common with most non-feminist psychological research the articles
in this journal express concerns about confounding variables, inter-rater
reliability, random assignment of subjects, representative samples, internal and
external validity, replication, generalizability - all factors that are considered
important to a study that is attempting to establish 'the facts'. Feminist positivists
are so enamoured with science that their critique of mainstream psychology's
sexism rests on the idea that mainstream psychology is not scientific enough.
Feminist positivist empiricists have challenged mainstream psychology's claims
to be producing value free, objective research, and argue that psychology's
sexism (i.e. the ways in which women are made invisible, male experiences are
taken as the norm, and women are pathologised) is the result of 'bad' science
(Harding, 1991). This kind of critique has been a consistent theme within
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feminist positivist psychology since the first wave of feminism in the early 1900s
when Helen Thompson Wooley (1910: 51) described sex difference research as
"sentimental rot and drivel", on into the 1960s 'second wave' of feminism when
Naomi Weisstein claims that sexist researchers "simply refuse to look at the
evidence against their theory and practice" and support their theories with "stuff
so transparently biased as to have absolutely no standing as empirical evidence"
(Weisstein, 1968/1993: 197). This critique continues in the 1990s with Paula
Caplan's challenge to the inclusion of various 'disorders' into the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-ffl) which she says "has little to
do with science and a great deal to do with ideology" (Caplan, McCurdy-Myers
and Gans, 1992: 40) Feminist positivists ultimately aim to create better, more
scientific research. As Alice Eagly points out "Science is ultimately strengthened
and improved by feminist psychologists' many analyses of the failures of science
to live up to its rules" (Eagly, 1994: 517).
Feminist positivists' commitment to science is also reflected in their choice of
method: they often adopt quantitative and/or experimental methods in order to
study social phenomena. Indeed, these researchers have been at the forefront of
developing new tests, scales and questionnaires. Some of the most famous of
which include: the Bern Sex Role Inventory (Bern, 1974), the Rape Myth
Acceptance Scale (Burt, 1980), and the Attitudes toward Women Scale (Spence
and Helmreich, 1978). In analysing their data, feminist empiricists are looking
for accurate representations of the world or the psychological subject. Whether
relying on qualitative or on quantitative research methods feminist empiricists
look beyond what people say (e.g. via interviews or via tests and scales) to draw
conclusions about the social world or about individual psychology. For example,
the Bern Sex Role Inventory asked people to rate themselves in relation to
stereotypical masculine or feminine traits (i.e. they are being informants about
their personalities), and their overall score is taken as indicative of their
psychological make-up. Feminist positivists use either a model of participants-as-
informants or participants-as-psychological-subjects. Therefore, the feminist
positivist approach is essentialist on all three of the dimensions I outlined earlier.
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It locates social phenomena within the individual, and embraces the principles
and methodological approaches of science.
(ii) The Feminist Standpoint Approach
The feminist standpoint approach has a rather more contradictory relationship to
essentialism, and has been conceptualised as falling somewhere in between
essentialist and social constructionist approaches (Henwood, 1995; Stanley and
Wise, 1990; 1993). Standpoint research includes the work of psychologists
Nancy Chodorow (1978) and Jean Baker Miller (1976), sociologists Nancy
Hartstock (1983, 1987) and Dorothy Smith (1974, 1989), philosopher Sandra
Harding (1987), and natural scientist Hilary Rose (1983). The standpoint
approach takes as its underlying assumption the idea that social phenomena
originate not from individual, inborn, private traits but rather as a consequence of
the things we do. Standpoint theorists argue that because women lead different
lives to men, they have different experiences, different ways of seeing the world
and different 'ways of knowing' (Belenky et al., 1986). Women's different
knowledge, then, derives from performing distinct social roles and types of work:
Feminist standpoint emerges from an examination of
women's activities ... [where] the emphasis is on change
rather than stasis, a world characterised by interaction
with natural substances rather than separation from
nature, a world in which quality is more important than
quantity, a world in which the unification of mind and
body is inherent in the activities performed. (Hartstock,
1987: 164)
For standpoint theorists, the relationship between experience and the production
of knowledge is crucial. The particular position and social location of those
producing knowledge is central to the standpoint perspective:
Standpoint epistemologies assert that what we know and
how we know it depends on who we are, that is, on the
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knower's historical locus and his or her position in the
social hierarchy (Marecek, 1989: 327).
Standpoint theorists argue that mainstream psychology is sexist because the male
researchers who dominate the discipline simply cannot 'see' or understand the
world as women do. The uniqueness of women's experiences have been ignored
or undervalued by mainstream psychology and consequently, feminist standpoint
researchers often choose to focus on issues which are specific to women such as
childbirth, mothering and menstruation. This approach stresses the importance of
making women visible in psychology and of doing research which is centred in
the lives of women. As Karen Henwood (1995: 15) puts it, standpoint theorists
"recognise the need to understand and base research from the perspective of
women's lives". Standpoint theoiy, then, builds on and from women's
experience and from the distinctive political positions that women occupy and
the distinctive work in which they are involved (Harding, 1987). For example,
Sara Ruddick argues that women develop a distinctive way of looking at the
world which she calls 'Maternal Thinking' which evolves from, and is formed by
the practices women are engaged in, and in particular the act of mothering.
Ruddick claims that women's work - "sheltering, nursing, feeding, kin work,
teaching of the very young, tending the frail elderly" - is threatened by violence
which interferes with their capacity to do their work (1990: 148). According to
Ruddick, women's work creates a connection between maternal work and peace.
Standpoint theory draws attention to aspects of women's lives which have been
ignored, devalued or marginalised in mainstream research. Researchers
recommend the re-valuing of women's experience and the celebration of
women's unique qualities. Standpoint theorists are often accused of presenting
essentialised and romanticised versions of women's psychology. Although
standpoint researchers are often careful to point out that things like 'maternal
thinking' are not an essential attribute of women arising from women's unique
biological processes, but rather a product of the social activities and work that
women do, they are misunderstood as making claims about 'essential'
differences in male and female psychology. Standpoint researchers frequently
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argue that men too could develop maternal thinking or other qualities if they
became engaged in the same activities as women. However, whether these
distinctive features of women's lives arise through biology or socialization, they
are nonetheless essentialist because they see psychological phenomena as located
inside the individual - i.e. maternal thinking is an attribute possessed by the
individual.
Standpoint theorists have typically been highly critical of some aspects of the
scientific method. In particular, the notion of objectivity has been subject to
close scrutiny and has often been rejected. Because standpoint theorists argue
that men and women see the world in very different ways, they argue that what
exactly we see is never neutral, impartial or objective but always comes from a
particular standpoint. As Belenky et al. (1986: 137-8) put it: "all knowledge is
constructed .... answers to all questions vary depending on the context in which
they are asked and on the frame of reference of the person doing the asking".
Scientific knowledge is always situated within the particular social location and
ideological framework of the researcher and can never be separate from it. We
are never just looking at social phenomena, we are always looking from a
particular social location. According to Steinberg (1994: 296), the central
premise of a standpoint approach is "that science is a site of power! social
relations which is shaped by and which shapes its historical and cultural
context". Since most knowledge is produced from the standpoint of men, the
standpoint approach argues that by starting from the perspective of women's
lives a more complete basis for knowledge is possible. So although on the one
hand standpoint theory rejects the notion of objectivity as a route to truth, it
continues to adopt the rhetoric of scientific discovery by arguing that less partial
truths are possible. Standpoint theorists claim that not only does women's
experience produce a different kind of knowledge, but that women's experience
also produces a better kind of knowledge. According to this argument, feminist
explorations of women's lives produce less distorted knowledge because women
are 'outsiders' to the mainstream structures and are able to critically reflect upon
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them (Collins, 1991). Men, whose lives are too closely linked to dominant
institutions, are unable to do so. As Nancy Hartstock (1987: 159) puts it:
women's lives make available a particular and
privileged vantage point on male supremacy, a vantage
point which can ground a powerful critique of the
phallocratic institutions and ideology which constitute
the capitalist form of patriarchy.
(iii) The Feminist Social Constructionist Approach
As noted earlier (section 1.3.1), social constructionists see the origin of social
phenomena not as fixed in nature, biology or socialisation, but as actively
constructed through social interaction. Social reality is that which, through
shared understandings and negotiation, people treat as social reality. The social
constructionist approach is illustrated by the following two examples in which
feminist researchers describe the social constructionist approach to sexuality:
sexuality is not a biological given, not an inherent
human quality, not any sort of instinct or imperative, but
rather a social construction, a way of being and relating
that is created by social arrangements. (Tiefer, 1988: 23)
Social constructionist theory in the field of sexuality
proposed an outrageous idea. It is suggested that one of
the last remaining outposts of the 'natural' in our
thinking was fluid and changeable, the product of human
action, history rather than the invariant result of the body,
biology or innate sex drive. (Vance, 1992: 132)
Social constructionism, then, involves questioning and deconstructing common-
sense or taken-for-granted knowledge about the world. For feminists this has
meant deconstructing common-sense ideas about the nature of women. For
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example, the idea that women's sexuality has been constructed as 'weak',
'difficult' or 'reactive' through social processes, rather than being 'naturally'
inferior to male sexuality. This has also meant deconstructing the very categories
which essentialists use to make sense of the world. Most noticeably this has
meant deconstructing the categories of male and female, man and woman. This
approach is exemplified by the work of Kessler and McKenna:
Our theoretical position is that gender is a social
construction, that is a world of two "sexes" is a result of
the socially shared, taken for granted methods which
members use to construct reality. (1985: vii)
Rather than seeing maleness and femaleness as essential attributes of individuals,
social constructionists look at how and when these categories are used and to
what effect:
gender categories (female-male, feminine-masculine,
girls-boys, women-men) are analyzed to see how
different social groups define them, and how they
construct and maintain them in everyday life and in
major social institutions, such as the family and economy
(Lorber and Farrell, 1991: 1).
In their classic article 'Doing Gender' Candace West and Don Zimmerman
(1987: 126) see gender not as the property of individuals, but as a "routine,
methodological, and recurring accomplishment" something which is undertaken
by men and women in interaction. Rather than attempting to discover the 'truth'
about differences between men and women social constructionists look at the
'doing' of gender, the ways in which gender is an "emergent feature of social
situations" (West and Zimmerman, 1987: 126). Social constructionists, then, are
interested in what people say, how they say it, and how one version becomes
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privileged over another as a result of social processes such as communication,
negotiation, conflict and rhetoric.
The question in which feminist social constructionists are perhaps most
interested, is not how social phenomena are constructed in the ways that they are
but - that is, with what effect, and for whose benefit. Hare-Mustin and
Marecek, for example, raise the question of utility in relation to various
representations of gender. Rather than tiying to establish the true nature of
gender differences, they ask "What are the consequences of representations of
gender that either emphasize or minimize male-female difference?" (Hare-
Mustin and Marecek, 1992: 235). They argue that constructing huge differences
between men and women masks inequalities because the focus on the essential
attributes of men and women obscures the possibility that these differences may
result from social inequalities. Minimising sex differences also has certain
consequences such as disguising the differences in resources available to men
and women and diverting attention away from women's special needs.
1.2.5 The Political Costs and Benefits of
Essentialism and Social Constructionism
There have been disagreements and charged debates between feminists about the
relative value of essentialist and social constructionist approaches to feminist
theorising, research and activism. Commentators note how feminists are accused
of essentialism as if this in itself were enough to discredit their work. According
to Jane Roland Martin, in the 1980s it was commonplace to hear women accuse
each other of essentialism. "If I had called your work or you had called mine
essentialist", she says "you or I would not merely have been offering criticism, as
we would if we had called that work sketchy or unconvincing or disorganized or
badly written or even false [...] the net effect was to place on the work a seal of
disapproval" (Martin, 1994: 630). Similarly, Carol Vance (1992: 132) notes that:
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In the sometimes heated debates that have gone on about
essentialism and social construction, the word
'essentialist', to some ears, sounds increasingly
pejorative - a dirty word, a contemptuous put down, a
characterization of being hopelessly out of date.
Essentialists are characterised as politically reactionary in comparison to social
constructionists (or post-structuralists or postmodernists). These criticisms are
levelled at both feminist empiricists who try to discover the scientific truth about
the essential nature of women (and, usually, how this is, or is not, different to the
essential nature of men), and at standpoint theorists (sometimes perjoratively
called 'cultural feminists') who celebrate those aspects of women's nature which
have traditionally been devalued. Essentialists (in particular 'cultural feminists')
are described as adopting "a homogenous, unproblematized, and ahistoncal
conception of women" (Alcoff 1988: 413), and they are said to "indulge in
dangerously erroneous generalizations about women" (Echols, 1983: 440). The
'essential' woman of much feminist theorising has turned out, in fact, to be
white, heterosexual, middle-class, able-bodied, and North American (cf.
Kitzinger, 1996).
Essentialist research which makes claims about the particular nature of women is
seen as too closely aligned with patriarchal practices which justify women's
subordination, and can be used to support programs and policies which are
inimical to women (Martin, 1994). For example, Michelle Fine and Judi
Addeiston (1996) demonstrate how the works of feminists Carol Gilligan and
Kay Deaux are used to justify the exclusion of women from a college in South
Carolina. The advantage of essentialism is that it allows for fixed and stable
categories to organise around. As Celia Kitzinger (1995: 150) points out, the
essentialist concept of 'the homosexual' has "proved valuable in establishing
lesbian and gay civil and political rights", biological theories of homosexuality
which support the idea that an individual cannot 'choose' to be homosexual are
used to argue for equality on the basis that if an individual 'cannot help' being
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homosexual, any more than an individual can 'help' being black then it is unfair
to persecute or discriminate against them (see also Vance 1992). How can
feminists and other activist groups organise politically if the identities on which
their activism is based (i.e. lesbian, women, black) are being 'deconstructed' by
social constructionists? Essentialism is crucial for undermining biased research
and/or social policy by 'proving' the mental stability of lesbians in child custody
cases, or 'proving' that children are not psychologically damaged when their
mothers return to work.
Social constructionists, then, are charged with political inadequacy. Because
social constructionists argue that individuals 'do' gender, 'do' race, or 'do'
lesbianism rather than 'being' female, 'being' black or 'being' a lesbian many
critics contend that social constructionists imply that identities are "fictional,
trivial, unimportant or not real" (Vance, 1992: 133). The attraction of social
constructionism is that it offers the promise of increased freedom for women - if
we can 'do' gender then perhaps we can 'do' something else. If there is no pre-
determined gender identity then we can conceivably find new forms of social
organisation.
Feminists, then, debate both the intellectual rigor and the political expediency of
essentialism and social constructionism. This thesis contributes to these debates
by exploring the competing epistemological approaches to data analysis and the
implications of these for research, theory, and activism provided by essentialism
and social constructionism.
1.3 Young Women and HeteroSex
Feminists are worried about girls and young women. They are worried about the
effects of a "girl-poisoning" culture on young women's lives (cf. Pipher, 1994),
and the invisibility of young women both within feminism and within
psychology. Bonnie Leadbeater and Niobe Way (1996: 1-2) argue that girls are
"seldom seen and rarely heard", and their voices are "missing in the
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psychological research literature". Similarly, Anita Harris (1996: 152 & 153)
claims that young women are "not particularly prominent on the feminist
agenda" and that feminism is a "platform which does not seek to incorporate
their experiences" (see also Brown and Gilligan, 1992). However, the past ten
years has seen a resurgence of interest from feminist scholars in studying the
lives of young women and an attempt to include young women's voices (Lees,
1989; Apter, 1990; Gilligan, Rogers and Tolman, 1991; Brown and Gilligan,
1992; Ward and Taylor, 1992; Leadbeater and Way, 1996). Feminist interest in
the lives of young women covers a huge variety of topics within the social
sciences including: their relationships with mothers (Apter, 1990; Cauce et a!.,
1996; Taylor, 1996), fathers (Sharpe, 1994) parents and/or teachers (Way, 1995;
Way and Stauber, 1996; Ward, 1996), 'mentors' (Rhodes and Davis, 1996;
Sullivan, 1996), peers (Hey, 1997; Way, 1996) and offspring (Apfel and Seitz,
1996); aspects of young women's schooling (Sharpe, 1994) and career
aspirations (McLoyd and Hernandez Jozefowicz, 1996; De Leon, 1996; Sharpe,
1994); their involvement in popular culture (Frazer, 1987; Walkerdine, 1984 &
1990; McRobbie, 1991, 1996; Christian-Smith, 1993); young women's
knowledge about menstruation (Lovering, 1995; Kissling, 1996) and motherhood
(Prendergast and Prout, 1980); and their thoughts about class (Phoenix and
Tizard, 1996; Frazer, 1988).
Nineteen ninety seven has been termed the 'Year-of-the-Girl' (Holman Weisbard
and Shult, 1997). In this year the feminist journal Signs has called for
contributions to a issue on young women, and Feminist Collections produced a
special issue on girls and young women (Holman Weisbard and Shult, 1997). In
addition to much psychological research, bookshelves have been dominated by
'pop' psychology aimed both at young women and at the adults with whom they
come into contact. These include the best selling Reviving Ophelia: Saving the
Selves of Adolescent Girls (Pipher, 1994), and Peggy Orenstein's (1994)
SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap, in addition to
books in which young women themselves talk (e.g. Girl Power: Young Women
Speak Out! (Carlip, 1995, and For Real: The Uncensored Truth about America 's
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Teenagers Pratt and Pryor, 1995). Together, these popular books and the growing
body of psychological research on young women have served to heighten
concern about the lives of young women.
Perhaps the research which has had the greatest impact on feminist theorising
about young women has been from those involved in the Harvard Project on
Women 'S Psychology and Girls' Development. In their hugely influential work
Meeting at the Crossroads, Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan describe
adolescence as a "crossroads in women's lives" (Brown and Gilligan, 1992: 1).
In attempting to understand the lives of women, Brown and Gilligan follow
women's psychological development by studying girls in adolescence. They ask
what happens between childhood where girls have "strength, courage, and a
healthy resistance to losing voice and relationship" and where they "speak freely
of feeling angry, of fighting or open conflict in relationships", to adolescence and
adulthood where voice is silenced and conflict avoided (Brown and Gilligan,
1992: 3 & 4). This "relational crisis", where girls do not feel able to speak
authentically but silence their own thought and feelings in order to remain 'nice'
girls and to retain relationships with others, is seen as a central site of women's
oppression and as psychologically damaging. The findings from this study are
echoed in many others which report on girls: most present a catalogue of
psychological disasters including depression, addictions, suicide attempts, eating
disorders (Pipher, 1994). Girls are identified as "at risk" from pregnancy, low
paid jobs, unemployment, inadequate education, dropping out, health problems,
they suffer a loss of self-esteem, are more likely than boys to attempt suicide
(American Association of University Women, 1991; Orenstein, 1994), and girls
are dissatisfied with their bodies (Charles and Kerr, 1986; Tiggemann and
Pennington, 1990; Croghan and Wainwright, 1996). According to these writers,
something dramatic, something new, and something damaging, is happening to
girls in adolescence. It is these observations which have led feminists to re-focus
their attention on young women.
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One area in which there is renewed attention is that of sexual relationships.
Concerns about young women and sexuality are reflected both in the feminist
and non-feminist literature. I look first at the non-feminist literature.
In the mainstream literature concerns about young women's sexuality are
concentrated on socio-economic and moral issues. Of particular concern are
reports that the age of first intercourse is consistently declining (Zelnick and
Kanter, 1980; Hofferth and Hayes, 1987a; Zelnick et al., 1981). In an extensive
survey of sexual behaviour in Britain, Kaye Wellings et al. (1994) found that for
those respondents born between 1931 and 1935 the average age at first
intercourse was 21 while for those born later (between 1966 and 1971) it was 17.
In mainstream psychological research loss of virginity or sexual initiation is
characterised as a crucial moment in the development of a sexual career which
sets the path for future activities. In other words, if a young woman has first sex
at an early age it is assumed that this will be the start of a downward spiral to
promiscuity, early motherhood and/or abortion. Considerable effort is therefore
invested in attempting to identify the various factors which mediate the transition
between virginity and non-virginity (see Brooks-Gunn and Furstenburg, 1989 for
an overview of this literature). Some frequently cited antecedents of sexual
initiation include: biological explanations which claim that earlier age of
menarche results in earlier sexual initiation (Zelnick, Kanter and Ford, 1981); the
influence of the behaviour/attitudes/norms of peers (Daugherty and Burger,
1984; Furstenburg, Moore and Peterson, 1986; Newcomer, Gilbert and Udiy,
1980); family structure (especially the connection between mothers' sexual
experience/childbearing and their daughters', see for example Newcomer and
Udiy, 1983 & 1985); communication with parents (Jessor and Jessor, 1977);
parental control/supervision (de Gaston et a!., 1995; Miller et a!. 1986) and
religiosity (DeLamater, 1981). The aim is to build up a profile of those women
who are 'at risk' from early sexual initiation, pregnancy, child-bearing and
motherhood, so that these women can then be targeted for prevention programs.
Particular attention is paid to discovering ways of delaying first intercourse
through sex education programs.
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Health and social policy campaigns have focused on issues around encouraging
young women to say 'no' to sex, not as a way of empowering young women and
enabling young women to control sexual encounters, but a way of curbing and
controlling their sexuality and ensuring the reduction of levels of teenage
pregnancy, abortion and sexually transmitted diseases. Governments in both
Britain and North America are setting targets for reducing levels of teenage
pregnancy and abortion. In Britain The Health of the Nation report prioritises and
sets targets for health interventions including reducing the number of
pregnancies to mothers under 16 by 50% by the year 2000. One of the ways in
which both these countries aim to meet their targets is through sex education. In
North America the view that teenage pregnancy is best reduced by encouraging
the delay of sexual intercourse until adulthood has been increasing in popularity
after an explosion of interest in the 1980s and was encouraged by both the
Reagan and Bush administrations. Various campaigns aimed at encouraging
young people to 'Just Say No' have been instigated by right-wing and religious
groups. The Postponing Sexual Involvement family planning program, for
example was based on the assumption that "Young people need awareness and
skills to be able to resist pressure to become sexually involved. They need
support and practice in learning how to resist this pressure" and emphasises
understanding why young people are having sex and how they might avoid it
rather than on the consequences of sexual involvement (Howard and McCabe,
1990: 22). The 'Sex Respect' program developed by health educator Cohen
Kelly Mast with the aim of lowering the incidence of teenage sexual activity is
currently being used in 50 states in North America and in 23 other countries. It
aims to provide (according to their internet site) young people with ways to say
"no" to sex and to make young people "Realize that true sexual freedom includes
the freedom to say "no" to sex outside of marriage"
(http://www.lochrie.comlsexrespectldefault'html). Other programs include the
schools based initiative Teen-Aid and the church based initiatives include True
Love Waits. The overall concern of these programs is not with unwanted sex or
coercive sex, but with what they consider to be 'immoral sex'. In contrast to the
feminist 'No means No' campaigns, then, these sex education campaigns are
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primarily concerned with reducing teenage pregnancy (e.g. Howard and McCabe,
1990; Warzak and Page, 1990; Warzak, et a!., 1995) or unsafe sex (Rosenthal et
a!., 1991) than with eliminating sexual violence against women. Sex education
produced by pressure groups is aimed at encouraging girls to preserve their
virginity and practice pre-marital abstinence (e.g. Teen-Aid, Sex Respect, True
Love Waits). Rather than being concerned about women's control over their own
bodies and their sexual autonomy, both mainstream research and public
discourse reflect concerns about curbing and controlling women's sexuality.
By contrast, feminist concerns about young women's sexuality are centred
around issues of pleasure and danger. Feminists are alarmed by research which
shows that young women find little pleasure in their sexual relationships. Young
women report that first sex is often characterised by boredom, disappointment
and pain (Thompson, 1990), and is rarely viewed in positive terms (Holland et
a!., 1996):
He was veiy gentle with me. Very. He couldn't have been
more gentle and just the way he talked with me - aw. But
it felt like a knife going through me. It really hurt a lot.
The pain was like I couldn't take it (Thompson, 1990:
365).
[I 1 wasn't expecting it to hurt so much. It was like total
pain. Even after the first minutes of pain, it's still like
you're too sore to enjoy anything. I didn't expect that at
all. (15 year old girl, Coles and Stokes, 1985: 74).
Fewer than 40% of women in one study described their experience of first
intercourse as pleasurable (Weis, 1983), and many described it as painful (Weis,
1985; Thompson, 1990; Coles and Stokes, 1985). Many women express
ambivalence about becoming sexually active describing first intercourse as
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unplanned, unprepared for, and as something which 'just happens' (Kisker,
1985):
P: The first time, it was like totally out of the blue. You
don't ... say "Well, I'm going to his house, and he's
probably going to liy to get to bed with me, so I better
make sure I'm prepared." I mean, you don't know it's
coming, so how are you going to be prepared?
(Woman aged 16-17, Kisker, 1985: 84)
Women are more likely than men to report feeling sorry or ambivalent about first
sex (Ingham et al., 1991), and are more likely to report feeling guilty (Sprecher
et a!., 1995; Darling et al., 1990). Intercourse itself may be so fast that girls
"barely realize what is happening before it is over" and one girl says "It was just
like - psssst, one minute here, the next minute it was there" (Thompson, 1990:
344-5). Describing her first time as "horrible" one 15 year old girl explains that
"He was so excited by the fact that he could have sex with me that it was so
quick that it wasn't even anything" (Coles and Stokes 1985: 74-5).
Getting young women to talk about their sexual desires and pleasures is
notoriously difficult. The Janus Report on sexual behaviour found that, among
18-26 year olds, 68% of males, compared to 18% of females, reported always
having orgasms, while 44% of women and only 13% of men reported never
having orgasms (1993). Similarly, in their study of 496 British women aged 16 to
21, Janet Holland et al. found that it was "unusual for young women to discuss
sex in terms of their own pleasure, rather than men's sexual needs, or their
feelings for a man or a relationship" (1992: 666). One notable exception to this
trend is the pioneering work of Deborah Tolman (1991; 1994) who explores the
ways in which young women experience sexual desire as embodied. Her
findings, in stark contrast to those above, show how young women talk about
sexual desire. They describe sexual desire as when "my body says yes, yes, yes",
as "an overwhelming longing", or as a "wicked urge" (1994: 255). Increasing
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women's knowledge about their bodies, sexual responses and sexuality more
generally, has been identified by feminists as an important aspect of women's
sexual freedom (Jackson, 1980), Feminists stress the importance of providing
clear and explicit information about sex to teenage girls in order to ensure that
they retain control over their bodies, to enable them to develop an autonomous
sexuality which includes sexual pleasure, and to ensure protection against sexual
abuse and exploitation.
For the most part, however, feminists have been highly critical of the content of
much school based sex education and the (often heterosexist and/or ethnocentric)
image of 'legitimate' sexuality which it presents (see for example Espin, 1984;
Ward and Taylor, 1992). They have criticised the focus on the negative aspects
of sexuality in many sex education programs (i.e. unwanted pregnancy and
disease), and the paucity of information about the positive aspects of sexuality
(Thomson and Scott, 1991). Sex education teaches young women (and men) that
they must protect themselves from the social, emotional and physical risks
associated with sexual activity and young women themselves describe sex
education classes as teaching about "how to protect yourself from illness and
pregnancy" and about "helping us to avoid unpleasant things and danger" (Ward
and Taylor, 1992: 191). While male pleasure is taught within the context of
biology (i.e. 'wet dreams' as the onset of puberty, 'erection as the preface to
intercourse, and 'ejaculation' as the act of insemination) female pleasure and
agency is absent. This "sexual disenfranchisement of women" (cf. Thomson and
Scott, 1991) is reflected in the way that women's sexuality is discussed solely in
terms of reproduction e.g. diagrams of female genitalia frequently show the
vagina but not the clitoris. According to Michelle Fine (1988) sex education
perpetuates a 'missing discourse of desire' in young women's sexuality. Often
women are presented as "passive", as "potential victims of male sexuality" or at
best as reproductive vessels (Thomson and Scott, 1991: 41). Young women
themselves have also continuously and consistently criticised sex education
programs for focusing on the biological and reproductive aspects of sex at the
expense of information about the sexual relationships and how to handle the
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feelings, emotions and negotiations within them (Ward and Taylor, 1992; Allen,
1987). Paradoxically, despite the emphasis on the biological aspects of sex young
women report feeling frustrated by the lack of information about physical
practicalities of sex. As one young woman comments, "He [the teacher] didn't
say how you did it, not how you did it. How can I put it in? He didn't tell you
what it was about" (Thomson and Scott, 1991: 7). Another says she bad "no
information on like foreplay, what you do and what it feels like, if it hurts"
(Hirst, 1994: 42). In one study 82% of young women ages 16 to 21 described
their sex education as inadequate, with only 6% describing it as good (Thomson
and Scoff, 1991). Feminists criticise the 'Just Say No' educational messages
because they deny female sexual agency (Fine, 1988). Sharon Thompson
suggests that a feminist sex education program would include lessons about
exploring the body, masturbating, orgasms, desire, and so on, in order that girls'
sexual pleasures could be addressed. To adopt the 'Just Say No' approach, she
argues, "is to join conservatives in sabotaging the sense of sexual confidence
upon which the pleasure narratives - and effective contraception - depend"
(Thompson, 1990: 358). Clearly, then, feminists are concerned about young
women's access to sexual pleasure and their ability to develop autonomous
sexual identities.
Feminists are also concerned about young women's vulnerability to sexual
danger. Young women are the targets of many different forms of sexual violence
including: sexual harassment, courtship violence, stranger rape, date rape, and
other forms of unwanted sex. But, as Larkin and Popaleni (1994: 214) note: "The
issue of violence in the lives of adolescent girls has received little attention in the
vast feminist project of politicising male violence against women". This situation
is beginning to change, one area of sexual violence against young women which
feminists (and others) have explored is violence in schools. Empirical evidence
suggests that such violence is widespread with young women routinely being
subjected to many different forms of sexual harassment. "Secrets in Public:
Sexual Harassment in Our Schools" (a joint report produced by the Center for
Research on Women at Wellesley College and the NOW Legal Defense and
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Education Fund, Stein, Marshall and Tropp, 1993), found that 89% of the girls
they surveyed had received sexual comments, gestures and looks, and 83%
reported having been touched pinched or grabbed. The "sexual tyranny" of
schools is reflected in the pictures of erect penises which confront girls as the
enter the school gates, and the comments about their appearance which follow
them around the corridors (Jones, 1985). Girls are taunted with verbal insults
such as 'cunts', 'slag', 'pro', 'bitch' (Jones, 1985; Halson, 1989), are targeted for
jokes about their periods or bras and are often touched, felt or groped (Halson,
1989). Complaints about boys' behaviour are often ignored by male teachers who
imply that male students are "just having a laugh" (Mac An Ghail, 1994), and
these teachers may also be the perpetrators of such harassment (Halson, 1989).
Girls are given little support by schools who do not recognise sexual harassment
as a problem, and instead are left embarrassed, humiliated, horrified and
powerless. One aspect of this harassment which has received particular attention
is men's categorisation of women into 'slags' or 'drags'. In her groundbreaking
work in this area Sue Lees (1986 & 1993) demonstrated that the label 'slag' may
be allocated according to appearance (wearing too much make-up, having skirts
too high, or tops too low) or behaviour (hanging around waiting for boys, talking
to too many boys, or to the wrong boy). The label 'slag', as Lees points out,
appears to have little to do with actual sexual behaviour, but rather reputation is
very precarious and can be lost and won in minutes. The result is that women
must closely police their behaviour treading a fine line between being sexually
attractive without being a 'slag'. As Hudson and Ineichen (1991: 19) observe,
girls cannot "express desire for sex. If they do, they are labelled 'slags'. On the
other hand, if they do not respond favourably to male sexual pressure they are
ostracised - as 'frigid', 'tight' and other such adjectives". Concern about
reputation places constraints on women's ability to negotiate sexual pleasure and
safe sex (Holland et a!., 1990), and is used to justify/excuse rape and sexual
abuse - i.e. 'nice girls' don't get raped but 'slags' do (Burt, 1980; Scully and
Marolla, 1984). Reputation is, then, "a crucial mechanism of ensuring [girls']
subordination to boys" (Lees, 1993: 29).
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Young women also face sexual harassment and violence in their private lives, as
well as at school, and may be subject to abuse from their boyfriends or dates (I
do not address here issues around child sexual abuse although young women are
also subjected to this form of sexual violence). Since the publication of
Makepeace's (1981) germinal paper there has been a growth of interest in the
phenomena of 'courtship violence'. Courtship violence covers a wide range of
behaviours including: being pushed or shoved, slapped or scratched, punched or
kicked, hit with an object, choked, or cut with a knife (Laner and Thompson,
1982; Henton et al., 1983; Larkin and Popaleni, 1994). Although both men and
women can be the victims or perpetrators of courtship violence there is some
evidence to suggest that the majority of violence is aimed at young women
(Sugannan and Hotaling, 1991), moreover, some suggest that young men are hit
only when young women fight back in self-defence, and that young women are
more likely to be the victims of more serious physical and sexual abuse (Roscoe
and Callahan, 1985). Estimates of the prevalence of courtship violence range
from as low as 9% (Roscoe and Callahan, 1985) to as high as 60% (McKinney,
1986a). Young women may be unlikely to seek help in cases of courtship
violence either because they are trying to assert their independence (Levy, 1991),
or because they define the violence as normative (Sugarman and Hotslinger,
1991).
The vast majority of research conducted on issues around rape uses young people
(i.e. college students), but these studies rarely focus on the ways in which this
violence is specific to young adults. But, according to Mary Koss there are
"[s}cientific as well as pragmatic" reasons to study college students. Drawing on
statistics from the Bureau of Justice, she argues that college students are a high
risk group for rape because they "are in the same age range as the bulk of rape
victims and offenders (Koss, 1988: 4). The victimisation rate for females peaks
in the 16-19 year age group and the second highest is in the 20-24 age group.
Findings from other studies support her claims. The Ms. Survey found that one in
four women were the victims of rape or attempted rape, and that 38% of these
women were aged between 14 and 17 at the time of their attack. The majority of
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rape victims seen by rape crisis centres are between 16 and 24 (Sousa, 1991), and
according to Roden (1991: 267) "although adolescents account for less than ten
percent of the population they are the targets of an estimated twenty to fifty
percent of all rapes".
Adolescents also represent a substantial proportion of those perpetrating rapes,
one study estimated that around 20% of rapes are committed by adolescents
(Davis and Leitenberg, 1987). Twenty-five percent of the college males surveyed
by Kanin (1967) admitted physically forcing, or attempting to force, sexual
activities even when the woman responded by fighting or crying. In a series of
studies (Malamuth, 1981a; Malamuth and Check, 1980a; 1981a, 1983;
Malamuth, Haber and Feshbach, 1980) Neil Malamuth asked male college
students to indicate the likelihood that they personally would rape if they could
be assured that they would not be caught or punished. Across these studies an
average of about 35% of males indicated some likelihood of raping (Malamuth,
1984), although it was as high as 60% of males in one sample (Briere and
Malamuth, 1983).
Although some of these rapes are stranger rapes, a substantial proportion are
committed by men known to their victims - in other words, they are date rapes.
Date rape differs from stranger rape in several ways. First, the type of coercion
used is often different. Rapes by strangers use more verbal threats, physical
violence and weapons, rapes by dates involve more subtle forms of coercion
(Muehienhard and Schrag, 1991). The presence of physical coercion makes it
easier for women to define their experiences as abusive (Kelly, 1987). The most
common strategy used by date rapists was holding the victim down or twisting
her arm (Koss et al., 1988). While stranger rapes are characterised by verbal
threats, date rapes are characterised by verbal manipulation. In one study, for
example, 44% of date rapists admitted to telling the woman that if she didn't
have sex then it would change the way he felt about her, and 34% threatened to
end the relationship (Mosher and Anderson, 1986). Rappaport and Burkhart
(1984) found that over 50% of their male sample admitted to forcing sexual acts
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on their dates, and 25% of Koss and Oros' (1982) sample of college males
admitted to one or more forcible attempts at intercourse. Of those participants in
the Ms. Survey who were raped, 84% knew their attacker, and 57% of rapes
occurred while they were on a date (Warshaw, 1988), and rapes by acquaintances
account for 60% of all rapes reported to rape crisis centres (Sousa, 1991). These
figures are not just descriptive of college students, an early study by Kanin
(1957) revealed that 30% of his sample were the victims of attempted or
completed rape while on a high school date.
What makes the figures on date rape particularly startling is evidence which
suggests that date rape is one of the most under reported crimes (Jenkins and
Dambrot, 1987; Mynatt and Allgeier, 1990). Teenagers may be particularly
reluctant to tell family members about being raped because they want to protect
their family, because they believe that their family would not understand or
would disapprove of their lifestyle, because they wish to retain their
independence, because they feel psychologically distant from their family, or
because their family is not close by (Burgess and Holmstrom, 1979). Teenagers
may also feel embarrassed about disclosing details of the rape to others, or be
worried that aspects of their behaviour (i.e. drinking or 'losing' their virginity)
will be judged negatively (Finkelson and Oswatt, 1995). Perhaps one further
explanation for this under-reporting, is that many women who experience date
rape do not define their experience as rape. In the Ms. Survey (appropriately
entitled I Never Called /t Rape), only 27% of those women whose experiences
met the legal definition of rape defined themselves as rape victims, 42% never
told anyone about it and only 10% reported the incident to the police or to a rape
crisis centre (Warshaw, 1988). Twenty-seven percent of girls in one study said
that they engaged in unwanted sex because of psychological pressure from their
dates, they did not interpret this as rape but as part of 'what happens on dates'
(Miller and Marshall, 1987). Women's ability to see such experiences as rape
may be obscured by the fact that forced intercourse is often considered to be a
normal and acceptable part of heterosexual dating relationships. In one study,
56% of girls agreed that it is acceptable for a man to use force to obtain sex
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under certain circumstances (Miller, 1988). Over twenty percent of the 500 male
and female students (mean age 19) in Muehlenhard's (1988) study thought that it
was justifiable for a man to have sex with a woman against her will under certain
circumstances: i.e. if they went to his apartment rather than to a religious
function, if the woman rather than the man initiated the date, and if he paid the
dating expenses rather than if they split the expenses.
Many discussions of sexual violence against young women, then, suggest that
force and coercion are commonplace in heterosexual relationships (Clark and
Lewis, 1977; MacKinnon, 1982), and that this contributes to the difficulty of
'proving' rape in the legal system (Dworkin, 1983; MacKinnon, 1982). In
addition, although women find it easier to identify such experiences as coercive
when they involve physical violence (Kelly, 1987), often, as we have seen, men
use more subtle means of coercion and manipulation - particularly in date rape.
Moreover, according to Clark and Lewis (1977), men who do not use physical
force often consider themselves to be seducers rather than rapists. Some
feminists have found it useful to conceptualise sexual violence as a continuum
which ranges from choice, to pressure, to coercion and force (Kelly, 1987), or
from "mild insistence on giving way to intercourse, or to intercourse on his
terms, to physical assault and rape" (Holland et a!., 1992: 647-648). Such a
concept makes explicit the connections between rape and the routine patterns of
heterosexual relationships which have been at the forefront of radical feminist
critiques of heterosexuality. At one end of this continuum are women's
experiences of (what has been called) 'unwanted sex'. Unwanted sex is the term
used to refer to when "a reluctant partner is induced to acquiesce against her
(his) will by psychological pressure from the would-be lover, but without the use
of or the threat of force" (Lewin, 1985). Studies of unwanted sex suggest that it
is veiy common.. For example, forty-four percent of women in one study said that
they had "given in" to unwanted sexual activities other than intercourse (i.e.
fondling, kissing or petting) because they were "overwhelmed by a man's
continual arguments and pressure", and 25% admitted to having sexual
intercourse for the same reason (Koss, 1988). Over 50% of female university
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student volunteers in a study conducted by Mumen et al. (1989) wrote
descriptions of unwanted sexual experiences, over one third reported that their
coercer used persuasion, and persuasion was the most likely means of coercion
when an attempt at intercourse (rather than kissing or touching the woman) was
made. Thirty-six percent of female college students reported that pressure to
engage in sexual behaviour was a significant dating problem for them (Knox and
Wilson, 1983), and in a different study 22% of college students reported that
they had experienced unwanted intercourse at least once, and 88% had been
pressed to have unwanted intercourse but had refused. According to Kelly,
pressurised sex covers "situations in which women chose not to say 'no', but in
which they were not freely consenting" - 83% of her sample said that they had
experienced pressure to have sex (Kelly, 1988). Pressurised sex, according to Liz
Kelly, involves women weighing up the costs of refusing sex, but if they don't
say 'no' then they find it difficult to label it as rape.
I didn't say no, I didn't dare to ... you know you don't
want to, but you are still doing it. That's why in my eyes
now it's rape with consent. It's rape because it's
pressurized, but you do it because you don't feel you can
say no (quoted in Kelly, 1996: 200).
According to Nicola Gavey, sometimes women do not seem to have the language
to be able to say no to unwanted sex; as one of her participants said "it's partly
having the language to say no. Like, this sort of amorphous feeling of, 'Ooh, I'm
not sure about this', but not having the language to say it" (Gavey, 1992: 334). If
being raped involves non-consent, then women who do not signal their non-
consent by saying 'no' may not recognise their experience as rape. The difficulty
of saying 'no' can result in women being almost 'unrapeable' (cf. Gavey, 1992).
It is clear then that young women face a huge range of different forms of sexual
violence. Feminists have approached the issue of saying 'no' in relation to sexual
violence by highlighting the ways in which when women do say 'no' their
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refusals are ignored or over-ruled. Feminists have pointed out that one of the
most common strategies used by date rapists is simply to ignore a woman's
protests even when she repeatedly indicates her refusal by saying 'no' (Rapaport
and Burkhart, 1984; Muehienhard and Linton, 1987). According to Robin
Warshaw, author of the groundbreaking 1 Never Called it Rape, many men
"simply discount what a woman is saying or reinterpret it to fit what they want to
hear", such that "saying 'no' is often meaningless when spoken by a female"
(1988: 42). One of the ways in which rapists justify their behaviour is to argue
that when women say 'no' they really mean 'yes', and that the woman didn't
resist enough to convince them that she didn't 'really' want it (Scully and
Marolla, 1984). This is linked to the common rape myth that 'Any woman can
successfully resist a rapist if she really wants to' (Burt, 1980: 290). By focusing
on saying 'no' to sex, rather than explicitly on sexual violence or coercion, this
thesis makes an important contribution to the blurred borderlands between
coercive and 'ordinary' heterosexual sex.
Having established date rape and unwanted sex as a key area of feminist concern
I now move on to briefly outline three existing social scientific theories
(miscommunication theory, emotion work theory, and sexual script theory)
which are used to explain instances of date rape and unwanted sex. I highlight
these theories because they relate explicitly to issues around saying 'no'.
Misconimunication theory suggests that date rape occurs because women fail to
say 'no' clearly and effectively, or because men fail to understand when women
say 'no'. Emotion work theory suggests that young women fail to say 'no'
because they are too emotionally involved with their partner, and are either
afraid of losing him or are unwilling to hurt his feelings. Sexual script theory
suggests that women are expected to say 'no', while men are expected to try and
'persuade' women to have sex. Script theory argues that because everyone knows
about these roles, men ignore women's 'no's because they assume that women
don't 'really' mean it, but are saying 'no' simply because they are expected to.
These theories are examined in detail in chapters four, five and six, in relation to
their ability to explain the data collected as part of this thesis, for their utility to
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feminist researchers and for their epistemological status as essentialist or social
constructionist. For the moment, I will briefly introduce each of the three
theoretical approaches to date rape and unwanted sex.
1.3.1 Sexual Miscommunication
Miscommunication is one of psychology's most popular theories to explain why
women's sexual refusals are ineffective, and why men apparently do not 'hear'
women when they say 'no'. According to this theoiy, date rape is the result of
misunderstandings between men and women; women fail to say 'no' clearly and
effectively, and men fail to understand women's sexual communications. Studies
of miscommunication (or "misunderstandings" or "misperceptions" - these terms
are used interchangeably) around sex suggest that it is very common. A survey
conducted on nearly a thousand college undergraduates in the USA found that
two-thirds of them replied "yes" to the question "Have you ever been friendly to
someone of the opposite sex only to discover that she or he had misperceived
your friendliness as a sexual come-on; you were just trying to be nice but she or
he assumed you were sexually attracted to him or her?" (Abbey, 1991: 97).
Significantly more women than men reported having their friendliness
"misperceived" as sexual interest, and women were most likely to become aware
of this "misperception" because the male kissed or touched them. After having
been subject to "misperception" in this way, women were more likely than men
to feel upset, angry and embarrassed, while men (who were more likely than
women to learn of the "misperception" indirectly through a friend, rather than
directly from the other person), were more likely to feel flattered, happy and
amused (Abbey, 1991). Miscommunication theory argues that these
"misperceptions" occur, in part, because women are ineffective communicators.
Many studies suggest that women find it difficult to say 'no' to sexual activities.
Fifty-one percent of women in one study could describe instances of unwanted
sex when asked to describe any experiences of being "sexually involved with any
person against your will or when you wanted to say no but didn't or couldn't"
(Neal and Mangis, 1995: 174). Similarly, in another study Warzak et a!. (1995)
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found that sexually active women aged 13 -19 rated the following statement
among the top three situations most likely to lead to unwanted sex: "My first
sexual experiences occurred because I had difficulty saying no effectively". The
authors recommend that 'refusals skills training' may be useful for individuals
who report "difficulty saying "no" or have difficulty communicating decisions
about their preferences regarding sexual contact and contraceptive use" (p. 98).
Of the young women in their study 45% said they lacked effective refusal skills
and 77% expressed an interest in learning more, which indicates that young
women themselves are concerned about their ability to communicate their sexual
refusals. Despite the fact that 90% of women in one sample said they felt that
they had moderate to total control over dealing with unwanted intercourse, the
authors report that over one third of the women reported making no response to
an unwanted intercourse attempt and that the most commonly reported coping
response (72.2% of responses) was to accept or ignore what had happened
(Murnen et al., 1989). In other words women may be reluctant to communicate
their desire not to have sex. In addition, miscommunication theoiy argues that
men's poor comprehension skills are also partly to blame for date rape and
unwanted sex. Apparently, men see a more sexually orientated world than
women, and are more likely than women to interpret a range of different cues as
indicating sexual interest. It is men, then, as we have seen, that are more likely to
interpret friendliness as a sexual come-on. According to miscommunication
theorists males are more likely than females to rate both male and female actors
as higher in sexual desire (Abbey, 1982; Abbey et al., 1987; Abbey, 1991). If a
woman wears revealing clothes, men are more likely to see her as more sexual
(Abbey et al., 1987). While women see dressing or acting in certain ways as
unrelated to a desire for sexual intimacy, men are likely to interpret such
behaviours as a signal for them to make a sexual advance (Goodchilds et a!.,
1988; Goodehilds and Zeliman, 1984; Muehienhard, 1988). Abbey gives the
following example of a "misperception":
Consider an example of misperception involving a man
and a woman who meet at a party. She is wearing tight
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jeans and a low cut shirt. They both have several beers
and dance and laugh together. She agrees to let him walk
her home and come inside to talk. Later, when she resists
his sexual advances he gets angry, pushes her down, and
forces her to have sexual intercourse with him. In this
example, the male misperceived a series of cues
throughout the evening (e.g., the woman's clothing,
alcohol consumption, and willingness to be alone with
him). He felt justified forcing sex because he felt he had
been teased and led on (Abbey, 1991: 96-7)
Researchers draw on both biology and socialisation to explain sex differences in
the perception of sexual intent, and to explain why women are unable to
communicate effectively and why men are unable to understand a woman's
sexual refusals. I discuss these various explanations in more detail in chapter
four where I look at the implications of using miscommunication theory to
explain my own data on young women saying 'no' to sex.
1.3.2 Emotion Work
I use the term emotion work to encompass two different literatures on women's
sexual relationships which seek to explain why women acquiesce, rather than say
'no', to unwanted sex. The first emphasises women's emotional involvement in
sexual relationships, which is sometimes characterised as pathologically intense,
or at the very least as constraining their ability to say 'no' to sex. The second
(related) literature emphasises the ways in which women care about, and protect,
the emotions/feelings of their male partners. I discuss how both of these
literatures relate to young women refusing sex.
First then, women are commonly assumed to be more emotionally involved in
sexual relationships than men. One frequently reported finding is that men and
women engage in sexual relationships for different reasons: women have sex for
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love while men have sex for pleasure (e.g. Peplau, Rubin and Hill, 1977; Juhasz
and Sonnerstein-Schneider, 1987; Ingham, Woodcock and Stenner, 1991). One
major national study of young people conducted in the 1960s investigated the
sexual behaviour of young people concluded that "Girls prefer a permanent type
of relationship in their sexual behaviour. Boys seem to want the opposite; they
prefer diversity and so have more casual sexual partners [...] the boy seeks
adventure while the girl looks for security" (Schofield, 1965: 2). Young women
are often seen as emotionally needy and are depicted as using sex to fulfil these
emotional needs. Young women themselves often describe being 'in love' as the
main factor which influenced their decision to have sexual intercourse (Wellings
et a!., 1994), and some have argued that young women's sexual decision-making
is based on intimacy, affection and "the quality of caring in the relationship"
(Bollerud et al., 1990: 277). Although some feminists have questioned whether
the primacy of love expressed by young women reflects their 'true' feelings or
merely socially sanctioned views (e.g. Wilson, 1978; Lees, 1993; Thompson,
1984), researchers argue that strength of feeling and a commitment to
relationship may influence their decision to engage in unwanted sex. Much of the
mainstream literature problematises women's emotional involvement with the
men with whom they are having sex. In one study, one of the top three situations
which young women reported most likely to lead to unwanted sexual activity was
"I felt that I had to have unwanted sexual activity with my partner because I love
him" (Warzak et al., 1995: 99). Another study suggested that "a woman's
emotional involvement with her date may in essence increase her sexual
exploitability", high levels of investment in a relationship may, the authors
suggest, make women more willing to give in to sexual pressure in order to
maintain the relationship (Quinn eta!., 1991: 27). According to one sex educator
interviewed by Holly (1989: 21) refusing sex can be "a problem for someone
who has grown up without love" and she adds "Quite a few girls are in that
position".
Second, and in addition to their own emotional involvement, women are also
assumed to be concerned about hurting men's emotions as an adjunct to their
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caring role more generally. In sexual situations this leads to reluctance to refuse
sex to a male partner who may be hurt by this rejection. Popular writing for
young people reflects this apparent difficulty; Your Pocket Guide to Sex
(originally for a Health Education Authority but was then banned by the
government and labelled as smutty in the media) says "A lot of time people don't
say no to sex because they feel guilty. There's often a sense that because you've
given the other person encouragement up to a point, then it's your duty to follow
through [..,] It can be hard to say no to a regular partner because you're
frightened of hurting them" (Fisher, 1994: 72-3). Teen magazines also address
this issue, in one article on how to 'say no to sex' the magazine identified five
coercive 'lines' used by boys including 'You would if you really cared about me'
and 'I love you and I just want to show you how much' (Sugar, 1996: 59).
Feminists have argued that one reason women feel pressured to engage in
unwanted sex in the absence of any physical force or threats is because they are
expected to be 'sexual servicers' to men, and are expected to be sexually
available to their partners (Hamblin, 1983). Women apparently feel unable to
prioritise their own feelings and experiences and have difficulty saying 'no' to
sex which they themselves do not desire (Kelly, 1996). Some have described this
as 'altruistic sex', where women do not say 'no' because they feel guilty or feel
sorry for the man (Bart, 1983). According to one author, women "clearly felt that
they 'owed' sex to their partners regardless of their own feelings" (Kelly, 1987:
55). In a study of college students, Kathleen Cairns (1993: 205) found that
consent was "constrained by their perceived duty to be co-operative" and by the
feeling that they were expected to provide sex in order to maintain the
relationship. Miriam Lewin (1985) described the results of her study, in which
75% of her sample considered it very likely that women's reaction to refusing a
sexual relationship would be concern that she has hurt the man, as evidence of
the 'stroking norm' - where women have been brought up to put men's needs
ahead of theit own. Here women's apparent inability to refuse unwanted sex is
linked to their connection of sex, love and intimacy - women are unable to refuse
sex, because the rejection will hurt the men they wish to protect, or out of some
sense of commitment. Kelly (1996) links women's sense of obligatory sex to
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models of sexuality in which male sexual needs are given the status of drives or
biological urges (see for example Wendy Holiway's description of the 'male sex
drive discourse', 1984), and where women internalise a sense of responsibility
for men's sexual pleasure. Women report engaging in unwanted sex because they
had 'led him on' to the point where they felt obliged to continue (Holland et a!.,
1992), because they felt that they would 'let him down' if they didn't continue
(Lewin, 1985), because they didn't want to cause a scene (Mite, 1976), or
because they might appear 'silly' if they didn't (Gavey, 1992).
In sum, women are described as experiencing a form of "paralysis of the will" in
which "feelings of obligation, service provision, fear of negative repercussions
for refusal, and guilt over having possibly given conflicting messages to the
partner" combine to make saying 'no' extremely difficult (Cairns, 1993: 205). I
refer to this as 'emotion work' and in chapter five I link the research outlined
above to sociological research on emotion work when I consider the utility of
this theory for understanding my own data on young women's sexual refusals.
1.3.3 Sexual Scripts
Psychologists have also drawn on the theory of sexual scripts to explain the
prevalence of rape. Sexual scripts are generally described as culturally defined
patterns of behaviour which prescribe what counts as sex and what people 'do'
sexually. These scripts are heavily gendered, men and women are expected to
behave very differently in sexual situations. This has frequently been referred to
as the 'sexual double standard' (Reiss, 1960, 1967; Delamater and
McCorquodale, 1979; Coles and Stokes, 1985; McCabe and Collins, 1990; Janus
and Janus, 1993). Research has consistently shown that men are expected to
initiate sexual activities, and that women are expected to restrict or refuse sexual
activities: people attribute strategies for having sex to men, and strategies for
avoiding sex to women (McCormick 1979), and men also report that they
themselves are more likely to use strategies to have sex, while women report
using strategies to avoid sex (LaPlante, McCormick and Brannigan, 1980). Men
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also initiate sex more often than women (O'Sullivan and Byers, 1992). Women
also report feeling more comfortable about refusing sex than do men, and less
comfortable about initiating sex (Grauholtz and Serpe, 1985), and men report
being more willing to engage in initiating behaviours than women (Green and
Sandos, 1983). In short the sexual script "dictates that men use any available
strategy to have sexual intercourse and women use any available strategy to
avoid intercourse" (LaPlante, McCormick and Brannigan, 1980: 350). According
to sexual script theory, then, men are expected to initiate or say 'yes' to sexual
activity while women are expected to restrict or say 'no' to sexual activity. As
Zimmerman et al. (1995: 395) succinctly state "saying no is more likely to be
part of the female sexual script than the male sexual script".
Some have argued that this socialisation of men and women into different sexual
roles provides the context for rape. In one of the earliest papers to advance this
argument feminist Stevi Jackson argued that "the same sexual scripts which
govern 'normal' sexual behaviour also provide a potential vocabulary for the
rapist" (1978/1995: 18). In her groundbreaking paper The Social Context of
Rape: Sexual Scripts and Motivation, Jackson asked not why some men rape, but
how conventional sexuality was defined in such a way as to create the potential
for rape. She argued that conventional sexual scripts are highly gendered, and
mirror the scripts for conventional masculinity and femininity in which, for
example, boys are encouraged to be independent, and to actively seek success
through their own achievements, while girls are encouraged to be dependent and
seek success by passively pleasing others. The aggressive aspects of masculinity
and the passive aspects of femininity become incorporated into the sexual
scripts:
The man becomes the seducer, the woman the seduced,
he the hunter, she the prey. It is he who is expected to
initiate sexual encounters and to determine the direction
in which they develop; her part is merely to acquiesce or
refuse. (Jackson, 1978; reprinted 1995: 19)
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Power, aggression, and sexuality as conquest, creates the potential for rape,
without this association, argues Jackson, rape would not be possible. At the time
Jackson was writing this paper it was commonly assumed, both within the
psychological literature and beyond it, that rapists are different to ordinary men:
they are unusual, beastly, evil or suffering from some kind of mental instability.
The majority of psychological research was directed towards identifying the
particular characteristics which differentiated rapists from ordinary men and this
remains a prevalent theme in contemporary psychological research - see, for
example, research which aims to identify the different personality characteristics
(Mahoney et a!., 1986; Mosher, 1991), arousal patterns (Quinsey, Chaplin and
Uphold, 1984; Malamuth, 1986), or communication styles (see previous section
on misconimunication theory and chapter four) which differentiate rapists and
'ordinary' men. Script theory offers feminists a different way of theorising rape:
rape is not seen as committed by a brutal madmen or monsters but by ordinary
men, rape is not extra-ordinary but is rather an extension of 'normal'
heterosexual behaviour (see Kelly, 1987; Stanko, 1985; Cameron and Frazer,
1987). This research also introduced the idea of a 'rape supportive' culture (cf.
Russell, 1982) and the idea that the social context within which rape takes place
is more important that looking at the attributes of individual rapists. Jackson
argues that not only did traditional sexual scripts provide the context for rape but
also the 'techniques of neutralisation' available to the rapist to excuse or justify
his actions. Rapists deny responsibility for their actions, according to Jackson, by
calling upon conventional notions about sexuality: including, for example, the
popular misconception that women are not easily aroused and need their desire
to be awakened by an ardent male. It is assumed, she argued, that "women need
some degree of persuasion before they will engage in sexual activity, but that
once their inhibitions have been overcome or their sense of propriety
demonstrated, they will respond" (Jackson, 1978/1995: 20). This is a popular
notion among convicted rapists who deny that they have raped, and among those
who admit to raping but indicate that they thought, at the time, that the woman
was willing (Scully and Marolla, 1984). Over one third of convicted rapists in
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one study who denied that they had raped described their victim as resisting or as
having said 'no' but justified their behaviour by arguing that the victims either
did not resist enough or that her 'no' had really meant 'yes'. As one rapist
explained:
A man's body is like a coke bottle, shake it up, put your
thumb over the opening and feel the tension. When you
take a woman out, woo her, then she says "no, I'm a nice
girl," you have to use force. All men do this. She said
"no" but it was a societal no, she wanted to be coaxed.
All women say "no" when they mean "yes" but it's a
societal no, so they won't have to feel responsible later
(Scully and Marolla, 1984: 535).
The idea that women don't really mean it when they say 'no', or that deep down
they enjoy it when they are raped, are central rape myths which feminists have
identified and investigated (Burt, 1980). Rape, then, is seen as an extension of
the 'normal' heterosexual roles for sexual activity, and explains why women's
'no's may be ignored. Men "are taught to take the initiative and to persist in
attempts at sexual intimacy even when a woman indicates verbally that she is
unwilling to have sex...." (Check & Malamuth, 1983: 344). According to
Charlene Muehlenhard (1988a: 97), who writes widely on this topic, the sexual
script dictated by the sexual double standard means that:
when a man makes a sexual advance and the woman
refuses he can ignore her refusal, assuming it is merely
token. In fact, according to this script, not only can he
ignore her refusal, he should ignore her refusal, because a
mati who stops when a woman says no is not sufficiently
masculine.
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Script theory, then, provides yet another way of explaining date rape and
unwanted sex, which makes explicit claims about women saying 'no'. In chapter
six I explore how script theory could be used to explain my own data on young
women saying 'no' to sex. By exploring these three theories from the position of
a feminist psychologist I hope to contribute both to the social scientific literature
on sexual negotiation and specifically to feminist theorising around sexual
negotiation.
1.4 Summary and Conclusions
This thesis, then, addresses a number of key feminist concerns. By focusing
exclusively on the psychology of young women I bring women's concerns to the
forefront of a discipline which repeatedly fails to address women's lives. In so
doing I treat what young women have to say about their own lives as valid,
interesting and worthy of considered attention in its own right; that is to say not
only (as is often the case in psychology), as an interesting point of comparison to
the lives of young men. In addition, this thesis strengthens feminist attempts to
restructure psychology at both the epistemological and methodological level. In
particular I explore the costs and benefits for feminist researchers of adopting an
essentialist or social constructionist approach to data analysis. Finally, this thesis
makes an important contribution to feminist debates around sexual negotiation
and sexual coercion, and by focusing explicitly on sexual refusals I bring issues
around saying 'no' (which have often implicitly been addressed in feminist
research) sharply into focus. In short, this thesis makes a positive contribution to
the development of feminist psychology.
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Chapter Two: Focus Groups: A Feminist Method
In this chapter I outline the methodological approach to data collection and analysis
used in this thesis. In order to explore women's talk about saying 'no' to sex I use
focus groups as my tool of data collection. Although feminists have carefully
scrutinised research methods and have been pivotal in the development of new and
innovative methods and research practices (see section 2.1. where I review this
literature), they have paid little attention to the use of focus groups. This is not to say
that feminists do not use focus groups, but rather that on those few occasion when
they used, their potential as a feminist method is often unexplored or
unacknowledged. In this chapter I consider how aspects of the pre-existing literature
on both feminist methodology and on focus group research reveal some interesting
parallels which raise questions about whether, and in what ways, focus groups can
be useful for feminists. In addition, I outline the specific ways in which the focus
group methodology has been implemented in this particular piece of reseaich (see
section 2.5), and the particular analytical approach adopted (see section 2.6).
2.1 Feminist Methodology
Feminist concern about psychology's methods initially derived from anger about the
'truths' which psychology claimed to have 'discovered' about women, and from the
frustration experienced by feminists tlying to use traditional methods to study
women's lives. Feminists began to explore new (mainly qualitative) methods in the
hope that this research would be better able to account for women's lives. In the
early 1980s, debates about feminist methodology centred around the relative value
of quantitative versus qualitative methods, and around whether or not there was a
feminist method (unstructured or semi-structured interviewing was the favoured
candidate for this position). Feminists then began to focus more clearly on the ethics
and politics of conducting research and of implementing research methods, giving
greater consideration to issues of power and representation. I reflect this chronology
in the followiiig review of the literature on feminist methodology by looking first at
debates around qualitative and quantitative methods, and second at the ethics and
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politics of research. I finish by reviewing feminist theorising on the process of
interpretation and analysis as this is a central theme of this thesis and is one to which
I shall return both throughout this chapter and also throughout the remaining
chapters. In reviewing this literature I have tried wherever possible to draw on
psychological research to illustrate important points but, given the particularly
conservative nature of psychology (in comparison to other disciplines such as
sociology), and the multi-disciplinary nature of feminism, I have had to incorporate
innovations made within other social scientific disciplines in order better to discuss
the range and variety of feminist methods.
2.1.1 Feminist Method(s)?
Psychology has been (and continues to be) dominated by the use of quantitative
methods. Experiments, surveys, and questionnaires are the primary tools by which
psychologists have 'discovered' what they call the 'truth' about women. Feminists
have angrily contested these 'truths' and have challenged the pathologisation,
degradation and oppression of women which these 'truths' often perpetuate. Within
the 'psychology of women', the critique of psychology's methods has, in the main,
been rather limited, and has been designed to 'patch up' rather than revolutionise
methods. Those working within the positivist empiricist tradition (see section
1.2.4i), which dominates the 'psychology of women' and psychology generally, have
been content merely to identify and correct the biases in traditional scientific
practices. Feminists have generated numerous critiques of sample selection, control
groups, and the interpretation of results, in order that experimental and other
quantitative methods can be more carefully applied. Such an approach is reflected in
the development of guidelines for non-sexist research which advise researchers how
to avoid the pitfalls of quantitative research (e.g. Denmark et a!., 1988). Other
researchers have provided more radical critiques of quantitative methods, arguing
that quantitative methods are by their very nature designed to distort women's
experiences. They point out that quantitative methods, by definition, rely on the
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quantification of experiences, and that this can lead to a narrow or misleading focus
in the research. Research on battering women exemplifies this problem as it often
includes only those variables (such as physical violence) which are most easily
quantified, at the expense of others (such as verbal or emotional abuse) which may
be more important for explaining battering but which are more difficult to count and
categorise. Feminists have been critical of pre-defined, pre-coded questionnaires
because they incorporate only those factors which the researcher (usually male)
defines as important, and fail to capture the full range of women's experiences
(Graham, 1983; 1984): Quantitative methods can measure only those variables
identified as relevant by the researcher at the beginning of the study. Bart (1971) for
example, criticised the narrow view of sex roles in sexual behaviour contained in
one questionnaire. Respondents' roles in sexual intercourse were categorised as
"passive", "responsive", "resistant", "aggressive", "deviant" or "other". Squeezing
women's experiences into such narrow and biased categories may seriously
misrepresent their experiences. As Bart suggests, quite different results may have
been obtained if the categories had read "active", "encouraging", "playful" or
"creative". When Susan Condor (1986: 101), as part of a pilot study, asked women
to "talk through" some standard psychometric tests on sex roles, she found that they
had difficulty answering the questions and sometimes became "aggressive" and
infuriated because the questions were "unanswerable". Ultimately Condor opted for
a qualitative technique in order to understand women's sex role beliefs "in their own
terms" (p. 103). Rather than being investigative and exploratory quantitative
methods serve to maintain the status quo by leaving no room for the unexpected.
The narrow focus which characterises quantitative methods has also been criticised
for removing women's experience from the social context in which it is meaningful.
Experimental research, in particular, has been criticised for 'context-stripping'
which Mary Parlee (1979: 131) describes as the process by which "concepts,
environments; social interactions are all simplified by methods which lift them out
of their contexts, stripping them of the very complexity that characterises them in
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the real world". Experiments have the capacity to "strip natural settings of richness
by controlling extraneous variables [...] or by restricting responses to pre-set
categories" (Peplau and Conrad, 1989: 388). Moreover experiments involve
artificial environments in which to study 'natural' behaviour (Sherif, 1979; Waliston
and Grady, 1985). Quantitative methods, then, are accused of distorting, fracturing,
or misrepresenting women's experiences by pigeon-holing them into man-made,
pre-defined, categories. Although some feminists suggested abandoning experiments
and quantitative methods in favour of more qualitative and descriptive measures
(Graham and Rawlings, 1980; Mies, 1983), in psychology at least (but less so in
sociology), quantitative methods have never seriously come under threat and
continue, particularly in North America, to provide the bedrock for research on the
'psychology of women'.
By contrast, and as a direct consequence of this disillusionment with quantitative
methods, excitement about qualitative methods has grown. Feminists have, over the
last two decades, begun to explore the potential of qualitative methods for meeting
their concerns about the distortion and fragmentation of women's experiences.
Rather than seeking to test pre-defined hypotheses, qualitative methods are valued
for allowing the generation of new ideas. The aim of this more open-ended approach
is to understand the social world 'through the eyes' of the participant. Rather than
imposing meanings and categories on to participants, it is hoped that participants
will set their own agendas for research and focus on those things which Ih
consider important. According to Fine (1985) one defining criterion of feminist
research is that researchers should focus on topics of importance to women
themselves. The flexibility of qualitative approaches makes this participant agenda-
setting possible. Chris Griffin (1986), for example, noted how the importance of
leisure in young women's lives, a topic which she had not originally anticipated,
became apparent only after she had conducted unstructured interviews. Feminist
researchers w1come qualitative methods which, unlike quantitative methods which
abstract and compartmentalise, are said to allow researchers to "say something
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meaningful" about women's lives (Scott, 1985: 69), and are seen as better able to
capture the complex and contradictory nature of people's lives (Griffin, 1986).
Qualitative methods are said to ideally suit feminist research needs because they
give voice to women's experiences. According to Du Bois (1983: 108, emphasis in
original), "to address women's lives and experience in their own terms, to create
theory in the actual experience and language of women" is central to a feminist
research agenda. Qualitative methods seem ideally suited to meet such an agenda.
Giving women the opportunity to talk about their experiences "in their own words"
is "an antidote to centuries of ignoring women's ideas altogether or having men
speak for women" (Reinharz, 1992: 19). Consequently, sociologist Ann Oakley
describes qualitative interviewing as a "strategy for documenting women's own
accounts of their lives" and "a tool for making possible the articulation and recorded
commentary of women on the very personal business of being female in a
patriarchal society" (1981: 48-9). Many feminist psychologists emphasise the value
of allowing women to 'speak for themselves' when justifying their choice of
qualitative methods (e.g. Sen and Daniluk, 1995; Belenky et al., 1986). These
factors (participant agenda setting and women speaking for themselves) led some to
conclude in the early 19 80s that the semi-structured interview was feminist
method (Bowles and Duelli Klein, 1983; Graham, 1983; Reinharz, 1983).
Other feminists have consistently denied that some methods are inherently more
feminist than others (Peplau and Conrad, 1989), and have continued to reassert the
value of quantitative methods (Jayaratne, 1983; Kelly, et al., 1992a; Unger, 1996).
Indeed, feminists continue to explore and develop a range of new and alternative
methods for social research, including: repertory grids (Wilkinson, 1986; Baker,
1989); Q-methodology (Semi, 1996; Kitzinger, 1986); memory work (Kippax et al,
1988; Crawford et al., 1992; Haug; 1992; Stephenson et a!., 1996); the voice-centred
relational method (Brown and Gilligan, 1992; Taylor et al., 1995; Taylor et a!.,
1996; Taylor, 1996); narrative analysis (Espin, 1996); and discourse analysis
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(Marshall and Wetherell, 1989; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1995). Others continue to
investigate the possibility of using more conventional experiments, test/scales and
questionnaires in feminist ways (e.g. Hyde, 1981; Eagly and Wood, 1991; Shaw-
Barnes and Eagly, 1996; Shields and Crowley, 1996). In general, however, feminist
concern with method has moved away from attempting to distinguish a particular
method as feminist, and towards exploring in more detail the ways in which research
methods are implemented including, in particular, the exercise of power in the
research relationship. It is this aspect of feminist methods to which I now turn my
attention.
2.1.2 The Ethics and Politics of Research
Perhaps feminism's greatest contribution to the critique of traditional research
methods has been to reveal and make visible operations of power between the
researcher and the researched. Traditional positivist research, with its reliance on
quantitative methods, emphasises the importance of emotional detachment and
objectivity in relation to research participants. The relationship between the
researcher and researched adopted in this approach is characterised as a
"nonegalitarian hierarchy of power, with the all powerful, all knowing researcher
instructing, observing, recording, and sometimes deceiving the subjects" (Peplau
and Conrad, 1989: 386). In a wry tone, Corinne Squire describes the 'ideal
psychologist' as "an active investigator, controlling the experimental environment,
making specific interventions in it, and quantif'ing their effects" (1989: 44). The
traditional model of research requires the researcher to enter the research situation
with aims and questions to be answered, and, caring little for the feelings and
questions of the participants, and to leave after having quickly and cleanly extracted
the answers. Feminists have explored ways of reconceptuaiising the relationship
between the researcher and the researched in ways which are less exploitative and
which redress imbalances of power.
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One approach has been to bring the researcher and her respondents closer together.
In her classic and groundbreaking early paper on 'Interiiewing Women' Anne
Oakley (1981) condemned the advice of methodology textbooks to parry
participants' questions or requests with bald replies as antithetical to feminism and
argued instead for an ethics of involvement. The strength of Oakley's paper was to
demonstrate both the ethical inappropriateness and the practical implausibility of
this kind of rebuff when faced (as she was) with the anxious questions of distressed
pregnant women. During her research on the transition to motherhood Oakley
reports that she was asked over 800 questions, many of which were requests for
information or advice such as 'Is it right that the baby doesn't come out of the same
hole you pass water out of?', 'Who will deliver my baby?' or 'How do you cook an
egg for a baby?'. Oakley argued that faced with apprehensive women who were
often reticent about questioning medical staff (and frequently received
unsatisfactory answers when they did) it is morally indefensible to do other than
answer questions "as honestly and fully" as possible (p. 43). Oakley questioned
whether it is appropriate to exploit research participants by regarding them solely as
sources of data. She proposed an alternative model based on the idea of 'no intimacy
without reciprocity' (p. 49). In other words, the researcher should answer
respondents, questions, share knowledge and experience, give support and otherwise
invest herself in relationships with her respondents such that a "transition to
friendship" may be possible (p. 44). Indeed, as strong support of the possibility of
genuine reciprocity between participants and the researcher Oakley remarked upon
remaining friends with some of the women she interviewed for some time after the
study had ended. However, the rather rosy picture of feminist qualitative research
painted by Oakley was challenged in well cited papers by Janet Finch (1984) and
later by Judith Stacey (1988). Finch argued that friendship between the researcher
and research participants may have a greater potential for exploitation. The fact that
women find it "great to have someone to talk to" should not necessarily be taken as
a sign of camaraderie or as a justification for asking probing questions about
women's lives. According to Finch, developing friendship and intimacy with women
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participants may represent a more effective way for researchers to further exploit
women as research resources. Reflecting on her own unease at the willingness of
women to share intimate details of their lives, Finch says:
I have emerged from interviews with the feeling that my
interviewees need to know how to protect themselves from
people like me (Finch, 1984: 80).
Some have suggested that it is the most vulnerable women, deprived of other social
contact, who may be the most willing to speak to researchers (e.g. Ribbens, 1989;
Cotterill, 1992). The blurring of the boundaries between researcher and friend
suggested by a 'transition to friendship' may serve only to obscure, rather than to
alleviate, the relationship of power and powerlessness between the researcher and
her respondents.
Others have questioned whether it is really possible to generate 'genuine'
relationships with research participants by 'investing ourselves' in the research. Jane
Ribbens (1989), for example, points out that many of the questions Oakley's
respondents asked were requests for information which did not require the
disclosure of the kinds of personal or intimate details which would parallel the
information which her participants were asked to reveal. When researchers are asked
'difficult' questions they are not always happy to honestly and openly share their
views. For example, although happy to share details about her own experiences,
Pamela Cotterill (1992: 603) reports feeling "uncomfortable" and "especially
vulnerable" when asked to make judgements about participants (in this case about
their status as in-laws) based on their responses during the interview. In addition,
some researchers have pointed out that their attempts to develop more intimate
relationships with participants and to include themselves in the research have not
always been welcomed by participants (Ribbens, 1989).
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Another way in which feminists have attempted to minimise the social distance
between the researcher and the researched by including researchers in the research
process has been to encourage what has become known as insider research.
Although feminists recognise that researchers always have the potential to exploit
participants, according to Patai (1991: 137), "this danger is increased when the
researcher is interviewing 'down', that is, among groups less powerful
(economically, politically, socially) than the researcher herself' (Patai, 1991: 137).
Initially, this was seen as a problem only when men were interviewing women.
Reinharz claims that "[f]or a woman to be understood in a social research project, it
may be necessary for her to be interviewed by a woman" (1992: 23). Early feminist
articles claimed that when a woman interviews women she is, by definition, 'inside'
the culture she investigates (Oakley, 1981). Feminists challenge the idea that
researchers can best represent the experiences of others when objectively reporting
on events in which s/he has no special interest, no particular axe to grind, and no
personal stake in the research outcome. By contrast feminists have emphasised the
importance of being personally involved in research, and of using personal
experience to direct or stimulate research questions (Stanley and Wise, 1983).
Feminists routinely research topics of which they have personal experience
including: adopted women's experience of childbirth (Hampton, 1997); therapy
(Kitzinger and Perkins, 1993); women's experience of being clergy wives (Finch,
1984); mothering sons (Rowland and Thomas, 1996), heterosexuality (see
contributions to a special feature in Feminism & Psychology, 1994), and class
(Ferreira De Macedo, 1996; Reay, 1996; Palmer, 1996). These researchers often
reflect on the value of this insider position for encouraging women to speak about
difficult issues, while being sympathetic and bringing a special kind of
understanding to the research. As Anne Woollett, reflecting on research with
infertile women conducted with Pifefer, comments:
Our own position as infertile women was a common link
with the women we interviewed: many welcomed the
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opportunity to talk to other women who shared what we all
considered to be a difficult position. As 'insiders', who had
experienced some of the feelings and experiences our
participants reported, we felt able to write about women's
distress and anger at 'not being heard', and about the ways in
which women's feelings were ignored or used against them
[...J We also felt able to write about women's sense of
isolation when the people they usually counted on for
support could not deal with the strong feelings generated by
infertility (Woollett, 1996: 68)
There was a tendency in early writing on feminist research to engage in a
"celebration of shared experience" (cf. Bola, 1996) assuming that women were
united in common experiences of oppression simply by being women. Those who
are oppressed because of their 'race', class, sexual identity, disability or age have
challenged this unitary notion of 'woman'. In a recently published thought
provoking collection of writing on 'Representing the Other' (Wilkinson and
Kitzinger, 1996) the feminist researchers reflect on the ethics and politics of
conducting research with women who are unlike themselves. This includes
examining the implications of white women representing black women (Edwards,
Russell), of young women representing old women (Titley and Chasey), of older
women representing young women (Harris), and of able-bodied women representing
disabled women (Marks). And, lest we get too complacent about researching only
those like ourselves, Tracey Hurd and Alice McIntyre warn against the 'seduction of
sameness'. Clearly then, feminists continue to struggle with issues of power related
to the idea of insider research and this is something I will return to when I reflect
upon my own research in chapter seven.
In addition to attempting to reduce the distance between the researcher and the
researched by bringing the researcher closer to the researched (i.e. by building
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reciprocal relationships or by conducting insider research), feminist researchers have
also considered the parallel strategy of bringing participants closer to the research.
In other words, feminist researchers attempt to include the participants in all (or as
many as possible) levels of the research; from the choice of topic to the
interpretation and analysis of data. One of the most common techniques is to 'give
back' transcripts or analyses to participants in order to receive further comments
(e.g. Acker et a!., 1983; Ribbens, 1989; Kissling, 1996). For example Liz Kelly
(1988) asked women to talk about what it was like to participate in her study on
sexual violence, and to give their reactions to transcripts of their conversations, a
process which enabled a discussion of the themes, interpretations and analysis which
she was developing. Another approach is for participants to become co-researchers
and study themselves, for example Patti Lather describes a project sponsored by the
Women's Economic Development Project where low-income women were trained
to research their own economic circumstances, and a study which she herself
conducted in which students interviewed each other about their experiences of an
introductory Women's Studies course (Lather, 1988). Not all attempts to include
participants in the research have been successful as Beverly Skeggs discovered:
I did try to make the research accountable to the young
women by giving them chapters and articles to read. 'Can't
understand a bloody word it says' was the most common
response. They were especially upset by pseudonyms,
wanting to see their names with their comments in print
(Skeggs, 1994: 86).
According to Opie (1992: 62) the purpose of this practice is to "realign the balance
of power in the research relationship by minimising appropriation through a
deliberate attempt to avoid misrepresentation and stereotype". However, researchers
have encountered considerable difficulties when faced with respondents who
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disagree with their interpretations, or disagree with each other about what the
correct interpretation should be.
2.1.3 Interpretation and Analysis
Many researchers suggest that although feminists can make some attempt to conduct
non-hierarchical relationships during the research, once the process of data
collection is over, it is at the point of analysis and interpretation that the researcher
is most powerful and the potential for exploitation is at its greatest:
when the researcher leaves the field and begins to work on
the final account, the responsibility for how the data is
analysed and interpreted is entirely her own (Cotterill, 1992:
604).
Even with qualitative research the analysis is usually
unilateral and the researcher is placed in the powerful
position of translator or presenter of other women's lives,
searching for quotable quotes to aid the development of an
argument (Scott, 1985: 80).
It is also true that the telling of a story can be empowering,
validating the importance of the speaker's life experience
On the other hand, narrators typically are not true partners in
the process. Whatever control they exercise during the
interview, when they are able to negotiate the terrain, usually
ends once the session is completed. This shift of control over
the narrative reveals the potential for the appropriation
hiding under the comforting rationale of empowerment
(Gluck and Patai, 1991: 2).
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The issue of interpretation is central to feminist theorising about methodology. The
idea that mainstream research has distorted and misrepresented women's
experiences has been a central strand of feminist critiques of psychology. Feminists
assert that women are experts on their own lives and that feminist researchers should
validate women's reality. Problems with validating women's reality arise when
women's interpretations of their experiences and feminist interpretations of those
same experiences are different. The women we research rarely identify as feminist,
and while 'they' may disagree with the interpretations 'we' produce, 'we' may also
profoundly disagree with the things that they say. As Katherine Borland (1991: 64)
puts it:
For feminists, the issue of interpretative authority is
particularly problematic, for our work often involves a
contradiction. On the one hand we seek to empower the
women we work with by revaluing their perspectives, their
lives ... [ojn the other, we hold an explicitly political vision
of the structural conditions that lead to particular behaviours,
a vision that our field collaborators, many of whom do not
consider themselves feminists, may not recognise as valid.
To sunirnarise, then, feminists have challenged the prominence of quantitative
methods, and explored the ways in which qualitative methods might be better suited
to meet the needs of feminist researchers. Although initially it was assumed that
some methods are more feminist than others there is now general agreement that "no
method comes with a feminist guarantee" (Peplau and Conrad, 1989: 380).
Feminists have explored ways of developing different models of conducting
research; ones which do not exploit participants as sources of data but which
promote egalitarian research relationships. These debates and developments are
ongoing, and debates around methods are becoming ever more sophisticated, rather
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than finding the answers feminists have generated more questions. In this thesis I
hope to add to these questions by focusing on the feminist ethics and politics of
analysing and interpreting qualitative data.
2.2 Introducing Focus Groups
Focus groups are not new. Their development in social science is usually attributed
to Robert Merton and colleagues in the 1940's and 50's (Krueger, 1988; Morgan,
1988; Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). Merton used the 'focussed group-interview'
to examine audience responses to radio programs and wartime propaganda (Merton
and Kendall, 1946, Merton et al., 1956). Despite their popularity within other fields
including marketing, media, health and education, focus groups have, until recently,
received little interest within the social sciences, leading one commentator to note
that the method had "virtually disappeared from the social sciences" (Morgan, 1988:
11). Textbooks on research methods rarely mention focus groups, with only a few of
the most recent books dealing with this method in any detail (e.g. Fontana and Frey,
1994; Breakwell et al, 1995). Over the last five years, focus group research is said to
be making a 'come-back' and gaining in popularity among social scientists (Fontana
and Frey, 1994; Millward, 1995; Morgan, 1997). Although focus groups, sometimes
referred to as 'group interviews' or 'group discussions', may take many forms their
defining feature is that a small group of people engage in a collective discussion of a
topic pre-selected by the researcher. According to Stewart and Sharndasani (1990:
10), a focus group "generally involves 8 to 12 individuals who discuss a particular
topic under the direction of a moderator who promotes interaction and assures that
the discussion remains on the topic of interest". Unlike interviews, where the
researcher asks questions and elicits responses from each individual in turn, in focus
groups participants collectively discuss and negotiate diverse responses to the
question, sometimes ending in agreement, but more often not. The hallmark of focus
groups is that group members interact not only with the researcher but also with
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each other, and this "produce[s] data and insights that would be less accessible
without the interaction found in a group" (Morgan, 1988: 12). -
2.2.1 How are Focus Groups Used?
The focus group is predominantly a tool for the collection of qualitative data
(although it is possible to produce some quantitative measures - see Krueger, 1988)
and may take many forms, for many purposes, with disparate groups of people, using
a variety of techniques to elicit discussion and to analyse the resultant data. Some of
the methods used to provoke group discussion include: showing coloured slides
depicting people with varying numbers and types of tattoos to explore young
people's awareness of the physical and mental health risks of tattooing (Houghton et
al., 1995); asking school students to provide individual responses to questions about
sources of stress which are then discussed by the group as a whole (Mates and
Allison, 1992); and showing a 'Western' film to 'American Indians' and 'Anglos' to
examine how they understand it (Shively, 1992). In focus group research the
moderator or facilitator is not necessarily the researcher: often, particularly in
marketing, a moderator can be bought in to conduct the research, and this may be
particularly useful when conducting cross-cultural research or research where the
participants and the researcher do not share a common language. For example, in
order to investigate factors which deter non-English speaking women from attending
cervical screening, Naish et a!. recruited bilingual health advocates who were
trained to conduct focus groups in a series of six workshops. These advocates not
only ran the group discussions but were also involved in planning the project and
analysing the data gathered. The advantages of training these advocates extends
beyond the actual research with the authors reporting that the training will "enhance
their ability to act as true advocates for their community" and that the advocates are
"keen to extend this approach to other aspects of health promotion" (Naish et al.,
1994: 1127). Similarly, in their study of health services for women in rural Yunnan
in China, Wong et al. recruited seven local researchers from the Yunnan Academy
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of Social Sciences (YASS) to act as group facilitators. The facilitators attended three
training sessions on the methodology and practice of focus group research. The
authors point out that the trainees were actively encouraged to "use their first-hand
experience to revise the focus group questions to enhance their appropriateness for
the targeted village women" (Wong et a!., 1995: 1150).
Focus groups can be used for a range of different purposes including: investigating
service provision (e.g. Cooper et al., 1993; Murray et a!., 1994; Seals et a!., 1995),
educational or media messages (e.g. Liebes and Katz, 1986; Kitzinger, J. 1990; Keck
and Meuller, 1994), or specific products (e.g. Chambers and Jones, 1993; Davies
and Lillis, 1993), with the aim of improving these services or products, conducting
exploratory research in order to develop quantitative measures (e.g. Mates and
Allison, 1992; Cooper et a!., 1993; Babin, Darden and Griffin, 1994; Heneman et
al., 1995; Houghton et a!., 1995; Okonofua, 1995), and, to explore the range and
diversity of experiences, attitudes or discourse in order to understand more about a
particular topic (e.g. Norris et a!., 1996). Often a particular project will incorporate
more than one of these aims.
One of the advantages of focus group research is that it allows the researchers to
generate a wide range and diversity of attitudes, opinions and beliefs and this is
particularly valuable when researching a topic about which little is currently known.
One such area is children's attitudes towards tattooing. Although much is known
about the long and short term health risks of amateur tattooing and body marking
practices, Houghton and colleagues point out that relatively little is known about the
development of children's and adolescents' attitudes toward tattoos, or their
awareness of the health and social consequences of tattoos. Consequently, these
researchers conducted focus groups with 48 primary school and 32 high school
students in order to "obtain as full an account as possible of young people's
perspectives in their own terms, and to elicit any relevant views, concerns, or
misunderstandings that may exist among particular age groups" (Houghton et a!.,
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1995: 973). Similarly, as very little is known about how college women perceive the
threat of sexual aggression, Norris et al. (1996: 129) elected to use focus group
research as a way of both "understanding these respondents' experiences and for
developing hypotheses that could be tested in the future". Focus groups are a useful
tool for exploring previously under investigated areas because they allow the
researcher to canvass the opinions/experiences of a range of people at the same time,
to discover the issues which are of importance to the target group, and to hear these
issues discussed in a vocabulary with which groups members are comfortable.
2.2.2 Recording Focus Group Data
Advice on how to record focus group discussions is very varied, but most frequently
focus groups are tape recorded (Taylor and Ward, 1991; Kisker, 1985; Lupton and
Tulloch, 1996; Seals et a!., 1995; Jarrett, 1994; Stanton et a!., 1993), and sometimes
are video-recorded (Dignan et al. , 1990; Houghton et al., 1995; Rosenthal et al.,
1996). Researchers often make transcriptions from their audio or video recordings,
and this has been described as "one of the most challenging aspects of the focus
group method" (Millward, 1995: 287). Working with tape-recorders and transcripts
is seen as an important way of systematising qualitative data analysis, ensuring an
objective and methodologically sound analysis which is less open to subjective bias
and inaccuracies found in other methods. As Parakyla notes, this approach:
eliminates at one stroke many of the problems that
etlmographers have with the unspecified accuracy of field
notes and with the limited public access to them [..] Tape
recordings and transcripts based on them can provide for
highly detailed and publicly accessible representations of
social interaction. (Perakyla, 1997: 203).
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In addition to the greater accuracy of transcripts (as opposed to field notes), a further
crucial reason for transcribing focus group data is to ensure that the analytic process
is open to verification by other researchers such that the data from which
interpretations and conclusions are derived can be cross checked (Krueger, 1988).
Whether or not to transcribe focus groups data, and indeed, how to transcribe it, is a
decision which is made in relation to the theoretical and analytical interests of the
researcher. How researchers choose to transcribe their data depends on the analytical
concerns they have - i.e. on the sorts of questions they want to answer. For some
analytical questions it may not be necessary to transcribe at all, or to only transcribe
the quotations one wishes to use. For example, Murray et al. (1994) used focus
groups as part of their rapid appraisal research designed to assess a community's
own views on its needs in relation to general practice. Two focus groups were
conducted to discuss and prioritise the problems identified in previous stages of the
research (using interviews, observations, and written documents), and to explore
possible interventions. With this aim in mind, meticulous transcription of the focus
group discussions would appear to be an unnecessary use of time and resources. The
aim was to generate a list of the changes requested by members of the community,
the researchers were able to meet this aim by simply summarising the suggestions
and did not need to transcribe the data (Murray et a!., 1994). Similarly, where focus
groups are used in order to generate hypotheses, or as a preliminary step in the
development of other research tools, detailed transcription of the discussion is again
an unnecessary step. This approach was taken by Michael Hyland and colleagues
who conducted six focus groups to generate items for a questionnaire designed to
measure quality of life in asthma sufferers. Many of the questionnaire items
consisted of verbatim comments taken from the focus groups. The authors make no
mention of the method of transcription or data analysis used to make sense of the
group discussion, but it is clear from their report that little in-depth analysis of the
qualitative data was necessary (Hyland et al., 1991).
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The vast majority of researchers who use focus groups as their main method of study
(i.e. not as a prelude to something more quantitative) do transcribe their data, but
most provide little or no detail about how the data was transcribed. Often the only
reference to transcription in published articles is something along the lines of
"Recordings of all groups were transcribed verbatim" (Norris et al., 1996: 130),
"Each discussion group was audio-taped and transcribed" (Lupton and Tulloch,
1996: 256), or in the fuller versions: "Each of the discussions was recorded, a
transcript made and this put into machine readable form" (Cooper et a!., 1993), or
"[focus groups] were audio-taped and later translated and transcribed" (Taylor and
Ward, 1991: 125). Quotes from research participants are then used to illustrate the
particular analytic focus of the researcher.
As anyone who has conducted qualitative research will know, interviews and group
discussions typically produce 'messy' data. As Stewart and Shamdasani point out,
focus group participants rarely speak in clear, grammatically correct sentences,
rather they express "incomplete sentences, half-fmished thoughts, pieces of words,
odd phrases" and other seemingly inconvenient and incoherent features of ordinary
talk. In order to increase the readability and clarity of the transcript some editing
may be necessary, although they warn us that "it is important that the character of
participants' comments be maintained, even if at times they use poor grammar or
appear to be confused" (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990: 104). This is particularly
true of researchers who are explicitly interested in discovering how participants talk.
Conversely, Sandelowski argues that some editing of the talk may be necessary for
capturing the true meaning of the talk, she says: "researchers may have to clean, or
edit out certain features of, the more 'complete' punctuation which functions to join
or separate and emphasise or de-emphasise words and phrases, [which] may capture
those words accurately but still misrepresent talk, thereby contributing to errors in
the analysis of data" (Sandelowski, 1994: 312). In some cases, argues Krueger, like
when participants are using humour or irony, the speakers actual words do not
convey the meaning, in such cases "some minor editing to correct grammar is
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appropriate as long as the meaning is not changed" (Krueger, 1988: 118). Although
editing the data may make it more easily readable and may facilitate the readers
understanding of what went on in the groups, there may be some costs associated
with this approach. As DeVault aptly notes, "some approaches to analysis depend on
those aspects of talk that are routinely discarded by other analysts" (DeVault, 1990:
105). Her own analysis rests on the meaning of 'you know', like the example of one
woman who, talking about shopping, says "My husband likes to just get in and out,
and then that's it. Whereas me, I like to look around, you know." (DeVault, 1990:
103). According to DeVault, halting and inarticulate talk such as this, which appears
to have little content, would typically be discarded from most analysis. She argues,
however, that the phrase 'you know' often occurred in places which are
"consequential in our joint production of our talk in the interview" and apparently
signalled a "request for understanding" (DeVault, 1990: 103). The point is not
whether DeVault's analysis is right or wrong, but simply that a transcript which
edited out this feature of the talk would have rendered DeVault's analysis
impossible. Nowhere is this more apparent than in those analytic approaches (such
as conversation analysis, discourse analysis and linguistics), in which the research
object is the nature of talk itself.
One of the most detailed systems of transcription conventions was developed by
Gail Jefferson (1985b) (though much has been added since its origin) and is used
mainly by conversation analysts (see for example, Schegloff, 1968; 1988a,
Pomerantz, 1984c; 1986). Conversation analysts are interested in, and analyse, the
organisation of talk, the ways in which conversationalists produce socially organised
interaction, and as such their favoured transcription system is "particularly
concerned with capturing sequential features of talk" (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984:
12). As such the Jeffersonian system includes, for example, conventions for
recording 'simultaneous utterances' where two or more people begin speaking at the
same time, 'overlapping utterances' where one person begins speaking after another
speaker has started but before they have finished, and 'continuous utterances' where
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there is no interval between one speaker finishing speaking and another beginning.
All of these features attend to the sequential organisation of the talk. It is the
particular analytic concerns of the researchers which have necessitated the
development of such an elaborate system which is designed to capture those features
of talk which are often overlooked by other researchers, indeed additions to this
system are often not intended to improve the accuracy of transcripts, but instead to
draw attention to features of the talk previously unattended to by analysts (Heritage
and Atkinson, 1984). There are very few examples of researchers using this
transcription system with focus group discussions (but see Myers, 1997; Edley and
Wetherell, 1997 for exceptions). The following (shortened) extract in which the
group is talking about environmental sustainability is taken from this paper:
F3 =the Downs are particularly bad actually, now you've said that it's almost as
if the owners think - ah - you know=
Fl yeah=
F3 =long grass - leave itJ
Fl/that's right
F3 but it's (2.0)
Fl urn - but it -always happens - especially [out there] - and sea pollution
(Myers, 1996: 17-18)
The conversation analytic mode of transcription is essential for Myers' analysis. His
comment on this extract is that "the preference for agreement is shown by the fact
that it comes without delay, sometimes even interrupting, first in the turn." (p. 18),
according to his transcription notation, / represents the beginning of an overlap, =
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represents that there is no interval between turns, and (1.0) represents a timed pause.
Of course for those unfamiliar with this transcription method, the extract can prove
veiy difficult to read and make sense of. Commenting on Jeffersonian style
transcripts Moerman says: "They are ugly to look at and clumsy to handle and refer
to. Their splatterings of "[]" and "(.)" and ":::" would try anyone's patience and
aesthetic sensibilities." (Moerman, 1988: 13). As Elinor Ochs notes: "One of the
important features of a transcript is that it should not have too much information. A
transcript that is too detailed is difficult to follow and access" (Ochs, 1979: 44). A
further disadvantage of this more 'complete' transcript is that it is incredibly time
consuming to produce. Potter and Wetherell (1987), for example, estimate that with
the more conventional verbatim transcription one hour of tape will take ten hours to
transcribe, while a full Jeffersonian transcript will take about twenty hours to
transcribe one hour of tape. This means that the analyst should be absolutely sure
that the type of analysis she wishes to conduct necessitates such detailed
transcription.
Some focus group researchers also report their observations of non-verbal behaviour
in the text of the report, Quine and Cameron (1995: 458) for example, observe that
in focus groups with the disabled elderly there were "initial looks of surprise at the
appearance of hip protectors, murmurs and nods of approval on the high quality of
the specially designed undergarment material, [...] time spent handling the protector
pads and undergarment, raising hands and shaking heads in disbelief at the high cost
of producing the appliance ...". hi addition, these same authors also include non-
verbal behaviours in their transcripts:
Mrs D.: Would people think it made them look too wide on
the hips? (after handling a protector pad further) .... There's
not really that much difference is there? I don't care a bit,
but maybe other people do.
(Quine and Cameron, 1995: 457).
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A rather more detailed approach to the transcription of non-verbal behaviours is
offered by Christian Heath (1997) who has developed elaborate transcription codes
for gaze and other non-verbal behaviours. The following example is a transcript of a
doctor/patient consultation;
Fragment 1, Transcript 3 and Figure 12.2
walks
up	 down	 up down up down up down
V	 V	 V	 V VV	 V V
P:	 I was coming up the steps li:ke this all the way up I felt,
A	 A A	 A
Dr:	 writes	 turns to	 turns to	 nods &
prescription	 P 'sface	 P 's legs	 smiles
(Heath, 1997: 194)
Heath argues, as someone interested in conversation analysis and
ethnomethodology, that a transcript which includes non-verbal behaviours will aid
our understanding of how bodily activities feature in talk.
It is clear then, that "there is not, and cannot be, a 'neutral' transcription system."
(Psathas and Anderson, 1990: 75), and that each method of transcriptions has both
advantages and disadvantages. It is testament to the wide variety of ways in which
focus groups are used that researchers use so many different ways of recording their
data.
2.2.3 Analysing Focus Group Data
Commentators frequently lament the lack of "nuts and bolts" (cf. Vaughn et al.,
1996: 98) information on how to analyse focus group data (see also Bertrand, Brown
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According to Morgan (1988) there are two key approaches to the analysis of focus
group data - ethnography and content analysis. Although the former is seldom
discussed either in the research literature or in the 'how to' books, the latter is
present in the literature (Morgan himself provides no information on how to do
ethnography through focus groups). The 'experts' often recommend the application
of techniques used to analyse interview data to the analysis of focus group data.
Researchers involved in focus group research often report following Zemke and
Kramlinger's (1985) approach to data analysis which involves: "generating a list of
key ideas, words, phrases, and verbatim quotes; using ideas to formulate categories;
examining the contents of each category for sub-topics and selecting the most
frequent and most useful illustrations for the various categories" (cf. Houghton et
a!., 1995: 975 and see also Kline et a!., 1992; Stanton et a!., 1993). According to
Jenny Kitzinger, analysing focus groups is "basically the same as analysing any other
qualitative self-report data", the researcher "draws together and compares
discussions of similar themes and examines how these relate to the variables within
the sample population" (Kitzinger, 1995: 301). She notes that the only different
aspect of analysing focus is the need to account for interaction between participants
and group dynamics, she suggests that 'special categories' of analysis, such as jokes
and anecdotes, would usefully capture this quality for analysis.
Following Vaughn et a!. (1996) I discuss five steps for data analysis which draws
together many of the suggestions offered by other 'experts'. The first step involves
identifying the big ideas which "emerge after involvement, rereading, and careful
consideration of the data" (Vaughn et a!., 1996: 105). Krueger describes the process
of analysis as like "detective work" where the analyst searches for the re-occurrence
of "trends and patterns" which are the "clues" to what is going on (Krueger, 1988:
109). These clues include: looking at remarks in context; noting consistencies and
inconsistencies; listening to tone of voice, enthusiasm or degree of conviction and
noting body language.
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The second step is to unitise the data which often involves using highlighter pens
(or, for the technologically advanced, re-typing extracts into a computer) to mark
extracts of the data which contain a particular piece of information or an idea.
Describing the process of analysis of their focus groups with young women Norris
and colleagues report that "research assistants read through the text and highlighted
all key words and phrases for each response that accurately represented the original
intent of the passage" (Norris et al., 1996: 130). Alan Hedges (1985: 88) describes
his own approach to dealing with data in the following way: "I go through each
transcript while listening to the tape, and type into the word processor both my own
notes and comments about the material, and a series of possible verbatim quotations
for possible use in the report".
The third step involves categorising the units where previously identified units are
cut up into separate slips of paper and "sorted into relevant piles which will
eventually represent categories or themes" (Vaughn et a!., 1996: 107).
The fourth step is for analysts to compare their categories and re-negotiate category
boundaries until agreement is reachecL A great deal of emphasis is placed on the
systematic and verifiable nature of qualitative data analysis (particularly at the point
of data categorisation), no doubt intended to counter potential criticisms from 'hard-
line' quantitative researchers who consider qualitative analyses to be soft and
woolly. Kisker, for example, notes that the interpretation of focus group discussions
is highly subjective and recommends that several people are involved in analysis.
Despite this the only information she provides about the processes involved in her
own analysis is "After each session was taped and transcribed, an analysis of the
content was carried out" (Kisker, 1985: 83). This fourth step is important method for
establishing the reliability and validity of qualitative research. Miles and Huberman
recommend double coding as a technique in which disagreements sharpen the
definition of the category/theme and is a good reliability check (Miles and
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Huberman, 1984). The need for inter-rater reliability is also stressed by David
Silverman who advises that a number of analysts should perform an analysis so that
differences can be "discussed and ironed out" (Silverman, 1993: 148). Often then
focus group researchers adopt this practice and refer to coding the data sometimes
with the help of an assistant (Press, 1991), sometimes with separate independent
coders (Norris et al., 1996) and sometimes with the aid of computer programmes
such as 'The Ethnograph' (e.g. Cooper et al., 1993; Stanton et al., 1993). Rosenthal
and colleagues discuss three stages to their coding procedure; transcripts were first
reviewed by two authors for recurrent themes, next all three authors independently
coded the transcripts for the identified themes and finally authors compared their
categorisations and when there was a disagreement this was negotiated until all three
authors reached a consensus (Rosenthal et al., 1996). Similarly, Seals and colleagues
who analysed the data from the focus groups they conducted with women with HIV
about their experiences of social services by independently coding each instance
which related to a social service and then comparing the results until a consensus
was reached about which data fit into which categories.
Finally, the fifth step involves identifying themes and the use of theoiy. At this stage
the analyst reconsiders whether the initial big ideas are supported by the categories
generated. Again, this process is often rather vague, even on the rare occasions,
when it is reported one example is provided by Norris et al., who state simply that
"[i]nterpretations were formed by weaving together various responses into themes"
(Norris eta!., 1996: 130).
A further area of concern for focus group analysts is how to report results and
present analyses and it is in this respect that focus groups are perhaps most similar to
other qualitative methods (Morgan, 1988). Most frequently, analysts use quotes from
research participants to provide evidence for analytic claims, an approach shared by
Norris et a!., who use quotes to "illustrate common themes that emerged from
discussions, and to reinforce fmdings from the questionnaire." (Norris et a!., 1996:
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129). This requires a process of 'thinning out' vast amounts of qualitative data into
concise, clear analytic statements. The aim is that these statements should not distort
but rather accurately represent the larger data set. Researchers are, however, warned
to guard against the corruptive influence of various factors including what Krueger
describes a 'tendency' in 'novice' researchers selectively to identify data extracts
which confirm, rather than contradict, prior expectations (cf Krueger 1988: 111, see
also Hedges' discussion of 'selective perception' 1985). Group processes may also
influence the analysis and can be mitigated by researchers trying to 'tune out' the
effects of (for example) a dominator in the group (Vaughn et a!.., 1996). While
researchers sometimes attend to this concern there is rarely any detailed information
about how they have ensured such representativeness. Norris and colleagues writing
on this very subject state only that "in order to ensure that quotes selected from
focus group discussions were truly representative, careful analysis of focus group
material was undertaken"! (Norris et al., 1996: 129).
2.3 Issues In The Mainstream Focus Group Literature
There are now several books which address the issue of how to conduct focus
groups. 'Focus Groups as Qualitative Research' by David Morgan, and Richard
Krueger's 'Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research' (both published
in 1988) are the two most frequently cited resources, although the slightly more
recent text by David Stewart and Prem Shamdasani 'Focus Groups: Theory and
Practice' published in 1990, is also very useful. These "how to" books cover such
issues as how to recruit focus group participants, how to design the focus group
question schedule, and how to conduct and organise focus group data. The key
issues which I wish to highlight here are (a) power and control in focus groups - the
role of the moderator, and, (b) the person in context.
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2.3.1 Power and Control in Focus Groups
According to the "how to" books, (compared with the one to one interviewer) the
focus group moderator has less control over the direction which the research may
take, simply by virtue of the greater number of research participants. According to
Frey and Fontana (1993: 26), "{t]he interviewer's influence on the interviewee,
while not eliminated, would be diffused by the very fact of being in a group rather
than in a one-to-one situation". As Krueger (1988: 46) points out, focus group
participants "influence and interact with each other", and as such are "able to
influence the course of the discussion". The advantage of this approach, according
to David Morgan (1988: 18), is that "participants' interaction among themselves
replaces their interaction with the interviewer", which in turn places a "greater
emphasis on participants' points of view" and consequently "focus groups offer a
stronger mechanism for placing the control over this interaction in the hands of
participants rather than the researcher". Participants are encouraged to challenge and
ask questions both of each other and of the moderator. These 'how to' books are not
feminist and therefore while feminists search desperately for research methods
which allow the researcher less control, this feature of the focus group method is
viewed by mainstream researchers as a potential weakness of the method:
The corresponding weakness, as noted in the comparison to
individual interviews, is that the researcher has less control
over the data which is generated. The degree of control is not
an all-or-nothing issue, but focus groups can never match the
potential of individual interviews in this regard (Morgan,
1988: 21).
Focus groups participants can influence the direction of the discussion which, we are
warned, may result in inefficient and distracting 'detours' where participants spend a
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great deal of time passionately discussing issues which are of little or no interest to
the researcher. It is at this point that the researcher may wish to regain control, and
adopt a more directive style. Although theoretically the level of moderator control
can be highly variable (moderating style can vary from highly directive to relatively
non-intervening - particularly in the case of self-managed groups), in practice
moderators are advised to retain some "mild, unobtrusive control" over the group in
order to "carefully and subtly" guide the conversation back on target and so address
the research question (Krueger, 1988: 73). The ability to "cut off" unproductive
discussion (Morgan, 1988: 50), is apparently an essential attribute for running
efficient and effective focus groups.
In addition, in order to ensure the participation of all members of the group the
moderator may need to be aware of the dynamics of the group and develop special
techniques to deal with 'problem participants' (Merton et a!., 1956, Krueger, 1988,
Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). Krueger, for example, identifies four problem
participants; the 'expert' who considers themselves to have the best knowledge
about the topic in the group and may inhibit other members from expressing their
views, the dominant talker whose opinions pervade the discussion at the expense of
others, shy participants may say very little or may interject comments very quietly
making it very difficult for the moderator to draw out their contributions, and lastly,
the 'rambler' who may talk a lot but rarely seem to make their point clearly.
Moderators are encouraged, in these text book accounts, to use various strategies to
limit the effects of the participants by limiting/maintaining eye contact or using
other body language, by manipulating the seating arrangements, and by verbally
shifting attention from certain participants by asking for different points of view. For
example Stewart and Shamdasani advise the following for dealing with an 'expert':
The moderator can make it clear that he or she is interested
in all members of the group ... [if this fails, however, the
moderator may use more assertive techniques such as cutting
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the individual off in mid-sentence, avoiding eye contact, and
not recognising the individual when he or she wishes to
speak ... [a]cting uninterested and immediately changing the
subject after the expert speaks may also be useful for
maintaining control of the group (1990: 97).
The exercise of this kind of control of the moderator may be necessary to ensure that
contributions are gained from all members of the group. The purpose of the group is
to discuss a range of viewpoints rather than to discover the correct 'answer' or the
'truth'. It is important then, that the moderator gives license to possible
disagreements and differences of opinion, and produces an environment where every
group member feels comfortable expressing their own views "regardless of how
different or unusual" (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990: 92). The overall role of the
moderator is summarised by Stewart and Shamdasani:
The initial job of the interviewer is to create a
nonthreatening and nonevaluative environment in which
group members feel free to express themselves openly and
without concern for whether others in the group agree with
the opinions offered. Once this environment has been
established it is the job of the moderator to keep the
discussion on track and to assure active participation of all
members of the group (1990: 87).
In sum then, focus groups are said to afford research participants a greater degree of
control over the discussion (than, say, one-to-one interviews), and consequently the
power of the moderator is limited. This has the advantage of ensuring the production
of a dynamic group discussion but the ensuing costs of participants 'going off track'
are also seen as cause for concern. Some level of moderator control is considered
desirable in order to ensure that the research questions get answered and that all
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participants have the chance to speak. Clearly, then, issues of power and control in
focus groups are presented in the mainstream literature as intimately bound up with
issues of quality assurance and the efficient collection of data rather than about
ethics and a concern for safe-guarding participants' needs.
2.3.2 The Person in Context
One of the underlying themes in the mainstream literature on focus group research is
a consideration of the costs and benefits of conducting social science research with
individuals in a group context. In this section I review the concerns raised in the
'how to' focus group literature around the facilitation or inhibition of disclosure in a
group setting, and demonstrate how these concerns reflect an essentialist approach
to research methodology. I then show how a social constructionist approach to focus
group research sets aside these concerns about individual disclosure and focuses
instead on group interaction.
(i) Essentialist Approaches
Focus groups, as I have already mentioned, are valued because they allow the
researcher to observe interaction between participants. (Morgan, 1988). However,
for the most part, researchers who use focus groups are not interested in looking at
group interactions; they rarely cite data extracts in which participants talk to each
other, and on the few occasions when such as examples are given they are seldom
discussed as interactions (Kitzinger, J. 1994; Wilkinson, in press b). Rather, most of
the 'how to' books assume (and this is reflected in the research) that the aim of
focus group research is to examine the beliefs, attitudes, values and opinions of
individuals within the group. Interaction between participants is seen as valuable,
not in its own right, but as a useful way of eliciting information about individuals.
Focus group members are encouraged to disclose as much information as possible to
ensure that the researcher has the most accurate picture of their views. According to
the literature, by studying the individual in a group context, focus groups facilitate
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this process of disclosure in three ways. First, the group context is said to provide a
more natural setting in which to study individuals' attitudes. As Krueger (1988: 44)
puts it:
People are social creatures who interact with others. They
are influenced by the comments of others and make
decisions after listening to the advice and counsel of people
around them. Focus groups place people in natural, real-life
situations as opposed to the controlled experimental
situations typical of quantitative studies.
The 'how to' books argue that because much of social life takes place in groups, and
because attitudes are not formed in isolation but in relation to others, focus groups
are an ideal format for studying attitudes. According to Albrecht et al. (1993: 54)
focus groups are "social events" which involve the "interaction of participants and
the interplay and modification of ideas", as such they are, they argue "more
ecologically valid than methods that assess individuals' opinions in relatively asocial
settings". This may be particularly pertinent when studying pre-existing groups
where the researcher may be privy to "fragments of interactions that approximate tc
naturally occurring data" (Kitzinger, J. 1995: 301).
Second, by allowing participants to discuss issues with others, focus groups may
encourage "the disclosure of internalized opinions" (Albrecht et a!., 1993: 57).
According to Stewart and Shamdasani (1990: 16) the group context produces
"synergynistic effect" where participants "react to and build upon the responses of
other group members" producing ideas that might not otherwise have been
uncovered. Kline et a!. (1992: 448) favour focus groups because they hope that the
"informality of the group setting" might "encourage a degree of candidness and
spontaneity among participants" that might not be accessible with more rigid format
of a one-to-one interview. Participants may share common experiences, remind each
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other of half forgotten memories, or spark off a different train of thought in a way
that is very different from a simple question and answer session. The responsibility
for answering a question is diffused among group members so that any one
individual need only respond to that question which s/he has a strong opinion about
(rather than simply providing and answer because one is required), and so individual
responses can be "more spontaneous, less conventional, and should provide a more
accurate picture of the person's position on some issue" (Stewart and Shamdasani,
1990: 19). The group setting may also encourage the participation of shyer members
of the group (Kitzinger, 1995). Mates and Allison, for example, report being
"impressed" with the "openness" of their participants and conclude that "the process
was successful in encouraging the more reticent members of the group to
participate" (1992: 473).
Third, the group context also allows participants to talk 'in their own words' and
using their own vocabularies to explain their views (Houghton et a!., 1995; Cooper
et al., 1993). Consider the following example from the work of Jenny Kitzinger
where she asks gay male participants to assess how much people in different 'risk
groups' are at risk from contracting HIV/AIDS:
JK: Fine, one last one, how at risk are [reads] "Female
homosexuals, that is lesbians?"
El: They're all faggots aren't they, everyone of them
E2: No, they are faggotesses!
E3: They're quite a lot at risk
[All shouting at once]
JK They are quite a lot at risk?
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Several voices: Aye
JK: Why
E2: They're faggotesses
E3: Muff divers [oral sex]
E4: Licking pussycat
(Kitzinger, J. 1990: 328)
The researcher (JK) introduces the topic in one language using terms such as
"female homosexual" or "lesbian" but this language is not used by the group
participants who use language more familiar to themselves. Not only might
participants feel more comfortable discussing issues in a way that is familiar (and so
disclose more information), but it is hoped that by allowing participants to use their
own words researchers may gain a more accurate picture of what participants
'really' think than if they are constrained by the researcher's choice of words.
Although the group context can (as we have seen) exert a positive influence on
research, researchers also warn us that interaction between participants can threaten
to contaminate, inhibit or distort data collection. Results may be biased by a very
dominant or opinionated member, participants may manipulate their responses in
order to tell us how they wish to be seen as opposed to how they really are
(Krueger, 1994: 10), or else the group might "censor any deviation from group
standards" (Kitzinger, J. 1994: 110). If respondents are influenced by others and
'change their minds' during the course of a group discussion (as they often do),
which view should be taken by the researcher as indicative of what they 'really'
believe? Flow can we tell if what they say is what they 'really' think, or the way they
wish to appear, or is the result of intimidation by another participant. As Crabtree et
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al. (1993: 144) note it "may be difficult to distinguish the individuals' beliefs from
those they expressed as a result of group pressures". Focus groups, then, produce
'messy' data filled with untidy and complex interactions where the laughing, joking,
boasting, teasing, persuading and arguing so characteristic of focus group research
creates difficulties when coming to analyse this data. It is for this reason that the
"how to" literature contains a disproportionate amount of infonnation about the
'right' composition of groups: this includes, for example, information about
appropriate group size, about the demographic or personality characteristics of
participants, concerns about group cohesiveness and homogeneity, and discussion
about how best to arrange the seating to facilitate discussion.
According to the literature, then, group processes can facilitate better, quicker,
cheaper disclosure, but must be moderated carefully as the potential for group
dynamics to undermine and contaminate the research is great. Underlying these
concerns is an essentialist model of research (i.e. participant-as-informant or
participant-as-psychological subject, see section 1.2.3), in which the objective of
research is to discover what people think, or feel, about a particular issue.
Researchers are concerned about the accuracy of the data they collect and wony
about possible biases which may affect the quality of the data. A 'good' method,
then, is one which allows for the collection of better quality data which gives a more
accurate reflection of what people 'really' think about a particular issue. From this
approach focus groups have both advantages and disadvantages.
(ii) Social Constructionist Approaches
From a social constructionist approach, these concerns about studying individuals in
a group context (outlined above) are based on the misguided assumption that
meaning is somehow located within the individual, and that group processes may
either facilitate or inhibit the individual from disclosing or making visible these
meanings to the researcher. The underlying assumption, then, is that it is the
individual which is the focus for analysis. An alternative, social constructionist
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Mother: ... did you watch the royal weddings, Rob?...
Older son: Yeah, I did, yeah
Mother: Were you proud? (2) [Did you feel
Older son:
	
[I can't remember my feelings
at the time, but I remember [I remember watching iton
TV but
Mother:	 [No but you felt that you
wanted to watch it
Father: I think no, I think the (.) I don't know whether pride
comes into it, Kate, I think that you realise at the time,
even watching it on telly, that all that pomp and
pageantry, probably you couldn't see, find, anywhere else
in the world
Mother: for definite, for definite you couldn't
Father: because people, this is what I was going to say a
while ago, that come from all over the world just to see
little brief snatches of it
(Billig, 1992: 38)
In this extract Billig argues that the notion of national pride introduced by the
mother is replaced by the father with the idea that you 'realise' that the pageantry of
royal weddings is unique. Instead of analysing this with a view to discovering
whether these people 'really' think that royal weddings are a matter of pride or not,
Billig looks at what function this change of emphasis serves. He argues that the
emphasis changes from the emotion of pride in ourselves to the more rational
'realising' that 'others' see 'us' as unique, so that:
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They see 'us' as unique; we 'realise' this. In so realising,
'we' lay claim to 'our' lack of prejudiced pride: 'we' are
only seeing 'ourselves' as others see 'us' (Billig, 1992: 38).
What results is a powerful rhetorical argument produced in the context of the Royal
Family, prejudice and nationalism. The meaning of this talk can only be understood
in relation to the particular context within which it is produced. From a social
constructionist approach, one which uses a model of participant-as-social-interactor,
the group context allows the researcher to investigate the interaction between
research participants and to analyse the meaning of this interaction in relation to the
group context.
In sum, then, the value of researching the person in context depends on the
particular epistemological position taken by the researcher in relation to the data
collected through focus group research. The kinds of concerns which researchers
have, the ways in which they analyse the data and the conclusions they draw, vary
depending on whether they use a social constructionist, or an essentialist approach.
From within an essentialist approach, studying individuals in a group context has the
advantage of allowing a more naturalistic discussion in which participants are more
likely to disclose what they 'really' think about a particular issue, while from a
social constructionist approach focus groups allow researchers to study the
construction of meaning through group interaction.
2.4 Focus Groups: A Feminist Method?
The recent resurgence of interest in focus group methodology has been particularly
noticeable among feminist researchers, although it would be misleading to imply
that the use of focus groups is common in feminist research. One indication of the
continued marginality of focus group research is that in the first six volumes of the
journal Feminism & Psychology (199 1-1996) only eight of the studies published
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used focus groups, and over a similar period Psychology of Women Quarterly
published only three (Wilkinson, in press b). This feminist focus group research
covers diverse topics with heterogeneous groups including: incest survivors talking
about their abuse (Barringer, 1992), men talking about sex (Crawford, Kippax and
Waldby, 1994), 'immigrant women' exploring their life narratives (Espin, 1995),
groups of boys and groups of girls talking about sexual risk-taking (Vera er a!.,
1996), and lesbians discussing safer sex practices (Lampon, 1995). In addition, other
studies have utilised a group setting for their research (which although not explicitly
defmed as focus groups appear to have many similarities), including: the use of
'girls' groups' to explore experiences of sexual harassment (Herbert, 1989); semi-
structured, single-sex 'discussion groups' with young adolescents talking about
'growing up' (Lovering, 1995); interviews with a group of girls about race, gender
and class (Macpherson and Fine, 1995); group discussions with young people about
power and social relations (Raabe, 1993); group discussions with girls and women
about homemaking (Pastor et a!., 1996); small groups of girls talking about 'feeling
good' (Erkut, 1996); and group interviews with girls and their mothers about
menstruation (Kissling, 1996). Despite this there are very few articles and NO "how
to" books which address the issue of doing feminist research using focus groups (but
see Wilkinson in press a, b for recent articles addressing this issue). Few of the
studies mentioned above provide any theoretical justification for their choice to use
focus groups rather than, say, interviews (e.g. Griffin, 1986; Frazer, 1988; Lovering,
1995), or discuss the method's strengths and weaknesses.
In section 2.1. I outlined feminist debates about research methods and concerns
about the best way to conduct research. In section 2.2 I reviewed the literature on
focus groups, and in section 2.3 I detailed two particular aspects of the mainstream
focus group literature. In this section I discuss the potential of focus groups as a
feminist method, and consider the interrelation of feminist concerns about research
methods and the two features of focus groups which I identified above - i.e. power
and control, and the person in context.
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2.4.1 Power and Control in Focus Groups:
Feminist Perspectives
Feminists have been critical of the hierarchical and potentially exploitative
relationship between the researcher and researched which characterises much of the
mainstream research (see section 2.1). In particular, the power of the researchers to
set the research agenda, to impart minimal information about themselves, to ask the
questions and control the research, and to appropriate the words of others by
imposing their own analytical framework onto the talk has been seen as cause for
concern. Feminists have created an alternative (although constantly contested and
developing) ethical framework within which to conduct research which emphasise
the importance of reciprocal, non-hierarchical, non-exploitative, collaborative
relationships between the researcher and her participants. To this end feminists are
exploring different ways of reducing the power and influence of the researcher and
of empowering research participants.
As illustrated earlier (see section 2.3.1), it is often assumed that compared to other
methods, the power and influence of the researcher/moderator is reduced in focus
group research. The balance of power in focus groups shifts, simply by virtue of the
greater number of research participants. While in the non-feminist literature this
apparent relative lack of control is seen as potentially problematic, it is generally
welcomed by feminists conducting focus groups with other women (but see Green et
at 1993, for a discussion of how this may be problematic when conducting groups
with men). The reduced control of the researcher, and the corresponding increase of
participant control, is valued by feminists because it enables women (i) to set their
own research agenda, and (ii) to give voice to women's experience. I noted earlier
that these are key feminist concerns.
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(i) Agenda Setting
Feminists have documented the ways in which group discussions facilitate the
privileging of participants' own research agendas. For example, although initially
Carrie Herbert wanted to examine the sexual harassment of girls by male teachers,
by six months into the project she had not been able to collect any data on this topic.
What she did collect was girls accounts of 'unpleasant experiences' they had
encountered with men; thirteen of the seventeen girls reported being sexually
assaulted and others reported instances of unwanted sexual attention. By allowing
the girls to set their own agendas, by letting them discuss the issues which were
important to them Herbert, although unable to collect any information on the sexual
harassment of girls by their male teachers, was able to obtain a wealth of
information about the sexual abuse of children (Herbert, 1993). Similarly, when
Elizabeth Frazer started her research with groups of girls issues around 'class' were
not part of her agenda, however she noted that "the public school girls frequently
brought it into the discussion" and so in subsequent groups she explored the
importance of class to these girls (Frazer, 1988: 344). Focus groups allow feminist
researchers to be less directive in their approach to moderating, allowing the
dynamic group interactions to steer the progress of the research to issues of
importance to the women themselves. Schlesinger et a!. (1992: 28-9) claim that
focus group discussions allow women to "determine their own agendas as much as
possible". Focus groups "allow for the expression of thoughts and feelings while
inviting participants to introduce their own themes and concerns" (Espin, 1995:
228). Focus groups, perhaps more so than interviews, allow participants to direct the
discussion and introduce new themes, ensuring that women talk about those things
which they consider to be most important.
(ii) Giving Voice
Focus groups are ideally suited to being used to "provide 'voice' to the research
participant by giving her an opportunity to defme what is relevant and important to
understand her experience" (Norris et a!., 1996: 129). Like other qualitative methods
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focus groups allow women to describe their experiences in their own words using
their own vocabularies. Focus groups "legitimize the voice of participants" (Ward
and Taylor, 1992: 189). Some argue that participation in focus groups may provide a
cathartic or clarificatory function for women who are angty or upset about their
experiences. According to Jarrett "[t]he unsolicited candor of the individual group
members indicates that such revelations, aside from their positive influence on
group dynamics, satisf' personal needs" (Jarrett, 1993: 199). Similarly, Elizabeth
Frazer notes "the need for opportunities to talk about their lives" experienced by the
girls in her study and the "time spent in girls' groups" helped make the research
process rewarding for her participants (Frazer, 1988: 354). The group context may
be particularly beneficial when women are being asked to talk about issues which
are emotionally charged. Women who participated in Schlesinger and colleagues
study in which women viewed, and then discussed, violent incidents on television
valued the supportive environment of a group setting which encouraged discussion
(Schlesinger et al., 1992). Commenting on her focus groups with women about the
intersection of national and sexual identities Oliva Espin praised focus group
research for exploring "the vocabulary of sex in different languages", she noted that
after group discussions conducted in English some participants said that they could
have expressed themselves better if they had used their first language, but that they
felt more comfortable discussing these issues in English (Espin, 1995: 232).
2.4.2 The Person In Context: Feminist Perspectives
Although there is very little feminist research which uses the focus group method,
and although those few studies which do use this method rarely discuss its potential
as a feminist method, the ways in which focus groups are discussed generally
parallel the concerns of mainstream research. In this section I outline feminist
concerns about disclosure and distortion resulting from a group context - concerns
which reflect an essentialist framework. I then go on to explore the use, by
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feminists, of focus group research to explore social constructionist concerns about
the construction of meaning in context.
(i) Feminist Essentialist Approaches
Feminist researchers are interested in the particular methodological issues which
arise from the dynamics of a group situation. Feminists share the same concerns
about the possible distorting effects of a group setting as mainstream researchers. In
their research using focus group discussions with black and Hispanic women
exploring attitudes and behaviours surrounding sexual decision making, Anna Kline
and colleagues report being concerned about the potential "tendency for participants
to offer, or emphasise more socially desirable responses in a group situation" (1992:
455), and noted that their respondents attitudes towards condom use were more
positive than the trends reported in most qualitative studies at that time. Participants
are, argues Jarrett, responding to an audience and that this more public arena may
influence their responses. She discusses how the African American women in her
focus groups generated an 'audience effect' occurred where group members
'performed' for each other providing "exaggerated accounts of themselves" as
strong women. Although this may initially be a disadvantage, Jarrett argues that
ultimately "it facilitates rapport so vital for the disclosure of more personal
information" (1993: 195).
Group discussions are valued for their ability to "produce a wider range of material
than the more traditional one-to-one formal interview" (Lovering, 1995: 15). As
noted earlier researchers are often advised that groups should have some degree of
homogeneity in order to facilitate the development of rapport between participants.
The key assumption is that these common concerns and experiences will make
participants more willing to disclose information. Robin Jarrett offers the following
extract from her research exploring contemporary patterns of family life to illustrate
this process at work:
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Trish: Everybody in my family got kids. [The] three oldest
girls, all three of us got kids. ... [1f] I want [something] from
the store ... [and ask my mother to watch the kids, she says,]
"Irish do not talk to nobody. [Laughter in the background]
Go to that store. You come on back here. ... I do not have no
kids in this house. My kids are grown."
Shelly: My mother just like that, just like that! My kids, they
potty trained. ... Sometimes they don't be at home at all. I
just bring them home and I say, "Mama, would you watch
them 'till I come home from the store?" [She says,] "What
store you goin' to?" [I say,] "I'm goin' to the store. I'm
comin' right back." [She says,] "Take [them] with you".
(Jarrett, 1993: 193)
Jarrett argues that the common experiences shared by these women facilitated their
disclosure of this information and in addition "sets the stage for deeper levels of
disclosure" (p. 193). Again, it is the researcher's emphasis on gaining accurate
disclosure from participants which marks their approach as essentialist.
(ii) Feminist Social Constructionist Approaches
A social constructionist approach sets aside questions about the accuracy or
otherwise of focus group data. Rather than assuming that talk in focus groups relates
to pre-established attitudes or beliefs, a social constructionist approach looks at how
meaning is produced in the context of a focus group discussion.
The question of how to interpret what people say is particularly salient in research
with groups as this method is more likely to "elicit ambiguity and indeterminacy" in
participants' responses (Frazer, 1988: 351). In her research with groups of teenage
girls talking about 'class' Elizabeth Frazer was faced with many instances of
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contradictory and ambiguous discussions between the girls. Rather than assuming
that these girls have a pre-existing image of class society which they present to the
researcher (albeit in a confusing and patchy manner) through their talk, which can
then be transformed (through careful interpretative work) into clear representation
of their class system, Frazer examines "the ways in which responses are negotiated
and answers arrived at in the research context" (1988: 351, emphasis added). The
meaning of a response can only be interpreted in the context of all that is said, what
is important, argues Frazer, is to examine the range of ways in which respondents
can talk about the topic, what determines which approach is used, and which ways
of talking are legitimated in the culture. Reflecting on their interviews with a group
of girls, about issues of 'difference' and 'sameness', Pat Macpherson and Michelle
Fine discuss the construction of racial identities within the group. After both
Shermika, who describes herself as "Negro. Not black, not African-American" (p.
188), and Janet, who thinks of herself as Korean, discuss their own racial identity
the conversation then turned to the issue of the invisibility of race in whites.
Michelle: Sophie, what do you consider yourself ethnically?
Sophie: Assorted flavors. I don't know, a lot of different
things. German,, Welsh, Scotch-Irish. What else am I?
Janet: Sophie, do you feel ... do you identify with any of
those groups? No?
Michelle: How do you attach to being white?
Sophie: I'm not white. Same thing with not being black.
[Shermika had said she's not black, but dark brown.] I don't
know what to call myself because I'm such a mix. I guess
I'm European-American. Yeah, that! [Sarcastically] I don't
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have much of a cultural identity. It doesn't extend beyond
my parents or grandparents, really. It doesn't go back to
Europe
(Macpherson and Fine, 1995: 189)
Attentive to the context of the group discussion, Macpherson and Fine interpret this
extract in the following way. Sophie is the only WASP (White Anglo-Saxon
Protestant) in the group, in the debates about multiculturalism in which Sophie has
participated 'Whites' often get cast as racist. Where differences mean deficits to
identify as White would mean the devaluation of others and possible accusations of
racism. "Sophie's refusal of what she sees as the white position has left her with no
power to make meanings from her experience; no power to do difference"
(Macpherson and Fine, 1995: 189). Rather than imposing categories of black or
white onto Sophie, or trying to determine whether Sophie 'really' identifies as one
or the other, Macpherson and Fine look at how these identities are constructed and
negotiated in this particular context. Using the following data extract taken from
Chris Griffin's research on young women's transition from school to jobs, I illustrate
how essentialist and social constructionist concerns lead researchers to treat focus
group data differently. The extract forms part of a discussion between four teenage
girls about sex and marriage:
Treena: But if a bloke asks you for sex, what do you do?
Brid: I'd tell him to go off and have a wank!
Stella: You dirty thing!
Kate: It's wrong, you ought to get married in a white dress.
Stella: But I don't think it is - if you like the bloke why not?
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Why wait until you're married?
Treena: She's talking - I bet she's done it!
Kate: You ought to sleep with a bloke if you love him and he
asked you to.
Stella: But you just said that you have to get married in
white!
(Griffin, 1986: 182-3)
Griffin provides no analysis of this extract using it merely to provide an example of
the complexity and contradictions inherent in the discussion. If we were analysing,
as many feminists do, this data from an essentialist approach we might be both
pleased and discouraged at the same time. That the girls question each other and
react to each other and that, in particular, Stella questions Kate's apparently
contradictory statements could be seen as the group dynamics working to the
advantage of the researcher to elaborate on and clarify their views. Alternatively the
teasing of each other which the girls engage in could be seen as disruptive to the
process of data collection. When both Brid and Stella express sexually permissive
views about, for example, not waiting to be married before having sex, they are
teased by other members of the group. For a researcher concerned to get at the
'truth' about what these girls 'really' think this teasing is problematic, it may inhibit
these girls from expressing more sexually permissive views as this is something
which has been censured by the group. From a social constructionist approach
concerns about the truthfulness or otherwise of the girls' statements are rejected,
instead this extract could be analysed in terms of how the meaning of female
sexuality is co-constructed within the group. For feminists concerned about the
decontextualisation and individualisation of women's voices this approach has some
obvious advantages.
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Bringing women together for a focus group discussion in crder to discover common
experiences may be welcomed by feminists not simply for pragmatic reasons, but
also for political reasons. It may be that focus groups have the potential to function
like consciousness raising groups. Maria Mies argues that 'good' feminist research
which empowers women can only be achieved by shifting away from individual
interviews and towards group discussions, she claims that the "collectivisation of
women's experience" may help women to "overcome their structural isolation in
their families and to understand that their individual sufferings have social causes"
(Mies, 1983: 128). Reflecting on her experience of conducting (with Pat
Macpherson) group discussions with adolescent women, Michelle Fine describes the
"collective consciousness work" they undertook, in which they moved from a
"stridently individualist feminism" to a "collective sense of women's solidarity
among differences" (Fine, 1992: 173-4).
In sum then, focus groups have many advantages for feminist researchers. They
enable the researcher to 'give voice' to women's experience within a supporting
environment, women are encouraged to talk about their experiences using their own
vocabulary, and researchers can study the things that women say in a contextualised
way. Despite these advantages focus groups are little used by feminist researchers,
although they do appear to be becoming more popular in recent years. I return to a
discussion of the relative benefits of the focus group method for feminist research
when I reflect upon my own use of focus groups in chapter seven.
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2.5 Focus Group Research On Young Women Saying 'No' To Sex:
The Methodology Of This Research
In this section I outline in detail the particular application of focus group
methodology used in this research, including details about the sample, the materials
used, the particular ethical considerations, the materials used, the procedure
followed, the transcription method adopted, and the analytical approach taken.
2.5.1 Sample
Focus group text books advise researchers to recruit participants who share certain
background characteristics such as age, race, class, status or sex (Krueger, 1988;
Morgan, 1988). Groups need to "maintain a reasonable amount of homogeneity ... in
order to foster discussion" (Morgan, 1988: 46). Often the topic under investigation
will determine the most important dimension of homogeneity, Cooper et aL, for
example, decided to match group members in terms of age and sex to allow for
"uninhibited discussion" on the sensitive topic of family planning (Cooper et aL,
1993: 328). This advice is based on the assumption that differences in participants'
backgrounds or lifestyles may inhibit the flow of the discussion or that the
discussion will deteriorate because of "a refusal to share experiences and opinions"
or due to "uncontrollable conflict" (Morgan, 1988: 47). The participants in the main
sample for this study all identified as heterosexual, all were white, female, and were
of a similar age.
(1) Pilot Group
The pilot group consisted of 31 university student volunteers (age range 18 - 50;
modal age 20) most of whom were recruited from undergraduate social science
classes at Loughborough University and through the university women's group. All
volunteers were white which perhaps reflects the demography of a predominately
white institution. Students were asked to volunteer to take part in the author's Ph.D.
research on 'Saying no to sex'. Six groups of from three to ten students were
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conducted either in the author's own home or in a comfortable room in the
university. All groups met only once with the exception of the initial group who
expressed a wish to meet again and agreed to assist the author with piloting various
different methods of initiating discussion including story completion (Homer, 1972;
Kitzinger and Powell, 1995) and memory work (Kippax et a!, 1988; Crawford et a!,
1992; Haug; 1992; Stephenson et a!., 1996). The aim of the pilot study was not only
to 'test out' different methods of initiating the discussion groups, but also to pilot
the focus group schedule, and to enable the author to become familiar with the
method of focus group discussions. My decision to include only heterosexual
volunteers in the main sample is one consequence of this piloting; the need for this
arose because it later transpired after the pilot focus groups were completed that at
least one of the pilot volunteers identified as a lesbian but had not felt able to 'come
out' as such in the group. I was concerned that her experiences as a lesbian were
being silenced in the group and therefore took the decision to make the groups
heterosexual-only. Although these groups were initially set up as pilot groups, the
data collected were so rich that I decided to include it in the main body of the thesis.
(ii) Main Group
The sample group for the main study was school students recruited from a Sixth
Form Psychology conference held at Loughborougb University. Female,
heterosexual students over the age of sixteen were asked to volunteer in group
discussions on the topic of 'Saying no to sex'. Students were assured that their level
of sexual experience (i.e. whether they had engaged in sexual intercourse or not) did
not preclude their participation in the study as the researcher was interested in their
views rather than their experiences. The students were aged 16- 18. This age group
was sampled because it was thought that they would be at different stages of their
sexual careers so that there were likely to be some who had engaged in various
different forms of sexual activity (including intercourse) and some who had not. All
of the volunteers were white; again this reflected the demographic characteristics of
the conference attendees, although it may also be the case that women from other
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'racial'/ethnic backgrounds may have chosen not to volunteer because the research
was conducted by a white woman. Eight focus group discussions consisting of
between two and five students were conducted in a comfortable university room.
Although many of the "how to" books on conducting focus groups suggest group
sizes of between six and eight, after conducting pilot groups with up to nine
participants I felt that smaller groups were preferable. This is because when groups
are larger it is more difficult to ensure that each participant is given equal
opportunity to contribute, and because transcription of the tapes becomes more
difficult when there are more participants.
The focus group text books recommend that participants should not be acquainted
prior to the group discussion (Krueger, 1988; Morgan, 1988). Conducting focus
groups with friends may cause special problems for the quality of the data collected.
According to Krueger (1988: 28), acquaintances "present special difficulties for the
focus group discussion" and familiarity may "inhibit disclosure". Similarly, Morgan
advises that:
Although friends converse easily this is often the result of
their ability to rely on the kind of taken for granted
assumptions that are exactly that the researcher is trying to
investigate. This problem is even more severe when the
assumptions include invisible boundaries around the subjects
that friends have agreed not to discuss among themselves
(Morgan, 1988: 48).
It seems that although pre-existing groups may facilitate the development of rapport
and a relaxed atmosphere may be more easily established, they may also inhibit
disclosure or distort the information given. In addition, researchers are warned that
pre-existing groups may create problems of analysis:
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The concern about familiarity is really an issue of analysis.
The analyst is unable to isolate what influenced the
participants. Were the findings related to the issue being
discussed or could the comments have been influenced by
the past, present, or future interaction with other group
members? (Krueger, 1988: 29)
Nonetheless, several studies have successfully utilised 'naturally occurring' or pre-
existing groups including family members (Billig, 1992; Gervais, 1993), members of
'Mothers' Club' groups (Coreil et a!., 1994), and colleagues (Gervais, 1993;
Zimmermann and Applegate, 1992). The AIDS Media Research Project studied the
effects of media messages about AIDS using a number of pre-existing groups -
including women whose children attended the same play group, civil engineers
working on the same site, and members of a retirement club - in order to "explore
how people might talk about AIDS within the various and overlapping groupings
within which they actually operate" (Kitzinger, J. 1994: 105). All but one of the
participants in the main study knew at least one other participant in the focus group
discussion in which they participated, and most focus groups consisted of friendship
groups who collectively volunteered to take part. This had the advantage of
encouraging participation and making the invitation to take part in a psychological
study less threatening. Objections raised in the mainstream texts were rejected
because of their underlying assumption that the primary focus of research interest is
the individual psychology of each participant. The concern of this project is not with
the examination of individual opinions and attitudes which just happen to have been
collected in a group setting, rather I am interested in exploring the collective
negotiation of meanings within the group as a group. Concerns about the facilitation
and inhibition of disclosure implies that the researcher wishes to 'discover'
previously hidden, or at least only partially visible aspects of the individual's psyche
to get at the 'truth' about what they 'really' think. Similarly, concerns over the
'accuracy' of interpretations are also, from the approach taken in this project,
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misguided. The variety of communication (the arguing, story-telling, joking, and
teasing) is one of the most exciting and distinguishable features of focus group
research, rather than being seen as obscuring analysis they can be taken as data
available for analysis.
All focus groups lasted for between thirty and ninety minutes and were conducted,
tape recorded and transcribed by the author. As noted earlier (section 2.2.2) focus
groups can be transcribed in a wide variety of ways, and each method of
transcription has both advantages and disadvantages. If my research question were
"how do women say no to sex?", and if my data were examples of women actually
saying 'no' to sex with men then a Jeffersonian style transcript would illuminate the
ways in which saying 'no' is done. However, although this would have given a great
deal of information about the way in which things are said, it would give very little
about the content of what is said. Take, for example, Myers' analysis of focus
groups (presented on page 81), he has much to say about how disagreement gets
done in focus groups but very little to say about environmental sustainability which
is the topic the participants were talking about. My own analytic focus is on what
gets said rather than how it gets said, I am interested in what young women say
about saying 'no' rather than in how they actually say 'no'. Of course, in taking this
approach I may be losing a great deal of detail about how the participants talked
about saying 'no'. There may be some features of the discussion, some aspect of
how things were said, which (for example) indicated their embarrassment about
talking about a particular topic, something which would be very interesting to
capture. Just like any other researcher I have to make decisions about the level of
detail I want in my transcriptions and the amount of time and resources I want to
allocate to this task. Given the size of my sample and the number of discussion
groups I ran, I decided to adopt the transcription method used by most focus group
researchers of transcribing all of the groups verbatim. I was unhappy about
transcribing only those bits of data which were of immediate interest as I did not
know in advance of transcription which aspects of the discussion would be
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analytically important, and so I followed the advice of other researchers and planned
to transcribe all of at least some data collection sessions, and in the end I transcribed
all of the focus groups in this way.
2.5.2 Materials
(i) The Video
Participants were shown short extracts from a sex education video 'Make Love
Last', which was designed for use in schools and youth groups. The video is
produced by Christian, Action, Research and Education (CARE), and according to
the accompanying 'Teacher's Pack' is designed to "provide teachers with resource
materials and ideas to present the case for abstinence from premature sexual
relationships outside of a permanent and committed relationship. i.e.; marriage." (p.
3). The video revolves around sketches involving two juxtaposed characters; 'Uncle
Roger' who is portrayed as giving outdated and old-fashioned advice, and 'Randy
Factor' who is loud, obnoxious and in the words of the video a "sex-sodden old git".
In addition to this the video also includes comments from sex educators, teen
magazine agony aunts and from young people themselves (for a more
comprehensive review of this video see Fnth, 1996).
(ii) The Focus Group Schedule
The number of questions which the moderator aims to cover within a focus group
study can vary considerably. One schedule, used by Kline, Kline and Oken (1992),
consisted of 35-.40 core questions about sexual decision making which were asked of
all participants and an additional 10-15 questions which were specific to each of
their target groups, for example, in the case of REV infected groups they were asked
about attitudes/behaviours in relation to the risk of transmission to partners and
children. Kathleen Irwin and colleagues report using a pre-tested discussion guide
consisting of 29 open-ended questions to investigate factory workers attitudes and
beliefs about HIV infection (Irwin et al., 1991), while Mates and Allison had just
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two questions to investigate sources of stress (Mates and Allison 1992). Regardless
of the number of questions asked, most of the studies emphasise that the guide
should not be used as a rigid schedule to be followed unwaveringly, instead the
guide should be suggestive of the topics to be covered "affording the moderator
considerable latitude to improvise fruitful questions and pursue unanticipated lines
of inquiry" (Miliward, 1995: 284). The focus group discussion guide schedule used
in this study consists often open-ended questions:
1. What is the main message of the video?
2. How effective or convincing do you think that message is?
3. What are good! bad reasons for waiting before you have
sex? How long do you wait?
4. What do you think are good! bad reasons for having sex?
5. Why might people choose not to wait?
6. Would it be easy or difficult to wait?
7. If someone was pressuring you to have sex when you
didn't want to what reason!excuse would you give not to
have sex with them? How would you convince them that you
do not want to have sex?
8. How confident do you feel in being able to tell someone
that you do not wish to have sex?
116
Chapter Two: Focus Groups: A Feminist Method
9. Do you think it makes a difference if you have been
intimate with them before - kissing, touching, oral sex?
10. Is there anything else you wish to add? Anything you
think we should have covered but haven't? Or, any other
questions which you would like to ask me?
The relatively small number of questions contained in this guide is indicative of
their purpose as reflecting the main topics to be covered in the group rather than
being an exhaustive list of queries. The guide is flexible enough to allow me to
phrase the questions in a language and manner which was comfortable for me and, I
hope, the group participants. Following other researchers I did not attempt to ask the
questions in a particular sequence (with the exception of the first two questions
which always came first for reasons explained below), but rather allowed the flow of
the discussion to dictate when a particular topic could be introduced (e.g. Cooper et
al., 1993; Kline et al., 1992). I used a considerable number of probes in order to
explore fully the responses to each topic area.
It is usual for focus group research to utilise discussion guides in which the
questions get progressively 'harder'. Often the moderator will start the group with an
'ice-breaker', Norris et a!., for example, report initiating their focus groups on how
women perceive the threat of sexual aggression with the question 'What did you
expect Greek life would be like before you joined?'. This initial question allowed
the group members to "become more acquainted and more comfortable with each
other" (Norris et a!,, 1996: 129). Often the first few questions of the discussion are
more specific, less personal and less threatening (although this is not always the
case), Andrea Press (1991) initiated her discussions about the impact of television
on reasoning about abortion with a series of relatively innocuous questions about her
participants' television viewing habits before encouraging them to talk about their
own decisions (or those of their friends or relatives) about unwanted pregnancies.
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The initial questions on the focus groups discussion guide used in this research
relate directly to the extracts of the 'Make Love Last' video shown to each group.
These questions ask the group participants to give their views and comment on the
video, and were designed to be non-intrusive and non-threatening in order to
galvanise the group into discussion. Questions three, four, five, and six were
developed in order to explore how young women talk about decisions about whether
or not to have sex, how they talk about how and why they make the decisions they
do. These questions are worded in such as way that they mix generalised questions
about what 'people in general' might do, and more personal, specific questions
about what these young women themselves might do. This use of vocabulary was
partly an attempt to acknowledge the differing sexual experience between the
participants, and partly an attempt to explore how young women talk about what is
expected of them, and what they expect of others, compared to what 'really'
happens in sexual negotiations. The later questions deal more explicitly with issues
around saying 'no' to unwanted sexual activity. Question seven investigates how
young women talk about different strategies, other than saying 'no', to avoid
unwanted sexual activity, while question eight examines how young women talk
about the ease or difficulty of negotiating saying 'no' in sexual encounters. Question
nine explicitly addresses issues of sexual experience and previous sexual intimacy in
relation to saying 'no'. This question does not presuppose any specific knowledge
on the part of young women but gives them the opportunity, if they have not already
done so, to talk about sexual activities other than intercourse. Question ten performs
two important functions. First, it allows me, as moderator, to bring the discussion to
a close in a way which doesn't bring an abrupt stop to the discussion. Perhaps more
importantly though, this question marks an explicit invitation for participants to
introduce aspects of the topic which they feel are important but which may not have
been covered already.
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2.5.3 Procedure
(i) Introduction and Overview
Participants were asked to volunteer to take part in group discussions around issues
of saying 'no' to sex which were part of the author's Ph.D. research. They were
informed that the groups would take about an hour to an hour and a half and that
they would be tape recorded and transcribed. They were also reassured that the
researcher was interested in what young women thought about saying 'no' to sex
and so whether or not they had any experience in actual sexual encounters of saying
'no' was not a factor which prevented their participation. Group members were told
that they would view a short extract from a film designed for use in sex education
classes and that they would be asked to discuss a range of issues prompted by
questions from the researcher. They were told that the researcher had a set of
questions to ask but that she was unconcerned about whether or not all the questions
were covered and was happy for the discussion to go in any direction which the
group thought was important. At the end of each group participants were thanked for
their time and asked if they thought that the researcher had missed anything which
they felt should have been covered, whether they had anything else to add, and
whether they wanted to ask any questions.
(ii) Establishing Ground Rules
Prior to the start of each group the moderator must establish some ground rules for
the conduct of the group. This is important for a number of reasons. First, it allows
the researcher to introduce and expand upon issues of ethical importance such as
anonymity and confidentiality. Second, it allows the moderator to create an
environment which is both non-threatening and non-evaluative in order that each
member of the group feels that their views are respected (Stewart and Shamdasani,
1990). Third, it allows the researcher to explain how the group will be conducted
and what the participants role in the research is and how they should respond to each
other.
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The ground rules are also an appropriate place to license different and differing
opinions. Participants were assured that that there are no right or wrong answers to
the questions being asked, and that the researcher did not expect that they would all
agree on all matters and would be actively seeking different viewpoints. However, at
the same time group members were encouraged to respect the opinions of others and
not to be thoughtless, insensitive or insulting. This latter point included being
attentive to the views of others, allowing everyone the chance to speak and not all
talking at once - not least because this makes it impossible to transcribe. Participants
were told that the format of the session would be similar to an ordinary
conversation, the moderator would not be asking them all questions in turn but that
they would be encouraged to discuss questions with each other, and that they were
welcome to ask questions of each other and of the moderator.
2.5.4 Ethics
This project was conducted in accordance with the British Psychological Society
ethical guidelines. Participants were informed prior to the group sessions about
exactly what would be expected of them, the length of time that their participation
would entail, and I requested permission to audio-record the discussions.
Participants were made aware of the sensitive nature of the research topic (i.e.
sexual and personal relationships) and advised that this might cause them some
embarrassment. Participants were given a rape crisis help-line number at the end of
the session so that, in the event of the group discussions being upsetting or
distressing for any of the women, they would feel that they had somewhere to turn to
for help. Participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the research at
any time, whether during the group discussion or at any time afterwards. Group
members were reminded that they were not required to answer any questions (posed
either by myself or by another member of the group), if they did not feel comfortable
responding. Participants were reassured that their names, and any locations
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mentioned during the discussions, would be altered on the transcripts to ensure their
anonymity, and that I alone would transcribe the tapes or listen to them in their
entirety. As none of the participants were under sixteen no arrangements were made
for parental consent. They all signed a consent form acknowledging that they bad
been informed about all aspects of the research and that they had voluntarily agreed
to participate (see Appendix One). All of the above considerations are typical of any
research project, but I now go on to discuss three issues which are specific to this
research project in a little more detail.
(i) Confidentiality
Issues of confidentiality are a little more complicated in focus group research than,
for example, in one to one interviews. Participants disclose information not only to
the researcher but also to other member of the group. One of the few commentators
on ethics in focus groups states that researchers cannot ensure absolute
confidentiality over the contents of the group discussion because they have no
control over what participants may reveal to others after they leave the group
(Smith, 1995). It is important, then, that participants are informed of this possibility
before they take part. One of the few researchers to do this (or at least to say that
they do it) is Norris and colleagues who asked participants to "honor an agreement
of privacy and confidentiality by not discussing the contents of the group discussion
or the participants" (Norris et a!., 1996: 129). A similar approach was taken in this
research. Participants were encouraged to think of the group discussions as
somewhat different from ordinary conversations, and to feel a sense of responsibility
to each other, which would include not repeating outside of the group anything
which they had heard inside of the group. This was particularly important, they were
reminded, because as they were friends it was likely that they would be seeing each
other again in a different context.
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(ii) Researching Sensitive Topics
Sensitive, embarrassing, or potentially taboo topics (such as sexual negotiations),
may initially seem to be inappropriate for discussion in a group setting. However,
many researchers have successfully used focus groups to study sensitive topics such
as menstruation (Lovering, 1995; Kissling, 1996), sexual relationships (Roberts et
al., 1995) and incest (Barringer, 1992). Some researchers suggest that the group
dynamics may facilitate, rather than inhibit, the discussion of sensitive topics
(Cooper et al., 1993), and Jenny Kitzinger, who has conducted many focus groups
exploring attitudes to AJDS, concludes that:
Group work can actively facilitate the discussion of taboo
topics because the less inhibited members of the group
break the ice for shyer participants. Participants can also
provide mutual support in expressing feelings that are
common to their group but which they consider to deviate
from mainstream culture (or the assumed culture of the
researcher) (Kitzinger, 1995: 300).
In this particular project in which participants were being asked to talk about how
they negotiate sexual encounters I felt that young women would find it less
threatening to talk in a group setting with other young women of a similar age rather
than in a one to one intensive interview situation with an interviewer who although
also female was older and of higher status. This is a decision that was not based on a
concern that a group setting would make for a more accurate or truthful account but
that this setting would be less threatening for the young women involved (for a
detailed discussion of the issues involved in researching sensitive topics see Renzetti
and Lee, 1993).
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(iii) Feminist Ethics
I have attempted throughout this study to attend to issues around ethics and politics
of research to which feminists have drawn attention (see section 2.1.2). In
moderating the focus group discussion I tried to be as non-directive as possible,
allowing participants to set their own agendas and introduce issues which they see as
important. I indicated, when establishing the ground rules, that participants were
welcome to introduce their own ideas and topics, and that I wanted them to feel that
their views had been adequately represented within the discussion, and that the
discussion as a whole had captured the aspects of the topic which they considered to
be important. I attempted to ensure that there was 'no intimacy without reciprocity'
(ef. Oakley, 1981) by sharing aspects of my own experience of refusing sex where I
felt it was appropriate. When establishing the ground rules, I also emphasised the
fact that participants should not feel that I was the only one allowed to ask
questions, rather they were encouraged to ask questions both of each other and of
myself. In addition, question ten on the focus group schedule is an explicit invitation
for participants to ask questions; either about the research process, about my own
experiences of refusing sex, or (given their attendance at a conference about
universities) my experience of university life. I attempted to answer their questions
as fully and as honestly as possible.
Although, I am older and of higher status than the young women who participated in
this study, to some extent this was an example of insider research. I am, like them
white, and heterosexual, and possibly still young enough (I was 23 when I conducted
the group discussions) for age not to make me too much of an outsider. These
factors may have made it easier for the women in this study to talk about their
experiences of refusing sex. I reflect on the notion of insider research in relation to
this study in Chapter Seven.
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2.6 Interpretation and Analysis
I began this research with the idea that I would interpret my data by using the same
kind of broadly thematic analysis conducted by most focus group researchers (see
section 2.1.3), which is also the kind of approach favoured by feminists conducting
qualitative research. My previous experience with qualitative data analysis had been
of this type, and I had found it fairly straightforward, particularly as I had
approached the data with a clear theoretical framework within which the
experiences of the women I interviewed neatly fitted (see Frith, 1993). At the onset
of this research, then, I assumed that my data analysis would be fairly
straightforward, and that the analysis was simply a means to an end - the end being
telling a good, coherent, and compelling story about the experiences of young
women saying 'no' to sex.
It turned out to be not quite so straightforward. In this section I will discuss the
evolution of my data analytic procedures, and the impact this has upon my thesis. I
began my empirical analysis by conducting and transcribing three pilot focus groups,
reading through the transcripts, both quietly to myself and aloud with my supervisor,
and (like other researchers engaged in focus group research) identified some extracts
of the talk which were of interest to me and which seemed to 'belong together'. I
then conducted a further seven focus groups with 16-18 year olds and began the
analysis proper. Like other researchers I identified themes, key ideas, patterns and
trends. These included talk about reputation, about personal experience, about
excuses and about men. I generated criteria by which membership of certain analytic
categories could be established. For example, the category of "personal experience
of saying 'no' to sex" had three criteria for inclusion: describing a specific event in
the first person, describing sexual activities as desired or expected by their male
counterparts, and describing the sexual activity as unwanted (see chapter three,
section 3.1 for more detail). Following Morgan (1988) I provide simple numerical
counts to exemplify the frequency of the various different categories, and use quotes
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from research participants to illustrate the content of these categories. It is this kind
of analysis which forms the basis of chapter three, and in this respect chapter three
most closely resembles the sort of analysis that most researchers using focus groups
present, and reflects my own initial approach to data analysis. Chapters four, five
and six move progressively further away from this model and instead reflect my
growing concern with the epistemological status of qualitative data.
It is at the point of categorising and coding data that qualitative researchers usually
assert that themes 'emerged from the data'. I have deliberately chosen not to use this
term because it obscures the work done on the part of the analyst. It suggests that
data extracts have a life of their own - that they jump out from the transcript, forcing
the passive, neutral and observant researcher to take notice. This obscures the
researcher's own relationship to and investment in the data. My own theoretical
background frames what I 'hear' in the data and what I find interesting. This became
even more apparent when, while reading through the transcripts, it became obvious
that my supervisor (Celia Kitzinger) and I 'hear' quite different things in the data.
Perhaps due to differences both in our sexual identities (Celia is a lesbian while I am
heterosexual), and our ages (Celia is 40 while I am 26) things which I considered to
be common knowledge needed careful explanation to become meaningful to Celia,
while Celia challenged and problematised things which I took for granted. Indeed, I
am sure that there are aspects of the data to which both Celia and myself were
unable to 'hear', things which we both took for granted or didn't notice. Our
similarities, as well as our differences, influence our interpretations of the data (see,
for example, Hurd and McIntyre, 1996 for a discussion of how white-on-white
research can lead to assumptions and misrepresentations). The feminist literature is
full of examples where researchers 'hear' different things and disagree about the
'proper' interpretation of data. For example, Kathy Davis' (1994) alternative
analysis of Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan's (1993) interpretation of a story
relayed by a respondent called Neeti; Sue Widdicombe's re-working of an interview
(initially analysed by Nicola Gavey) in which a woman talks about her experiences
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of unwanted sex (Widdicombe, 1995); and Stevi Jackson and Angela McRobbie's
different readings of girls' magazines (Jackson, 1996; McRobbie, 1996). These
examples clearly demonstrate is that it is not just that as feminists and women we
'see' things that men do not (as suggested by standpoint theorists), but also that as
feminists, involved in various feminisms, interpretations are varied within feminist
thinking. What is interesting about these differences in interpretation is not that they
occur, nor that one is 'right' or more 'accurate', or better represents the world view
of those that it claims to represent. Rather, what I am interested in is the extent to
which the basis on which a researcher reaches one interpretation rather than another
remains either unexplored or unarticulated. Analyses which rely on the 'God trick'
(cf. Elaraway, 1988) and claim objectivity, "typically neglect to discuss why one
research question or interpretation prevailed over others" and as such they "render
oblique the ways in which we, as researchers construct our analyses and narratives"
(Fine, 1992: 211). From a feminist positivist position it is often assumed that one or
other of the analyses is simply inaccurate or that there is some problem with the
analytical tools being used. According to Davis, for example, the disagreement
between her own reading of Neeti's story and that of Brown and Gilligan arises
because of the inadequacy of the 'Listener's Guide' (Brown and Gilligan, 1992;
1993) which, she argues, directs analysts to listen to narratives in order to seek
confirmation or voice (or the loss of voice) which "seems to prevent them from
'hearing' voices which are different or do not 'fit' their notion of what voice is all
about" (Davis, 1994: 359). In this case, then, Davis is criticising Brown and Gilligan
on a methodological basis - their measuring instrument (the Listener's Guide) is
simply not sensitive enough to pick up all the different stories that Neeti is narrating,
or is skewed towards detecting some rather than others. The implication is that if
only a more sophisticated tool were developed then information about what Neeti
'really' meant could be gathered.
It is not my intention to develop such a tool, or to suggest that others do so. Rather
my interest lies in attempting to take seriously the idea that there is no 'right' (i.e.
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objectively correct) way to analyse data, and to explicate some of the
decisions/choices which researchers make when producing their own interpretations.
What follows in the subsequent chapters (chapters four to six) is, then, not only an
engaging account of young women's talk about sexual experiences, but also an
intensive investigation of the process of interpretation and analysis. I explore how
differences between researchers about the 'right' analysis of particular pieces of data
are underpinned by different epistemological and political choices. These chapters
(four through to six) investigate in detail three themes from the focus group
discussions: miscommunication, emotion work, and sexual scripts. Using these
themes as illustrative examples I examine the epistemological and political choices
which influence the analytic work and interpretative choices made by researchers.
This interrogation of qualitative data is organised around two polarised axes: (i)
transparent and constructed interpretations, and (ii) feminist and non-feminist
interpretations. I introduce these two axes briefly below. These axes are interwoven
throughout my analysis chapters, and I will return to both of them in the final
chapter (chapter seven).
2.6.1 Transparent and Constructed Readings
This analytical axis explores the relationship between theory and empirical data at
the epistemological level. As discussed in chapter one (section 1.2) epistemology is
the study of knowledge systems - who knows what, about whom, and how? In
chapter one I outlined the distinction between essentialism and social
constructionism. I argued that these two positions differed in relation to their
conceptualisation of the origin and location of social phenomenon, and in their
relationship to science, and finally in relation to their methodological approach. I
noted that it was this last aspect, the methodological approach, which is the primary
focus of this thesis. I described an essentialist approach to data analysis as involving
transparent readings of qualitative data, and a social constructionist approach to data
analysis as involving constructed readings of qualitative data. In this section I
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explain exactly what I mean by transparent and constructed readings. By treating the
data as transparent, analysts assume that participants' talk provides a (more or less)
accurate description of the world or of their own experience. By contrast, a
constructionist approach treats what people say as talk produced in a particular
context (i.e. in discussion with a researcher and other participants), and as produced
by participants who have certain investments in what they say: they are attending to
expectations, potential accusations, managing identities, providing excuses and
justif'ing actions. I will provide some examples to illustrate these differences.
By treating data as transparent researchers assume that in interviews and in focus
groups individuals are reporting, more or less accurately, on real events in their lives
or about what they think or feel. Here talk is treated as descriptive, and individuals
are portrayed as describing events in their lives in a neutral and straightforward
manner. This 'open souls' approach to research posits that if researchers want to
know why people do what they do then they should simply ask (cf. Harré and
Secord, 1972). There are two different approaches to treating the data as transparent.
The first approach uses a model of participant-as-informant, where the participant is
valued for providing information about her social world (e.g. the world of sexual
negotiation amongst adolescents). One study which used this model conducted focus
groups with women from different ethnic minority groups in order to discover the
factors which deter them from cervical screening. Here, women's talk is taken as a
more or less accurate reflection of their social world, the authors conclude (for
example) that "[m]ost of the women had had their first smear taken at postnatal
examination", and that "[m]ost women gained their information through women
friends or relatives" (Naish, Brown and Denton, 1994: 1127). Similarly, in another
study, the social service concerns expressed in focus groups by women infected with
HIV (e.g. about whether they are eligible for certain services and about the
consequences of not having services) are assumed to reflect the reality of these
women's lives iti relation to such things as the attitudes of service providers,
legislation, and organisational definitions of illness (Seals et a!., 1995). In both of
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these studies, research participants are seen as providing information about the
world. According to Wendy Holiway (1989), it is this kind of 'descriptive
interviewing' analysis which is most common among feminist researchers.
The second approach uses a model of participant-as-psychological-subject, where a
participant's understanding of their social world is seen as 'filtered' through their
individual psychology. In this latter approach a participant may or may not provide
information about her social world but it is a world which is 'real to her' whatever
its 'objective' reality. A participant's talk is seen to reveal more about her own
understandings, beliefs, values, mental and psychological states, than about social
reality. Jenny Kitzinger (1990), for example, argues that the discussions she
conducted with diverse groups of men and women around the media coverage of
AIDS were useful for revealing people's understandings of media representations
and for making explicit their assumptions about the 'kinds of people' described.
However, a group of gay help-line workers who rated 'People who have sex with
many different partners of the opposite sex' as at a higher risk than 'Homosexuals -
that is gay men' is not taken as evidence that such people are at greater risk, rather -
this is seen as revealing important information about how this gay help-line workers
understand the notion of risk in relation to AIDS. This study then, uses the model of
participant-as-psychological-subject: that is, participants' talk is treated as
transparent data which reveals their 'understandings' or their 'assumptions' about
the social world as they understand it. This can then be contrasted with objective
reality - i.e. what we 'really' know about HIV and AIDS risk.
These two approaches differ in their understanding of what exactly analysts access
through participants' talk (i.e. social reality or psychological states), but are similar
because they attempt to access something behind, underneath or beyond the talk -
i.e. treating talk as a transparent window to social reality or as a route to cognitions.
Much data from focus group discussions (and other forms of qualitative data) are
analysed in this way. Brown and Gilligan's analysis of Neeti's interviews also
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provides (in common with much feminist work) a transparent reading of (in this
case) interview data. The accounts that young women give of their lives during
interviews is taken as evidence of both social reality - Neeti at age twelve displays
"resistance to oppressive authority" (i.e. the camp guide) - and, psychological states
such as a "loss of voice" or a "struggle for self-authorization" Brown and Gilligan,
1992: 39).
In my own research, then, treating the data as transparent, treating what these young
women say as neutral descriptions of their lives outside of research, would allow me
to answer certain analytical questions. If I were to use the model of participant-as-
informant I would be interested in understanding the world of adolescent sexual
negotiation and what young women said about this world in focus groups would be
taken as a more or less accurate description of what 'really' happens in sexual
negotiations. This model would allow me to ask analytical questions such as: What
are sexual negotiations like between men and women?; What happens when women
say (or try to say) 'no' to sex with men? I would, presumably, be able to answer such
questions simply by asking participants how they negotiate sexual encounters, and
about how they refuse sexual activities or avoid unwanted sex. But here I run in to
problems. If I want to use the data to draw conclusions about the nature of actual
sexual negotiations between men and women I would ideally have to have data in
which men and women are conducting actual sexual negotiations. I would have to
be privy to those conversations in which men 'persuade' women to have unwanted
sex, or in which women refuse unwanted sex. Such data would, of course, be
difficult - if not impossible - to collect. If I were to take what people say as a more
or less accurate indication of what they actually do my data would still be
considered deficient in a number of ways. It could be seen as deficient because I
have 'only' conducted focus groups with young women and not young men - surely,
then, this account of sexual negotiations would be skewed towards the perspective
of women and perhaps misrepresent young men. Others might criticise my reliance
on self-report data which is open to problems of recall, social desirability and/or
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intewiewer effects. Perhaps their disclosures are adversely influenced by the sorts of
group effects mentioned earlier (see section 2.3.2 i); perhaps they are too
embarrassed to admit to engaging in unwanted sex, perhaps they want to appear
more (or less) sexually experienced than they are; maybe the views of one
influenced the others; perhaps one person changed their mind at the end of the
session. All of these problems cast doubt upon the validity of any conclusions which
I subsequently draw.
Alternatively, still treating the data as transparent, I could use a model of
participant-as-psychological-subject. Using this model I can still gain insight into the
world of adolescent sexual negotiations, but this will be the world as my participants
perceive it (which may or may not correspond to how the world 'really' is). This
world view might also provide insights into young women's psychological states. To
give a crass example, young women may argue in focus groups that they are equal to
men in sexual negotiations, which gives me an insight into how young women see
the world. As a feminist this vision may not correspond to what I know is the 'truth'
about sexual negotiations (i.e. that men have greater power in sexual negotiations
than women), and this mismatch between my own and my participants
understanding of the world may lead me to conclude that young women are falsely
conscious.
Treating the data as constructed means problematising the link between talk and
social reality, and between talk and psychological states. It assumes that there is no
way of knowing whether the accounts given by participants to researchers
correspond to what actually happens 'out there' in the real world, or to internal
psychological processes. Rather than using a model of participant-as-informant, or
participant-as-psychological-subject, this approach uses a model of participant-as-
social-interactor. Rather than assuming that talk in interviews takes place within an
"interactional vacuum" (as is the case in transparent analyses) the participant is seen
as providing information about the particular, localised context in which the talk is
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produced (Widdicombe, 1995: 110). This attention to the social context within
which talk is produced is a feature of the work of both Elizabeth Frazer on class, and
Pat Macpherson and Michelle Fine on 'race', which I discussed earlier (see section
2.4.2 ii). As Holland and Ramazanoglu (1994: 144) point out "An interview is a
specific account given to a particular interviewer at a particular moment". The
providing of this account takes place then within a particular interactional context,
and as such it is "primarily produced to address the interactional business deemed
relevant to particular circumstances" (Widdicombe, 1995: 110). This approach then
looks at the social functions of talk in the context in which it is actually produced.
As noted earlier, this approach is taken by Billig (1992) in his analysis of talk about
the Royal family, where he looks at the function of talk rather than trying to assess
what people 'really' think (see section 2.3.2 ii). In contrast to transparent
approaches, participants' talk is examined in its own right and "not as a secondary
route to things 'beyond' the text like attitudes, events or cognitive processes" (Potter
and Wetherell, 1987: 160). Rather than treating the talk of the young women
involved in this study as representations of what 'really' happens, or of internal
psychological states, this approach treats the talk as an 'account' of what happens.
This may seem like a minor step but it has far reaching consequences for the kinds
of conclusions that one can draw from data. Rather than being seen as descriptive,
talk is seen as constructive; people do not use language in a neutral way but rather
"... people use their language to do things: to order, request, persuade and accuse"
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 32).
From this perspective then, I look at how the descriptions which young women give
about their lives are not neutral, disinterested descriptions but rather serve particular
functions in the local context in which the talk is being produced (i.e. in the focus
group). This approach considers the descriptions people produce to be a resource
which participants use in order to present themselves in a favourable light and to
counter potential negative assumptions about them. It is the social functions of talk
which Kathy Davis perhaps alludes to when she says "What I couldn't help hearing,
132
Chapter Two: Focus Groups: A Feminist Method
in fact, was a Neeti who is engaged in justifying and explaining actions and feeling
which she finds problematic". Neeti is not neutrally describIng her actions, she has
certain investments in the descriptions she provides and her talk must function to
justify and explain, rather than to simply describe, her actions. Similarly, me
Gremmen (1994: 364) claims that Brown and Gilligan's approach "makes it difficult
to keep seeing conflicts, confusion and struggles as conflicts, confusion and
struggles" rather than as evidence of deep rooted psychologicai difficulties. Rather
than being seen as a means of obtaining information about 'reality' these accounts
provide information about how individuals present themselves in a specific context.
This approach, then, looks at how talk is put together, in what context, which what
interactional implications.
To summarise, then, in chapter three I present a conventional analysis of my focus
group data which parallels the kinds of analysis produced by most researchers (both
feminist and non-feminist). I then move on, in Chapters Four, Five, and Six, to
explore themes from the focus group discussions (miscommunication, emotion work
and sexual scripts) using these two very different epistemological approaches to data
analysis (transparent and constructed readings) and examine the kinds of analytical
questions they address, and the kinds of conclusions which can be drawn from these
two positions.
2.6.2 Feminist and Non-Feminist Readings
The second axis around which the analysis chapters revolve is a distinction between
feminist and non-feminist interpretations of the data. When faced with a multitude
of competing analyses, and with epistemological positions which problematise the
notion of a 'right' way to analyse data, the interesting question becomes how the
researcher can decide which interpretation (from the myriad of those available) to
endorse? Committed to feminist research, the obvious answer for me is to endorse a
feminist interpretation. Such a position is taken by Holland and Ramazanoglu who
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observe that interview transcripts are indeed open to different interpretations, and to
different policy implications, but note that this does not mean that all interpretations
are equally valid. They highlight how their own feminist politics leads them to
produce conclusions which "favour feminist policies which empower young women,
over masculinist policies that affirm sexuality as an area to be controlled and
policed" (Holland and Ramazanoglu, 1994: 133). Although initially I planned to
follow in Holland and Ramazanoglu's footsteps, as I began to produce some
analyses of my data it became obvious that it is often not at all clear (especially
given the wide variety of feminisms) what a feminist interpretation would look like,
or just which interpretations qualify as 'feminist' and to whom.
The value of a feminist interpretation is perhaps most easily identifiable when it is
contrasted with analyses and interpretations which are most noticeably anti-feminist
- see, for example, feminist critiques and reinterpretations of Freud (Rush, 1977),
Paula Caplan and Maureen Gans' critique of 'Self-Defeating Personality Disorder'
(Caplan and Gans, 1991), or Carol Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg's theoiy of moral
development (Gilligan, 1982). It is more difficult, however, to identify the feminist
interpretation among competing feminist analyses. Feminists disagree, for example,
about the feminist interpretation of women who work as prostitutes; about women
taking pleasure in viewing soap operas or reading romance novels; about the
feminist interpretation of women's cosmetic surgery; and about lesbian
sadomasochism. Having discovered that qualitative data is often open to more than
one interpretation, and given the difficulty (if not impossibility) of identifying the
feminist interpretation, I am still left with the problem of trying to distinguish
between, and evaluate, opposing and competing interpretations. Instead of asking
questions about whether an analysis is 'right' or 'wrong', or whether it is 'feminist'
or 'anti-feminist', I frame the question differently by asking what are the costs and
benefits of analysing the data in this way, and for whom. This may include the
costs/benefits of an analysis for feminism (i.e. does it advance feminist theory, does
it make a clear statement, does it blame women for their own oppression) and the
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costs and benefits of adopting particular ways of talking for the women themselves.
At the beginning of this chapter (section 2.1.3) I identified some of the ways in
which feminists have talked about issues around interpretation and analysis
including issues around 'validating women's reality' or providing political analyses,
presenting women as victims or as active agents, and giving or appropriating voice.
We can see how these aspects of feminist research practice become central in
disagreements between feminists about interpretations and analyses. Giving voice to
women's experiences and taking these voices seriously is one aspect of Brown and
Gilligan's work that is highly praised by other researchers, even by those who
ultimately disagree with their analysis. me Gremmen, for example, describes
feeling "moved and inspired" by Brown and Gilligan's attempts to take girls'
knowledge, experience and problems seriously (Gremmen, 1994: 362), and Kathy
Davis reports being "[iJnspired by the project of taking women's voices seriously
and validating their approaches to morality and care" (Davis, 1994: 354). Critiques
of their work are focused on other aspects of feminist research practice.
me Gremmen, for example, suggests that the distinction between 'authentic' and
'fraudulent' relationships drawn by Brown and Gilligan can only be made on moral
and political grounds. Accused of elevating their own political agendas, Brown
reiterates that the distinction between 'genuine' and 'fraudulent' relationships
comes directly from the young women themselves: there are references to what girls
"told us", to what they "described" and what they "talked about" their lives (Brown,
1994: 387). This reaffirms the importance of listening to women and of women
speaking for themselves both in feminism more generally and more specifically as a
guiding principle for their own research. What this implies, of course, is that
analysts should merely reflect the words, voices, experiences, of the women they
research. Brown concludes that "There is no doubt we interpreted such distinctions
and their implications for girls' lives on feminist grounds but we did not
'patemalistically' impose the distinctions or these categories themselves" (Brown,
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1994: 388). It is clear, then, that issues over the appropriation and control of data are
central to feminist debates about 'good' analysis.
Another way in which the costs and benefits of different analyses could be addressed
is by considering the implications of certain interpretations and the possibilities for
direct activism and intervention they create, It is to this aspect of Brown and
Gilligan's work that me Gremmen again draws attention. According to Gremmen,
the 'solution' to the 'relational impasse' faced by girls at adolescence offered by
Brown and Gilligan's work is that girls should "resist external constraints and keep
trusting their 'true' feelings 'inside' and speak openly" (Gremmen, 1994: 363). The
advantage of this solution is that girls are seen as active agents rather than passive
dupes manipulated by patriarchal society, and that it opens up possibilities for
change. At the same time girls who do not 'speak openly', those who do not remain
'in connection' could be implicated in their own oppression and blamed for
passively accepting their fate. These may of course be concerns for young women
themselves which they orient to in group discussions, but equally they may be a
concern for feminist analysts who are also concerned about the image of young
women which they present in their research.
This axis, then, looks at the implications and consequences of privileging one
interpretation over another. These implications can include which behaviours come
to be defined as problematic (in the case of rape, for example, is it men's sexual
aggression or women's 'loose' behaviour which is at fault), who is held to be
accountable, and the 'solutions' which are endorsed.
2.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, then, I have reviewed the literature on the use of focus groups as a
methodological technique, including an exploration of the ways in which focus
groups have been used in other research. I drew particular attention to issues of
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power and control in focus groups, and to the competing tensions of essentialist and
social constructionist understandings of the relative advantages of studying the
person in context. In addition, I also explored feminist approaches to research
methodology, including concerns about method, ethics/politics and analysis. There
seemed to me to be clear parallels between issues raised in the focus group literature
the concerns expressed by feminists about research method. Consequently, I
explored (in section 2.4) the ways in which focus groups might prove fruitful as a
specifically feminist method. Moreover, I explained in full detail the ways in which
focus groups were implemented in this particular study, including information about
the research sample, the materials used, the procedure adopted, and the particular
attention given to ethical issues. Finally, I explained how the particular analytical
approach adopted in this research would revolve around two dimensions: transparent
versus constructed readings of the data, and feminist versus non-feminist analyses.
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In this chapter I present an overview of the group discussions which is based on
the kind of transparent reading of qualitative data which I outlined in the
previous chapter (see section 2.6.1). 1 provide a broad outline of some of the key
features of the focus group discussions. These features were identified using a
broad thematic approach to data analysis, which (as I discussed in chapter two) is
characteristic of most focus group research. First, I look at women's experience
of unwanted sexual attention and sexual coercion, whether or not they said 'no'
in these situations, and what happened after they said 'no'. Second, I discuss the
various different strategies which women say they use (or could use) in order to
refuse sexual encounters: these include getting straight to the point, using
excuses, and other strategies such as humour. Third, I explore the constraints on
saying 'no' which women face. The constraints which I explore (although these
are by no means the only constraints) are bound up with issues of identity.
Women describe how refusing sex is constrained by sexual reputation, by the
kind of person you are, and by the kind of man to whom the 'no' is said. Finally,
I reflect upon the content of this chapter and its place within the thesis as a
whole.
3.1 Women's Experience of Refusing Unwanted Sex
In chapter one I introduced the idea of essentialist and social constructionist
approaches to research. One of the values of essentialist research is that it allows
researchers to make strong claims about the nature of social phenomenon. From
an essentialist perspective, some of the most important questions to answer from
this research might include: do women experience unwanted sexual attention,
and do they say 'no'? In this section I present an essentialist analysis which
attempts to answer these kinds of questions.
In the 15 focus groups (with a total of 58 women) there are 35 'personal
accounts' in which participants describe themselves as being in sexual situations
which they wanted to refuse. 'Personal experiences' were defined as those which
were reported as personal experiences by young women, usually using the first
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person, and describing a specific event as opposed to a hypothetical generalised
event which could happen. These accounts are prefaced with statements such as
"I've been in quite a dodgy situation ..." (Jane, 91), was actually in that
situation once..." (Cath, 7), or "in fact this happened to me just the other week..."
(Jan, 8) which mark the following accounts as examples of 'real-life' personal
experiences. The accounts also often give some indication that some form of
sexual activity is desired or expected by their male counterpart, for example "...
he tried it with me for a couple of months..." (Lara, 3), "... I felt very pressured to
do it ..." (Susie, 13) or "...he started getting really pushy..." (Michelle, 1). There
is also, in the accounts, some indication that this sexual attention is unwanted:
sometimes this is simply implied by the use of words such as 'pressured' and
'pushy':, sometimes it is made explicit as, for example, "...basically I wasn't
enjoying myself..." (Cath, 7), "...I decided I didn't want to do it..." (Kate, 1), "...l
definitely knew that I didn't want to have sex..." ( Michelle, 1). These are all
accounts then, of specific incidents in which the speaker reports that she was in a
(potentially) sexual situation in which some form of sexual activity was
experienced as unwanted. The accounts come from over 30% of the women who
participated, with some women reporting more than one incident. In other words
18 of the women in this study had experienced some form of unwanted sexual
attention which they wanted to refuse.
Despite being in situations where they did not want to engage in a particular
sexual activity, these women (like women in other studies) report that they do
not always say 'no'. In twenty percent of the situations they describe, women
explicitly state that they did say 'no'. In a further twenty percent of situations
it is unclear from the woman's description of the event whether or not she said
'no'. This means women report saying 'no' to unwanted sex in over half
(55%) of the situations they described, and in a further two situations women
said that they indicated 'no' without actually saying it.
'All the names are pseudonyms and the numbers refer to the number of the focus group
discussion from which this extract is taken. A ±uill list of the focus groups and participants is
provided in Appendix Two.
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In twenty percent of incidents then, women report that they did say 'no' to
unwanted sexual activity. Kate, for example, describes one situation in which she
did not say 'no':
I went out with this bloke for three months and I
finished with him because I didn't fancy him at all, and
the night we finished we had this massive row - and we'd
both had a bit too much to drink which probably didn't
help - but all the time I'd been seeing him I said no, I
didn't want to sleep with him and the night I finished
with him I felt so upset and so guilty that I'd hurt him
that I ended up having sex with him (Kate, 1)
Although Kate reports that she had said 'no' on previous occasions without
difficulty, she reports that this time she does not say 'no' because she feels guilty
about hurting him. Earlier in her focus group Kate reports another incident in
which she also does not say 'no', but for a very different reason:
I invited the bloke that I really fancied at the time
back, and basically we were naked and I decided that I
didn't want to do it. And he forced me and I just didn't
know what to do, I was so scared that he was going to hit
me and get violent, and he had my hands pinned up and
everything [...] at the time I was just like 'oh god is it my
fault? How do I say no? (Kate, 1)
Kate explicitly defines this as date rape. Other reasons for 	 saying 'no'
include the following from Sarah:
I'm in that situation at this very moment in time. I just
don't find him sexually attractive at all but I really like
him, and he's like really trying to force me and I just put
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my foot down and said you know ... and I haven't told
him no because I don't want to lose him as a friend
(Sarah, 1)
A different reason again is given by Sharon:
She sat there on the sofa wondering when he would go
home, she had met him earlier on in the evening, a friend
of a friend, and he had walked her home. Now he just
wouldn't leave. She was really tired and quite drunk and
just wanted to go to sleep [...] but he wasn't shifting,
eventually she knew he wasn't going to go and she
wouldn't get any sleep at all. Finally she grabbed him,
she grabbed his hand and dragged him upstairs, 'why
not', she thought 'at least I'll get a decent night's sleep
afterwards' (Sharon, 3)2
In other words, women don't say 'no' for a variety of reasons - out of fear,
relationship reasons, or for more pragmatic reasons.
In a further twenty percent of incidents there is no clear indication of whether the
women said 'no' or not. For Jane, circumstances ensured that she avoids having
to say 'no':
I've been in quite a dodgy situation but his parents
arrived back so he just gave up but it was quite.. I was
like kind of saved (Jane, 9)
2 TS extract is taken from the pilot study in which various different approaches to data collection
were explored (see section 2.5. ii). The nature of this extract differs from the others, then, because
Sharon is reading out (to the rest of the focus group) a memory elicited using 'memory work' (see
Haug, 1992 or Kippax eta!. 1988 for a description of how to do memory work). One 'rule' for
recording a memory invoked in memory work is that the memory should be written in the third
person. So, the 'she' to which Sharon is referring in this extract is taken by the groups to really be
referring to herself.
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In some cases the circumstances were such that the woman was not given an
opportunity to say 'no':
I've been in a situation, really crude, which was I was
drunk and I fell asleep in this guy's bed, which is a really
silly thing to do, and I woke up with his penis in my hand
and he just put it there
(Lara, 7)
For Lara there was no opportunity to say 'no' as his penis was already in her
hand when she woke up.
Encouragingly, in the majority of incidents (55%) women report that they I4 say
'no'. In many of these accounts, the young women report feeling confident and
able to say 'no' to unwanted sexual activities with their male partners:
and then at that stage you can say 'I'm not going to
have sex with you so don't start getting that idea' because
that's what I said to my present boyfriend 'I'm not having
sex with you', you know (Liz, 6)
I personally feel that I could say no and I have done lately
and I wasn't bothered [...] I have said no and they
accepted that [...J I did consider myself to be in control
(Jan, 8)
I have been - in certain situations - been fine, I haven't at
all been bothered about saying no (Cath, 7)
I was all right with my first proper - like the only
boyfriend with a proper relationship that I've had - I was
fine with him. I basically told him how it was and he
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tried it for a couple of months and then he gave up (Lara,
7)
I said no, I said no and I said no... (Linda, 1)
and I was just no, look no way, I don't know you at all
(Sarah, 1)
In a further two incidents women report tiying to convey their refusal in other
ways:
And one night he was trying to come on to me and
that, and it was such an awful feeling because we were
best friends and that, and I didn't want to hurt him in the
slightest way or anything like that and yet I definitely
knew that I didn't want to have sex. And it was just such
an awful feeling, a really awful feeling .. yeah but
obviously I just turned over and pretended to be asleep...
(Michelle, 1)
What I've usually done in the past when I've got into
tricky situations is given them this whole rather
exaggerated life history of how.. of how.. how I've had so
many bad experiences with blokes and basically that
they've put me off sex... (Lara, 7)
These two accounts were not included in the 'not clear' category because they
report that they did communicate, or attempt to communicate, their refusal to
have sex either by pretending to be asleep or by providing a convoluted reason
for not wanting sex, but did not explicitly say 'no'.
144

Chapter Three: Young Women Saying 'No' to Sex
them thinking it was going to be a sociable occasion with
friends of my boyfriend, if you want to call it that. And I
was resisting and they were laughing, and I must have
been about 15/16, and they were laughing. And I was sort
of... I suppose a virgin really, and then this guy was
pushing himself on me, and then when I got back to the
house, you know, he was kind of pushing himself on me,
and I was kind of no no no.
(Linda, 1)
Linda clearly states that she said 'no' more than once but her refusal was over-
ruled and ignored by the men who raped her. Kate describes how she was
"pinned down" and was scared that the man might "get violent". In both of these
instances women explicitly define their experiences as rape and emphasise the
physicality of the coercion they endured (i.e. they were 'forced'). As noted
earlier the presence of physical coercion makes it easier for women to define
their experiences as abusive (Kelly, 1988). In many of the accounts women give
of engaging in unwanted sex, they do not explicitly define what happened as
rape. Kate, for example, describes how she 'ended up' having unwanted sex with
one 'bloke' after a big row in which she 'finished with him' because she felt "so
guilty and so upset that I'd hurt him" (Kate, 1). Sharon also reports an instance in
which she ends up having sex with someone when she doesn't really want to,
after a double date with a friend. They go back to Sharon's house while her
parents are away:
I ended up in one bedroom with him and she ended up
in another bedroom with his friend and ermm we were in
bed and he sort of like started making advances and I said
no I don't think so, I don't think this is right, and he said:
well what on earth did you invite me in for? Why did you
ask me here you know if you didn't want anything like
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that? Why did you ask me to stay the night? And actually
I felt pressurised into having sex then
(Sharon, 2)
Sharon reports that she did eventually have sex with this man. Rose, for example
describes being forced to do all sorts of stuff' (other than sexual intercourse) and
that she'd "say don't do that and they'd do it anyway" (Rose, 8).
In addition to those accounts in which women describe being raped, and those
accounts in which women report having sex which they do not want, in many of
the accounts women describe encountering further coercion or pressure to
engage in unwanted sexual activity but it is unclear whether their coercer is
successful in 'persuading' them to have sex. These women describe occasions
where, despite having made their refusal clear, the man "would just not take no
for an answer" (Jan, 8). Lara and Helen describe the kinds of verbal coercion
which they have faced in response to their refusals:
they then kind of go 'well, you know I'm different, I can
do things that you know that I can do' (Lara, 7)
oh I'm really lucky I've just said oh no I'm not ready and
that's been the end of the conversation they've tried a bit
of 'oh but you always are, but when's ready' (Helen, 7)
It is this kind of verbal coercion which was identified as a substantial factor in
women's victimization by Mary Koss. In her study forty-four percent of women
reported "giving in" to fondling, kissing or petting because they were
overwhelmed by a man's continual arguments and pressure, and 25% to sexual
intercourse for the same reason. In another study of sexual coercion, Holland et
saying no and despite feeling 'pressured' unusually Sharon reports that she was "actually
quite glad" that she had sex with this man. The only other example which bears some relation to
this response is given by Charlotte who reports that she regrets saying 'no' to a "nice guy" that she
"really fancied" but who she "didn't want to sleep with", and that she "kicked [her]self so bad and
[she] never saw him again" (Charlotte, 1).
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a!. (1992) distinguish between verbal pressure as persuasion in which men need
not "take any decisive action" to exert pressure and for women to acquiesce, and
verbal pressure as coercion. It is clear that the women in this study describe
experiencing both forms of pressure. For these women saying 'no' is not enough
to avoid unwanted sex, they (like the women in other studies) report that their
refusals can be over-ridden, ignored, disregarded and dismissed.
Women's refusals are not always ignored. Women report that their 'no's are
sometimes accepted relatively unproblematically: "he just gave up" (Jane, 9);
"then he just went" (Cath, 7); "and then he gave up basically" (Lara, 7); "I just
turned round and said 'look I don't want to do it' and that was fine [...] that was
acceptable" (Cath, 7); "I have said no and they just accepted that" (Jan, 8); and
"he was sort of fairly reasonable about it" (Tina, 1). Even when a refusal is
accepted a refusal women may still face negative reactions from men; so even
when men do accept women's 'no's they do so ungracefully. Natalie describes
how when she said 'no' to 'Dave' he "threw his diary on the floor", she
concludes that "the easiest thing to do would be to kiss him because then I
wouldn't have that to cope with all the aggression afterwards" (Natalie, 13).
Similarly, Carla describes how a 'friend' who had "come on" to her was "really
horrible" and "really took it badly" when she turned him down (Carla, 4). The
difficulty of saying 'no' implicit here is in the way which women see themselves
as fortunate when their 'no' is accepted: "I was kind of saved" says Jane (9) and
Helen comments "Oh I'm really lucky I've just said 'oh no I'm not ready and
that's been the end of the conversation" (7). The young women also report that
these situations are intimidating, embarrassing and make them feel vulnerable.
Helen, talking about a man who was "a lot older" than her, reports feeling
"frightened", "vulnerable" and "intimidat[ed]" (Helen, 7) and Natalie also
reports feeling "vulnerable" (Natalie, 13). Jan describes one incident in which a
man who "just wouldn't get out of [her] car" and who "would just not take no for
an answer" as "awful" and a "nightmare" (Jan, 8). Charlotte describes her
experience of being harassed by a man in his room:
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and basically he persuaded me into his room And once
I was in his room he locked the door behind me, and I
sobered up like that. And I was totally sober and I
thought shit! I've got to get out of here because I knew
that I was in a situation that was potentially awkward. [...]
And.. he started to take his top off and er.. he started to
er..take mine off basically, and all I could think was don't
make him angry, get some help, get out of the room
(Charlotte, 1)
Charlotte, recognising a dangerous situation, is worried about making the man
"angry" and counts herself "lucky" that she was with "loads of friends".
Embarrassment may also be a concern as Lara points out, you might be "worried
that they're going to judge you and it's going to be embarrassing... "(Lara, 7). By
contrast Carla reports feeling "annoyed" and "cross" that someone she had
thought was a friend would put her in the "embarrassing situation" where she
had to say 'no' to them (Carla, 4). Some report feeling guilty about saying no:
I just felt so guilty because he was so upset that I just
gave in (Kate, 1)
we went so far and I said 'no' and I said, you know,
this is our first date and everything. But I had this
massive pang of guilt [...J and even though it did scare me
a bit that he'd been so pushy I still felt very guilty, you
know, the first few times saying no (Michelle, 1)
Others are concerned that saying 'no' might hurt their partner, as Michelle
explains, "I didn't want to hurt him in the slightest way [...] I didn't want to
reject him and ruin our friendship" (Michelle, 1). This talk of guilt suggests that
women feel responsible for men's arousal and responsible for meeting men's
sexual needs. This has been identified as a factor which constrains women's
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ability to refuse unwanted sex (see Bart, 1983; Cairns, 1993, Kelly, 1988, and
section 1.3.2), and is a key theme which I pick up and explore in more detail in
chapter five.
It is clear, then, from these personal accounts that on at least half of those
occasions when women experience unwanted sexual attention they do say 'no',
although the evidence is that saying 'no' is not always considered easy. In
addition, despite having clearly said 'no' these women report that they are often
subject to further pressure for unwanted sexual contact and sometimes raped. In
this respect the women in this research are no different from the women who
participate in other research of the kind which I reported in chapter one.
These personal accounts are unlike most of the talk in the focus groups which is
more often of a generalised or hypothetical nature with young women
speculating on what they might do in certain situations rather than what they
have done. Talk is prefaced by the pronoun 'you' rather than 'I' - an ambiguous
term which could refer to everyone or to the specific person being addressed -
and men are referred to as 'they' meaning men in general rather than a specific
man (the significance of this is discussed in more detail in chapter six on Sexual
Scripts). In the following section I outline some of themes which I identify both
from the personal experience accounts and from the more generalised
hypothetical talk.
3.2 Strategies for Saying 'No'
These women were asked to talk about the ways in which they would refuse
unwanted sexual attention - the kinds of things they would say and do to indicate
that a certain form of behaviour is undesirable (see question seven of the focus
group schedule reproduced in section 2.5.2ii). In this section, I outline the kinds
of strategies they talked about. These include: getting straight to the point; using
excuses; and, 'other' strategies.
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3.2.1 Getting Straight to the Point
When asked how they would tell a male partner that they do not want to have
sex, some young women reported that this was a fairly straightforward matter:
Jane : You just get straight to the point
Zoe: mm
Pam: just say I'm not ready, and if they don't like that
well then they can just - I don't know
Zoe: I think we're both quite outgoing people and we're
quite likely to just put our cards on the table and say sod
offi
(Group 9)
Jane reiterates this point later when she notes that you just say "no I don't want
to", similarly Jan reports that she just "tell[s] them to sod oil". Helen and Cath
portray being able to get straight to the point as something to be valued:
Helen: but I'd like to think that I was cool enough
Cath: Man enough!
Helen: to say to someone I've just met., to say bugger off
basically
(Group 7)
Saying 'no' is sometimes seen as something that could (or should) be discussed
with a partner:
Deb: Well you'd just explain it rationally and if it was
like two adults together, which is what I think you've got
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to be or you should be to have that sort of relationship is
even discussed, and then discuss it
(Group 10)
And, if this partner was a boyfriend (rather than a recent acquaintance) some sort
of explanation might also be required:
Jill: you would explain yourself more as well, if you
knew him, you'd want to sort of say "oh no I don't want
to sleep with you because .." and then explain it
(Group 10)
Another direct strategy which the young women report using (or expecting to
use) was that of non-verbal signals. Jill reports that she has "never actually said
'no don't do that" instead she says 'no' by "showing them with my body
language" (10). Similarly, Jan argues that "normally you don't have to say
anything it's what you do [...] I mean just like physically force them [to stop],
they get the message" (8).
3.2.2 Excuses
As noted above (section 3.1), women report feeling guilty for saying 'no', and
they count themselves lucky if they can say 'no' effectively. Sometimes, they
say, they feel the need to explain thy they have said 'no' - particularly to a
boyfriend. One way to avoid unwanted sex without making an explicit refusal,
might be to use an excuse. The women in this study were able to come up with a
number of different excuses (a total of 36) that they could use in order to avoid
sexual activity. These excuses fall into four main categories: (i) interruption, (ii)
postponement, (iii) menstruation, and (iv) illness. I discuss each of these excuses
in turn and explore young women's discussion of the efficacy of each.
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(i) Interruption
Over one fifth (n8) of these excuses were designed to interrupt or ignore the
request or to change the subject abruptly: "I'd just say that I needed the loo" (Jan,
8); "is that the time?" (Deb, 10), "my mum might walk in" (Jan, 8); "1 think my
mum's got my dinner ready" (Karen, 10); or in a night-club "ah there's a good
song, wait a minute" (Zoe, 9). Other 'interruptions' included saying "oh it's a bit
cold" (Jane, 10); "Oh god I'm hungry, let's see what's in the freezer then" (Zoe,
9); and saying that "you've got to leave or something" (Deb, 10). Often these
excuses imply a change a scenery perhaps away from the 'threatening'
environment of a bedroom:
Jan: I actually if I was under loads of pressure I'd
say that I need the loo and run to the too and hope
that by the time I'd come back that passion would
fade away
(Group 8)
(ii) Postponement
Over one fifth of excuses (N8) involved women reporting that they are 'not
ready' for sex or 'not ready yet': "I'm not ready yet can we wait a while" (Sam,
5); "I'm not ready yet" (Pam, 9); "just say you're not ready yet" or "you want to
keep it for a special time" (Zoe, 9); one way is "not to say 'no' as in you never
want to but 'no' as in not now" (Cath, 7); "I've just said oh no I'm not ready"
(Helen, 7); or slightly differently "I don't know you well enough" (Jane, 9); and
finally, Karen reports that some people would "make out like they were just
postponing it" (Karen, 10).
(iii) Menstruation
Five of the women reported that one possible excuse was to indicate that they
were menstruating. Women said, for example, "I'm on my period" (Rachel, 11);
"I'm on my period and things like that" (Cath, 7); "I got my period" (Rose, 8); "I
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think most people would just say they've got their period" (Jill, 10); and "I think
you've got your period works best" (Ros, 11). Although this number is relatively
small this particular excuse created a lot of interest. My assessment is that the
importance of this category of excuses is not reflected in the number of times it
was mentioned. This observation highlights the difficulty of quantifying focus
group data. Does the researcher count only those times when the word 'period' is
mentioned, or the length of time for which menstruation is discussed, or count
each separate instance when different members of the group talk in one
condensed piece of discussion? Elizabeth Kissling, for example, comments that
the conversational dynamics of group interviews means that often not all of the
questions on the schedule are answered by all of the participants "making
quantitative summaries of their answers or attitudes impossible" (Kissling, 1996:
485, and see Morgan, 1988 for further discussion of the problems of quantifying
focus group data). I return to the category of menstruation after briefly outlining
those excuses which rely on some form of illness.
(iv) illness
Six of the women reported that some kind of illness such as a "headache"
(Karen, 10 and Cath 7) might also be an excuse to use to avoid unwanted sexual
activity. Cath reports that saying "I'm tired" (7) could be one excuse and Jane
and Pam both indicate that "I'm knackered" might be used as an excuse (9),
while for Wendy "I just feel really ill or something" is another (11).
Other excuses sometimes involved practical worries such as "you've got
nowhere to do it" (Ros, 11) or that you "could get expelled" (Zoe, 9) or you are
"scared of getting pregnant" (Rose, 8). One young woman ( Ros, 11) reported
that "I've got a boyfriend" might be an excuse, or that you could "bore them to
sleep so then you could run off' (Helen, 7).
As noted above, one type of excuse which provoked much discussion was 'I'm
on my period'. There was a range of opinion about whether this was a 'good' or
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a 'bad' excuse, and as to whether or not it 'works'. Jill is very positive about the
advantages of using 'I'm on my period' as an excuse not to have sex:
Jill: I think the main one [excuse] is you've got
your period ... that's the easiest ... I think most
people would just say they've got their period
because that would stop the boy from blaming you
and it stops them from undoing the trousers in
the first place so you know
(Group 10)
Here Jill argues that menstruation is a good excuse for two reasons; first a male
partner will not blame a woman for not wanting or being able to have sex
(presumably because women have no control over menstruation) and second,
because this excuse (unlike some others) will stop all sexual activity immediately
and a male partner will not continue to 'persuade' a woman to have sex. Some
researchers claim that people more often use excuses which emphasise their
inability (rather than lack of desire) to comply with another's wishes (Drew,
1984), because they have a "no blame" quality (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 86).
In the following extract, Ros, Wendy and Rachel agree that menstruation is a
good excuse and expand on the reasons why this should be so:
Ros: because lads go 'oh periods, oh no, best not
talk about that' it's like that's like women's -
Hannah: so there's -
Rachel: they're ignorant, aren't they, a lot of the
time
Wendy: they shy away from it, they're very., they
don't have a clue
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Ros: they might get a bit suspicious if you say that
every night of the month
Rachel: I think the idea of periods would put them
off anyway because they automatically think 'oh
blood'
Ros: yeah it sounds very messy
(Group 11)
Men's revulsion to menstrual blood may make 'being on your period' a good
excuse to use. As Sophie Laws has effectively demonstrated, the link between
menstruation and men's sexual access to women is an important aspect of the
sexual politics of menstruation. She comments that:
The avoidance of heterosexual intercourse during periods
is often viewed as a crucial part of the playing out of
women's oppression. Many theories of the origin of
menstrual 'taboos' imply that all men are repelled by the
idea of sex with a menstruating woman. (Laws, 1990:
110)
While 'being on your period' may be an effective and useful interpersonal
strategy for avoiding unwanted sex, it both works within and reinforces male
definitions and understandings both of menstruation and of female sexuality. Not
all of the women who talked about using menstruation as an excuse saw it as a
good or effective excuse. Helen for example, argues that 'being on your period'
'lust gives you a few days respite" (7), while Rose comments that excuses such
as this are "all really obviously lies" (8). Jan adds that she thinks it's "befter to
try and be nice and explain why [you don't want to have sex] because if you say
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you've got your period then they'll just come back next week and say yeah yeah
yeah" (8).
One of the dimensions upon which excuses are judged, then, is their ability to
evade - consistently, continually and convincingly - male pressure for sex. This is
a feature of discussions about menstruation (as noted above), and also of
strategies to postpone sexual activity. Cath suggests that a "real coward's way
out" is not to say "no' as in you never want to, but 'no' as in not now" (7). The
idea that some excuses may simply 'postpone' sexual intercourse rather than
being final refusal is seen as a weakness which undermines the value of some
excuses. The problem which these young women identify is that postponing,
rather than firmly declining, sexual intercourse may leave one open to further
pressure from young men (usually characterised as verbal pressure). For example
Lara and Helen respond to Cath's suggestion to say "no' as in not now" in the
following way:
Lara: oh I think that [postponing] is just terrible
because then you get in to the situation where they
try to start convincing you
Helen: playing on a weak spot
Lara: yeah exactly and then and then if you're lying
they'll always be able to argue it out and then
you're in the position where you'll have to say 'oh
well all right then'
This excuse, then, has a "weak spot" which can (and, it is assumed, will) be
exploited by young men who will "try to start convincing you" or "argue it out"
until worn down and with no further options women acquiesce to the pressure. A
further example is given by Lara who describes one excuse which she has used in
the past:
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Lara: What I've done what I've usually done in the
past when I've got into tricky situations is given
them this whole rather exaggerated life history of
how I've had so many bad experiences with so
many blokes and basically that they've just put me
off sex
As Lara points out, this may not be the end of the conversation and this excuse
too is open to further coercion:
Lara: they then kind of go 'well, you know I'm
different, I can do things that you know that I can
do' but so yeah I've tried that
(Group 7)
Similarly, excuses around feeling ill are not fail-proof:
Hannah: it's like if you say 'I don't feel very well'
Ros: they say 'I'll make you feel better'
In addition to the discussions about the efficacy of the various different excuses
that could or had been used in order to avoid engaging in sexual activity, the
young women also talked about whether excuses were a desirable and valuable
part of sexual negotiations. Some participants resented the idea that excuses
could or should be used in unwanted sexual encounters:
Lara: that's horrible why should you have to lie on
an issue that is just perfectly right and you feel
strongly about, why do you have to come up with
excuses
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Cath: that's right
Lara: I mean I would much rather it would just be
so nice just to be able to say no, for no particular
reason 'I don't really know, I haven't felt the need to
think about it, Ijust don't particularly fancy it'
(Group 7)
Here, Lara and Cath appear to be resisting the 'normality' of male sexual
coercion as acceptable, asserting that women have the right to say no, and should
be able to say no to sex without being held accountable for this and without
having to present elaborated excuses (lies) to explain their behaviour. What they
appear to be searching for is an autonomous sexuality in which you "shouldn't
[wouldn't] actually have to have a reason" (Jane, 9).
3.3.3 Other Strategies
Sometimes (as we have seen) just saying 'no' is not enough and the young
women report having to use additional strategies in order to ensure that they are
not coerced into unwanted sex. In the following extract Jan and Rose discuss
such a situation:
Rose: Now I think I'd just really tell them to stop and if
they didn't I'd run away
Jan: In fact this happened to me just the other week [...}
he just wouldn't get out of my car, and that was a
nightmare, so I physically -
Hannah: - ejected him -
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Jan: Physically. But no it was awful he would just not
take no for an answer
Rose: I don't think I'd try and hit someone because
they're likely to be stronger than me and you're likely to
provoke them even more, so I think I'd run
(Group, 8)
Here the answer to a male partner who ignores a woman's 'no' is to run away
and remove yourself or him from the situation. Another strategy is to say
something which "makes a joke of it" (Jane) as these young women report when
asked what reasons or excuses they would give for refusing sex:
Jane: I'm a man!?
Zoe: Yes, I'm beautiful
Jane: I'm knackered
Pam: I'm a lesbian. That is such.. I swear that one works.
And loads of people use that at home especially in night-
clubs and things. I'm not that way. It's quite a classic [...]
I've already had ten tonight I'm knackered thank you
(Group 9)
It is interesting to note the dimensions to which these jokes address themselves
including gender identity (I'm a man), sexual identity (I'm a lesbian) and female
desire/active sexuality (I've had ten tonight I'm knackered).
In sum then, women report using a wide variety of different strategies to avoid or
refuse unwanted sexual attention. These range from the more direct tactics of
just getting straight to the point to using humour to undermine the initial
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request/invitation/implication. One of the most frequently discussed strategies
was to use some kind of excuse, generally these excuses fell into four categories:
(i) interruption, (ii) postponement, (iii) menstruation, and (iv) illness. These
different excuses were carefully evaluated and discussed in terms of their ability
to make sexual refusals as unproblematic as possible and to ensure no further
coercion.
3.3 Constraints on Saying 'No'
3.3.1 Sexual Reputations
As noted in chapter one (section 1.2) the sexual double standard ensures that
men and women are evaluated differently when it comes to sexual relationships.
In particular, women are judged more harshly than men for sexualized
behaviours. One of the most thoroughly researched aspects of this double
standard are the ways in which women are judged and categorised (usually as
'slags' or 'drags') in relation to their sexual behaviour. Many have documented
the fine line that women have to tread between being seen as sexually attractive
while remaining sexually unavailable (Lees, 1993; Wood, 1984). In this section I
document the ways in which young women's concerns about sexual reputation
may constrain their ability to refuse unwanted sexual attention.
During the group discussions talk about the precariousness of sexual reputation
and the threat of the label 'slag' is evident. Sometimes this is talk about other
women who are labelled 'slags', stories which serve as a 'cautionary tale' of
what might happen. The following extract from Sam illustrates this:-
but I remember a while back there were some signs going
back down the road [...} about some girl who'd slept with
some guy and they'd written .. they'd put all these signs
on the lamp-post and that saying that she was such a slag
and giving out her phone number and stuff because she'd
slept with this guy...
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(Sam, 1)
In the data I collected, the label "slag" is generally used to mean young women
who have intercourse with several different partners (see Lees 1993 for a
discussion of other ways in which this label is used). As Michelle notes "there
seems to be quite a big stigma attached to someone who's slept around" (1).
Girls who "sleep around" have got, according to Rose "such bad reputations" (8)
and often become "branded" (Michelle, 1). However, the young women in this
study were very much aware that their p reputations were also at risk from the
label "slag". As Liz comments, one 'bad' reason for having sex is that people call
you a 'slag', a label which is then internalised and "you think well yeah I am,
then you feel bad and all that stuff' (6). In particular, women report that one
effect of the label 'slag' is that they are unlikely to take the initiative in sexual
activity with men, or to openly express (hetero)sexual desire. According to Rose:
"it makes you look like a real whore if you really want sex and they're not
interested": she adds that she would "be really scared they'd tell everyone about
it" (8). When asked to imagine initiating a sexual encounter with a young man
and being told 'no', Cath exclaims that she "would just feel like a complete slut
[..j like a complete slag" (7). Expressing sexual pleasure, and asking for specific
sexual activities, was described as likely to attract the label "slag". Arguing that
it is difficult and "embarrassing" to negotiate sexual pleasure with a partner, Lara
predicts that the male response to explicit sexual requests would be "what are
you some kind of sexual animal?" (7). Pam implies that only a "slapper" would
be so direct as to say "come back to my house" while anyone else would be
"cautious" (Zoe), "subtle" and not that "direct" (Jane). Although the threat of
being labelled a 'slag' may lead some women to refuse sexual invitations out of
fear, it may also mean that they refuse sexual invitations which they desire as
well as those which are unwanted. The threat of being labelled a "slag", then,
prohibits or constrains young women's expression of sexual desire and as such is
effective in perpetuating the "missing discourse" of female desire (Fine, 1988).
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Previous researchers have developed extensive documentation of the existence
and operation of labels such as 'slag' and the ways in which it constrains young
women's sexuality and sexual negotiations. Its counterpart, the 'drag' has been
less well documented. However, it was clear from the focus group discussions
that these women were equally concerned about the threat of being seen as
sexually naive and they were anxious to avoid the stigma associated with being
seen as a 'drag' or as 'tight' 4. Sam comments that "I thought virginity was
something to be gotten rid of as soon as possible" in order to "get rid of the
stigma" (5). If sexual experience and knowledge are seen as a form of currency
between young people (Measor, 1989; Thomson and Scott, 1991), then those
who are sexually naive are at a disadvantage. Although fear of being labelled a
virgin was not considered a 'good' or 'sensible' reason for engaging in first
sexual intercourse by these young women, it was nevertheless identified as a
source of pressure. As Liz says "it's when you're younger that all your mates are
going 'oh have sex it's great blah blah blah', 'I had sex with such and such last
week and it was really good' and 'you've got to have sex" that the pressure from
peers is greatest. It is at this time, claims Liz, that young women think '"oh I'm
the odd one out, OK I will', and then the next person you get off with you'll have
sex just so you can be like your mates" (6). Karen and Jill argue that pressure can
come both from friends and from young women's own feelings of worry:
Jill: [a bad reason to have sex is] if you're worried
because you're still a virgin
Karen: or if you're worried because the rest of your
friends have had sex and you haven't yet, you might think
'oh no'
4 'Tight' in this context has many connotations. Under the heading 'If you're too tight'
psychosexual therapist Ruth K Westheimer (1995) discusses vaginismus, but being 'tight' could
also mean being ungenerous with sexual favours in the same way that being tight-fisted means
being ungenerous with money.
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Jill: and you want to keep friends with them
(Group 10)
Jan, agrees that "if you're still a virgin there's defmite peer pressure" but also
that pressure can come from within as well as from peers if, for example, "you're
just frightened of getting old and not losing your virginity" (8). The words used
to describe their feelings (i.e. being 'worried' or 'frightened') indicate the level
of anxiety which appearing sexually naive can evoke. The frequent references to
peer pressure to gain sexual experience suggest that virginity is a source of
stigma. It is clear, then, that young women identify the threat to reputation of
being labelled a 'drag' as a source of pressure to engage in sexual activities.
Consequently, the fear of being labelled 'tight' or a 'drag' constrains women's
ability to refuse sex. As Ros (11) comments that "if you know that it would get
back to your friends or people in your year [at school]" then you would be less
likely to say "I just didn't want to [have sex]" and more-likely to make-some kind
of excuse such as "oh I feel really ill". The embarrassment and stigma of not
wanting to have sex would, apparently, be too much to bear.
In addition, the expected (and experienced) intolerance of men to sexual naiveté
is also a feature of young women's talk about sex. The negative repercussions of
appearing sexually inexperienced or unwilling, and the constraints this places on
women's ability to refuse unwanted sex, are clearly articulated in the following
exchanges between Lara and Cath, and between Karen and myself:
Lara: I'll tell you the sort of thing I imagine if I imagine
being in that kind of scenario [of saying no] and then in
the morning, you know, he's with his mates [...] and
they're laughing and saying 'so how was it last night' and
he goes, you know, 'silly cow' and just starts laughing at
you basically. And they go, oh you know, 'what's her
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problem' and it's like you can just imagine them saying
basically derogatory things like 'tight' and stuff like that
Cath: Frigid yeah
(Group 7)
Karen: and also some of the rumours that would go round
if they said no they would find more frightening than if
they just had sex
Hannah: Why? What would happen?
Karen: because they would be 'oh they're frigid ..'
(Group 10)
The negative comments and names these young women expect to be called for
engaging in sexual activity and for being seen as sexually naive indicate the
power and force of this threat to identity. As Karen notes "some of the rumours
that would go round if they said no [to sex] they would find more frightening
than if they just had sex" (10). The constraints on female sexuality resulting from
the threat of being labelled 'tight' or 'frigid' are clear and may even result in
young women engaging in unwanted sex in order to avoid such labels.
In sum, then, women are concerned about their sexual reputations and can
clearly articulate these concerns in focus group discussions. They discuss the
ways in which they have to negotiate their sexual reputations not only with their
male partners, but also in relation to their peers. The difficulties they face in
attempting to negotiate their sexual reputations can be a factor which constrains
their ability to say 'no' to unwanted sex.
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3.3.2 The Person You Are
The young women in this study often presented an image of themselves in
relation to contrasting images of 'other' women. The following extract from a
focus group discussion in which Zoe, Pam and Jane talk about how they would
say 'no' clearly illustrates this:
Jane: You just get straight to the point,
Zoe: mm
Pam: just say I'm not ready, and if they don't like that well
then they can just - I don't know
Zoe: I think we're both quite outgoing people and we're
quite likely to just put our cards on the table and say sod
off!
[Laughter]
Pam: but but I can see that quite a shy or slightly more
backward person would find it quite difficult
Jane: yeah like a weak character or something
Zoe: yeah
Jane: would probably feel they have to
Pam: especially if they felt they were going out with
someone who was quite cool if you know what I mean or
older than them it was giving them an image by going out
with them because I mean you see quite a lot of people
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who go out with people for the image of going out with
them
Hannah: mm
Zoe: so they wouldnt want to lose that, especialiy if
they're quite shy or not happy in themselves, so they
didn't want to get themselves out of that relationship so to
keep in it they'd do anything a lot of people, well I've
seen girls make mistakes like that
(Group 9)
So, while they describe themselves as "quite outgoing people" who are "quite
likely to out our cards on the table and say sod off', others are described vety
differently; as "shy" or "slightly more backward", as "not happy in themselves"
or as having a "weak character". This may be a way for these young women to
both recognise stereotypes about young women and their sexuality while at the
same time resisting such stereotypes. We can see this when we look at how
closely the participants' descriptions of 'bad reasons for having sex' match with
their descriptions of what 'other' girls do. These young women also see fear of
being 'dumped' 5 as a bad reason for having sex:
Sam: bad reason because you're pressured into it by your
boyfriend because you're scared he's going to dump you
(Group 5)
It is other 'girls' who make the mistake of having sex for this reason as Zoe
illustrates:
Zoe: so they wouldn't want to lost that [the image of
'going out with someone who was quite cool'], especially
5 Being 'dumped' is a colloquialism for one's partner ending the relationship.
167
Chapter Three: Young Women Saying 'No' to Sex
if they were quite shy or not happy in themselves, so they
didn't want to get themselves out of that relationship so
to keep in it they'd do anything a lot of people - well I've
seen girls make mistakes like that.
(Group 9)
These 'girls' are clearly flQt similar to the young women providing the
description they are 'shy', 'not happy in themselves', and clearly having sex for
the 'wrong' reasons. In contrast to these 'shy' and 'unhappy' girls, Pam and Zoe
present themselves as confident and able to say 'no':
Pam: It's always going to be difficult, but I'd be quite
happy to yeah
Zoe: But you're not going to let him take you to bed [...]
just because you're afraid to say no or whatever
(Group 9)
The implication is that although saying 'no' is difficult they are the sort of
women who are clued up enough to be able to so. A similar parallel between
'other' girls and themselves is drawn in the following extract:
Jill: I think a lot of people don't really find it [saying no to
sex] very easy at all it just depends I suppose in the
relationship
Karen: or what the person or what the girl's like
Deb: mm some people especially if they're not
particularly outgoing or a bit shy then, you know,
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Karen: they can be persuaded round or they just let it
happen
(Group 10)
It is 'other' girls, then, who are vulnerable to the pressures to have sex and who
are "worried because the rest of [their] friends have had sex". According to Sam:
Sam: ... if you're a really strong character then you are
going to be able to say no, you don't want to do this. But
if you're worried that sort of you'll be completely
rejected by him, and sort of the crowd that you're with,
because you won't have sex with him then you might just
sort of go along with it because you're worried about
losing everybody else around you
(Group 5)
Helen comments that she has "never felt that it would damage our relationship if
I said no, so I always have done" and Lara reiterates this when she states that she
has "never said had to say no for fear of losing someone I really loved [..] I've
just said no through self-respect" (Group 7). These young women construct
themselves as perfectly confident and capable of saying no to sex in contrast to
"a lot of people" who make "mistakes". They are agents in control of their own
sexuality ready and willing to protect their own interests while others may be shy
and unhappy and potential victims for coercion and unwanted sexual
experiences.
In sum, by constructing descriptions of what 'other' girls are like - what they say,
what they do, and why - the women in this research are also able to imply certain
things about their own identities. By constructing 'other' girls as weak, pathetic
and as victims these women present themselves as knowledgeable and proficient
sexual actors.
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3.3.3 The Man You Say 'No' To
One of the most frequent responses to the questions I raised about saying 'no' to
sex was "it depends":
Karen: it depends so much though, do you know what I
mean - the situation, how close to him you are, whether
you've just met him and whether he's expecting you to
have sex on the first date or something, and if you don't
want to then it depends on how well you know him
(Group 10)
Rachel: it depends on who they are, how well you know
them, how long you've known them, what sort of
relationship you have, all sorts of things
(Group 11)
How young women say 'no' and how they feel about saying 'no' depends
(amongst other things) on how well they know the man they are saying 'no' to. A
clear distinction was made between saying 'no' to sex with a boyfriend and
saying 'no' to sex with a more casual acquaintance. Lara, for example makes a
comparison between saying 'no' to her boyfriend in which she "basically told
him how it was and he tried it with me for a couple of months and then he gave
up", and a "casual relationship" in which it would be very hard to say 'no'
because "you're worried that they're going to judge you and it's going to be
embarrassing" (7). Ros agrees that it would be harder to say 'no' to somebody
you just met arguing that if "they're trying to push you into having sex it's a bit
more difficult because you don't know what they're going to react, what they're
going to say, or how it's going to turn out or anything" (11). It is the
unpredictable, unanticipatable nature of men with whom women are newly
acquainted which makes it difficult to refuse sexual activities with them.
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There was some disagreement across the groups about whether it would be more
or less difficult to say 'no' to a boyfriend or to a more casual acquaintance.
Helen, for example, argues that it would be much easier to say 'no' to "someone
you meet in a pub or club" because there are less likely to be repercussions at
school and amongst peers (7). Similarly, Cath claims that she would "definitely
be more assertive if I wasn't involved with them in any way" (7). Deb, Jill and
Karen discuss the different strategies of saying 'no' that they would use with a
boyfriend and with someone they had just met. With the latter:
Deb: you just say no
Jill: I would lose complete interest and just walk off
Karen: just make and excuse and leave
(Group 10)
Saying 'no' to someone you've just met then appears to be fairly straightforward,
compare this with saying 'no' to a boyfriend:
Jill: you would explain yourself more as well, if you
knew him you'd want to sort of say "on no I don't want
to sleep with you because .." and then explain it.
(Group 10)
Likewise, Jane, Pam and Zoe make a similar comparison with Pam asserting that
"If it's someone I've just met I wouldn't think twice about it [...] because I don't
know them I'd say no straight away". With a boyfriend "if you had been going
out with them for quite a long time then it would make it more difficult" says
Jane, Zoe adds that "then again in some ways it's easier to talk" in a relationship
(9). This 'ideal' notion of what saying 'no' in a relationship is like is further
illustrated by Lynn and Lucy:
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Lynn: depends how close you are if you can't talk, if you
can't say it to their face that you don't want to sleep with
them then you shouldn't be In that relationship at all
Lucy: you're not ready for anything at all if you can't talk
to this person, if you can't talk about contraception, if you
can't talk about diseases and the consequences of what
you are going to do then you can't really do it because
you haven't been through it all
(Group 5)
This idea is echoed in another group in which Deb argues that "if you're not
close enough to talk to them about it then you're not close enough to be having
sex", and that if, after you've talked about it, he still wants to have sex and you
don't then "he's not the right bloke for you" (10). However, although Jill agree
that it is easier to talk to someone "you know very well" and you "expect them to
understand" it is also difficult because this kind of relationship bring other
expectations as Jill explains:
if you have sex a lot and then one day you're just too
tired, or one day you just don't want to do it and
everything else, then I think there it's going to be harder
to say it to him than if it's just a one night stand, a)
because he [the one night stand] probably expects you to
say no at some stage
(Group 10)
By implication a boyfriend does not expect you to say 'no' and consequently
might "get worried and think whether you were still interested or not". Rachel
and Wendy note that saying 'no' to sex with a boyfriend brings new
responsibilities:
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Rachel: If it's someone you trust, someone who knows
you, just the best way [to say no] is just to explain how
you feel, just talk about it - apart from anything else it
doesn't have to go that far anyway if you've got a good
relationship
Wendy: Just saying no is not enough if you've got a good
relationship, because if you say no it puts doubts in other
people's minds and they think 'Oh no what's wrong with
me? Why does she not want to' or whatever, so if you
explain it then there's more chance that they're going to
think 'Oh it's ok, it's not that she's not attracted to me' or
whatever. It's so that they don't feel so bad in themselves
so they know it's you
(Group 11)
In a relationship with a boyfriend women report that they have to take into
account his emotional reactions to being told 'no' when they decide how to, and
whether to, say 'no'.
Another dimension upon which the ease or difficulty of saying 'no' to particular
men is judged is that of age. Cath describes one experience with "someone who
was older" in which although "nothing happened" she felt worried and "quite
intimidated by it all" and didn't like "feeling that vulnerable" (7). Helen too
reports an experience with a man who was "a lot older" than herself which she
describes in the following way:
Helen: ... when he said to me 'Do you want to come back
to my flat' it just frightened me so much, I mean I was
probably being really stupid and overreacting sort of
thing, but I just felt so.. yeah so vulnerable [...] so
intimidating
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(Group 7)
Cath, expressing empathy, reports that she would find such a situation
"incredibly scary" (7). Lara, by contrast, argues that "it's ok with boys our own
age but with anyone older I just find it hard". This difficulty is attributed to the
higher expectations of older men who "as soon as you're in a room alone with
them, or whatever, then that is basically equal to sex", whereas boys their own
age will 'just want to snog" (7). Jan makes a similar comment apparently about
boys her own age:
Jan: yeah with the people we're with. I mean if they.. if
they did anything they wouldn't harm us, the particular
people - I mean that might be a bit naive of me, maybe a
bit later on maybe but not now
(Group 8)
Older men are seen as particularly intimidating and difficult to say no to while
younger men are not seen as so threatening. This is particularly worrying in the
light of evidence which suggests that women are more likely than men to have
their first sexual intercourse with someone older, particularly those women who
have first intercourse at a younger age (Ingham et a!., 1991; Wellings et a!.,
1994). In sum then these women construct issues around saying no differently
depending on the type of relationship they have to the man whom they are
refusing. They discuss the differences between saying no to a boyfriend and
saying no to a casual acquaintance, and in the process construct what
'relationships' are like and the place of sexual behaviours within them.
3.4 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter represents an analysis of the focus group data which most closely
resembles the kind of analysis commonly used by focus group researchers and by
feminists. What I mean by this is that I have identified some themes, patterns and
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trends, some data extracts which seem to belong together, which I developed into
themes. At the beginning of this chapter I clearly stated the criteria by which I
identified relevant data extracts and throughout the chapter I use data extracts to
illustrate themes. For the most part I treat the research participants as either
psychological subjects or as informants (see section 2.6.1, for a detailed
description of these approaches). Although my thinking and analytic interest
have moved on since conducting this analysis (see section 2.6 for an overview of
my approach and the following chapters for an illustration), I decided to include
this chapter in the thesis for two reasons. First, it provides a useful contrast to the
following chapters and marks the start of my analytic progress. Second, it
provides an illuminating overview of the content of the focus group discussions.
Although I have not taken any precise measurement of, for example, the amount
of time spent on one topic rather than the other, this chapter illustrates the kinds
of things which preoccupied these young women during the group discussions. In
the following chapters (chapters five, six and seven) I self-consciously compare
this kind of transparent approach to the data with an approach which treats the
data as constructed. Each of these chapters focuses in more detail upon one
specific theme identified both from the social scientific literature more generally
and from the data presented in this chapter.
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Chapter Four: Sexual Miscommunication and Refusing Sex
In focus group discussions about their sexual negotiations with young men,
young women often report being misunderstood, misinterpreted and misread.
They describe how men misunderstand their intentions; often interpreting their
friendly behaviour as a sexual come-on. They are concerned about giving
'contradictory messages' and feel guilty when they think that they have not
communicated clearly. Often, they say, men fail to understand that 'No means
No'.
In chapter one (section 1.3.1), I noted that miscommunication theory is widely
used to explain instances of date rape and gave a brief outline of this theoretical
approach. Miscommunication theory is not just popular within the social
sciences but is also prevalent in pop psychology and books dealing more
generally with relationships between the sexes. In addition, women (and men)
themselves also use a 'lay' version of miscommunication theory when
attempting to make sense of, and account for, unwanted sexual experiences. In
this respect, then, the accounts of sexual miscommunication provided by the
women in this research are analogous to existing research in which women talk
about being misunderstood. Miscommunication theory would seem an
appropriate place to start trying to make sense of this data. In this chapter I look
in detail at the social scientific literature on sexual miscommunication which
looks both at women's (apparently) poor communication skills, and at men's
(apparently) poor comprehension skills. I then briefly outline misconimunication
theory's relationship to essentialism and social constructionism on the three main
factors I identified in chapter one (i.e. the origin of social phenomenon, relation
to science, and methodology). As discussed in chapters one and two, my own
particular interest is in the relationship of essentialism and social
constructionism to the analysis of qualitative data, and more specifically in
comparing transparent and constructed readings of such data. In this chapter I
begin to explore these two analytical approaches in relation to talk about sexual
miscommunication. I present, then, two analyses of my focus group data in
which women explain instances of sexual coercion and rape as the result of a
misunderstanding or 'miscommunication' between themselves and their male
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partners. The first is an analysis of women's talk as transparent data, as reflecting
either the 'truth' about sexual relationships (i.e. a participant-as-informant
approach), or the 'truth' as women themselves see it (i.e. a participant-as-
psychological subject approach). The second is an analysis of women's talk as
constructed data, in which the investments women have in talk are investigated,
and the functions of 'miscommunication talk' are examined. I then discuss the
costs and benefits of these two different approaches to analysing qualitative data
for feminism, in other words, which approach can be used to produce a stronger
feminist analysis.
4.1 Sexual Miscommunication Theory
In this section I outline the social scientific literature on sexual
miscommunication looking both at explanations which focus on men's poor
comprehension skills which are used to explain why men fail accurately to
understand a woman's sexual refusals, and at explanations which focus on
women's poor communication skills which are used to explain why women fail
to communicate clearly and effectively what they really think, feel or want.
According to most versions of miscommunication theory, men and women speak
different languages (or "genderlects", Tannen, 1991), so that when it comes to
communication between the sexes, Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus
(Gray, 1992). This clash of conversational styles between the sexes leads to
misunderstandings which in turn cause confusion, frustration and tension. In one
of the earliest papers to advance this argument, Maltz and Borker (1982) claim
that:
American men and women come from different
sociolinguistic subcultures, having learned to do different
things with words in conversations, so that when they
attempt to carry on conversations with one another, even
if both parties are attempting to treat one another as
17
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equals, cultural miscommunication results. (Maltz &
Borker, 1982: 200)
These claims are echoed in the writing of Deborah Tannen, whose work is
widely acclaimed as offering a "feminist" explanation of difficulties between
men and women:
Women and men have different past experiences... Boys
and girls grow up in different worlds... And as adults
they travel in different worlds, reinforcing patterns
established in childhood. These cultural differences
include different expectations about the role of talk in
relationships and how it fulfils that role... When styles
differ, misunderstandings are always rife. (Tannen, 1991:
125& 127)
This theory, then, suggests a cultural approach to sex differences in
communication. Men and women are portrayed as members of different cultures
which have their own, very different, assumptions and rules for communication.
When these two diverse cultures meet in sexual negotiations misunderstandings
are inevitable. As applied to sexual violence, miscommunication theory is used
to argue that rape and other forms of sexual abuse are often the outcome of
"miscommunication" between partners: he misinterprets her verbal and non-
verbal communication, falsely believing that she wants sex; she fails to say "no"
clearly and effectively. Both biology and socialisation are invoked to explain
why this form of "miscommunication" is so common. I will look first at theories
advanced to explain male misunderstanding - that is, why men apparently
misunderstand women's refusal of sex; and second, at theories offered to explain
female miscommunication, that is, why women apparently exhibit such poor
communication skills in refusing sex.
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4.1.1 Male Misunderstanding
Explanations focusing on men's problems in understanding typically claim that
men (whether for reasons of biology or socialisation) see a far more sexually
oriented world than do women (Abbey, 1982; Goodchilds et al, 1988): the
implication is that men's preoccupation with sex means that they are liable to
interpret any behaviours as sexual, whether women intend them that way or not.
According to Ellis (1991: 631), who favours biological explanations, "natural
selection has favored men who more readily learn forced copulatory tactics than
women, and women who are more inclined than men to resist forced
copulations". In seeking to account for why some men rape and others
(apparently) do not, theorists explain that some men are more inclined than
others to over perceive sexual intent. These men (rapists) may have "deficits in
their ability to separate seductive from friendly behavior" (Murphy et a!, 1986:
260) or may suffer from "a blind spot" (McDonel and McFall, 1991: 19) - a
specific cue-reading impairment such that these men are unable to decode a
woman's negative cues. As Muehienhard (1988b: 31) points out: "this
discrepancy could cause some men to feel led on if they thought that a woman
was acting as if she wanted sex more than she actually did, and some men regard
being led on as a justification for rape". Ellis (1991, 1993) argues that
neurological and hormonal factors are responsible for rapists' perceptual deficits.
Socialisation theories are also widely invoked to explain rape. Media
presentations of sexuality encourage men to believe that sexual violence against
women is acceptable. Studies of pornography, for example, typically find a high
percentage of sexual episodes involving male force: "Regardless of the force
used, however, in most cases the female is aroused by the ministrations of the
male, her body belying her verbal protests and, to her humiliation, she responds
physically" (Smith, 1976: 22). In general, men "are taught to take the initiative
and to persist in attempts at sexual intimacy even when a woman indicates
verbally that she is unwilling to have sex...." (Check & Malamuth, 1983: 344).
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Finally, some social scientists have advanced the idea that sexually aggressive
men have a "suspicion schema" (Malamuth and Brown, 1994); men's apparent
failure to "understand" when a woman says no to sex is neither the result of a
biological imperative nor (in a straightforward sense) a socialised incapacity.
Rather, it is due to men's belief that women's communications about romantic or
sexual interest cannot be trusted: i.e. women don't tell the truth when it comes to
sex. Malamuth and Brown (1994) argue that "sexually aggressive" men (i.e.
rapists) discount the veridicality of women's communications, particularly when
the woman appears to be communicating a clear and strong message (e.g. "she
protests too much"):
Aggressors may be more likely to perceive women's
"no" responses as seductive teasing [so that] an assertive
rejection might be interpreted as somewhat seductive by
those with an adversarial orientation to women.
(Malamuth & Brown, 1994: 706)
According to sexual miscommunication theory, then, men have difficulties
understanding women's communications regarding sex either because they
regard women's communications as untrustworthy, or because biology favours
men who don't take 'no' for an answer and because sexual aggression represents
adaptive behaviour.
4.1.2 Female Miscommunication
Explanations focusing on women's poor communication skills claim that women
often fail to say no clearly and unambiguously, partly because "women and men
often communicate indirectly when initiating sexual relationships... One
problem with indirect sexual signalling is that women and men often interpret
behaviors differently" (Muehlenhard, 1 988a: 96). Apparently, adolescent females
interpret non-verbal communicative behaviours (including clothing, posture,
gaze and so on) in a "less sexualized way" than do males (Zeilman et al, 1979:
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12). Arguing that "much of the sexual violence directed against women may be
generated out of cross-sex pseudocomniunication", Cahill (1991: 83) focuses on
sex differences in non-verbal communicative behaviour suggesting, for example:
females' high levels of interactive gaze may simply
reflect a learned and adaptive attentiveness to the cues of
others. If males respond to females' gaze as intimacy
indicating, pseudocommunication may result. For
example, a male may reply to a female's gaze with
another form of intimacy indication behavior. The
female will interpret this behavior as forward and
respond accordingly. This response, in turn, will be
interpreted as a violation of the understood terms of the
contact. (Cahill, 1991: 81)
In other words, women may unintentionally invite sexual interest from men by
'giving off non-verbal behaviours which are understood by men as indications
of sexual interest. "Undercommunication of disinclination to have sex" is also
described (Allgeier, 1986 cited in Murnen et al, 1989: 102) as a contributing
factor in date rape. According to a group of psychologists writing in the Journal
of Sex Research, the stereotypical feminine gender role (passivity,
submissiveness, nurturance, acquiescence to male needs and helpfulness) means
that "women are often trained to be ineffective communicators in a sexual
relationship.... Perhaps if more women were able to communicate their
disinterest [sic], more of the unwanted sex could be eliminated" (Murnen et al,
1989: 102). As Charlene Muehienhard, (1988a: 101) puts it, "direct, open
communication might help reduce misinterpretation". A final complicating
factor is that (contrary to the feminist slogan that no always means no), women
do sometimes give deliberately misleading verbal signals about their willingness
to engage in sex: that is, they say "no" but mean "yes" (and, of course, vice
versa). Self-report data from 610 female undergraduates indicated that over a
third of them had engaged in what psychologists have described as "token
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resistance" to sex (saying no but meaning yes) on at least one occasion
(Muehienhard and Hollabaugh, 1988). Consequenfly, men may learn to
disregard women's signals:
The problem for the man is how to differentiate between
sincere rejections and requests on the one hand, and those
that are ambivalent or merely facades on the other hand.
Since the task is difficult and since the risks in backing
off when the rejection is not real are so grave [i.e.
contempt of his unmanliness], many men simply give up
tiying to make the distinction and forge ahead regardless
of what the woman says (Zilbergeld, 1978: 32, cited in
Muehienhard and Hollabaugh, 1988)
In sum, then, women are seen as ineffective communicators, unable to articulate
their sexual desires or dislikes, unable to refuse unwanted sexual attentions,
because socialisation has taught them to be passive, unassertive and to attend to
the needs of others before their own. Women are portrayed as communicating
indirectly about sexual matters - leading to ambiguity and confusion - or as being
uncomfortable about sexual communication, particularly around sexual refusals.
Sexual miscommunication theory is essentialist because, like other essentialist
theories, it assumes that the origin of social phenomenon (such as rape) can be
found in biology or in socialisation. Miscommunication theorists assume a cause
and effect relationship: they start from observations of social phenomenon (i.e.
that men and women miscommunicate in sexual negotiations) and then try to
locate the cause of this phenomenon. In this way miscommunication theory uses
the language of scientific discovery so characteristic of essentialist theories.
They aim to discover the truth about what 'really happens' in sexual negotiations
and to progress towards a better understanding of sex differences in
communication and the origin of rape. In order to do this they generally use tests,
scales, or experiments. But regardless of the methods used, research participants
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are seen as informants or as psychological subjects who are neutrally reporting
on their social world, or who are revealing aspects of their individual
psychology. In other words, and this is the aspect which is key to this thesis, the
research on sexual miscommuniation relies on a transparent reading of self-
report data. Researchers look beyond the talk to draw conclusions about the
social world. Think, for example, of how Antonia Abbey's research, in which
students reports of having their friendliness 'misperceived' as sexual interest, is
taken as evidence that "gender differences in sexual and dating role socialization
may cause some men to force sexual relations on dating partners, mistaking their
partners' true lack of interest for flirtatious repartee" (Abbey, 1991: 103). In
other words, what people say in response to questionnaire items is taken as a
more or less accurate description of what 'really' happens in sexual negotiations.
It is this kind of approach that I outline in relation to my own research in the
following section.
4.2 Sexual Miscommunication and Refusing Sex:
A Transparent Reading
The notion of sexual miscommunication is popular not just within the social
scientific literature, but also in other fora - as illustrated by the phenomenal
success of Deborah Tannen's (1991) book You Just Don't Understand which has
sold well over one million copies. Other "pop" psychology texts dealing with
"the babble of the sexes (e.g. Shapiro, 1996) are also widely read, as are those
which claim to take a humorous look at gender relations and offer 'helpful'
translations through which men and women can better understand each other. In
The Little Book of Romantic Lies, for example, Bruce Smith and Laura Goeke
Burns try to help men and women negotiate "these times of uncertain relations"
where "no one 'really' knows what the other means" by offering translations of
what men and women 'really' mean (1996: 1). Interestingly, one of the
translations they include is that when she says 'Can't we just talk for a while',
what she 'really' means is 'I'd rather make love to a trailer hitch'. In other
words, when a woman indicates that she does not want a sexual relationship, this
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is not immediately understandable as such, but rather needs translating.
Paradoxically, part of what makes these books humorous is that 'eveiybody'
knows that 'Can't we just talk for a while' is a sexual rejection. Media
representations of rape also draw on miscommunication theory. One article
published in The Sunday Times which commented on the trial of Austen
Donnellan (who was acquitted of raping a fellow student) concluded that the
case illustrated the "confused and complex relationships forged by students freed
of the old constraints on behaviour but without a blueprint for today" and the
problems which arise when someone "misunderstands" the signals (Driscoll,
1993: 14). From many people's point of view, then, miscommunication theory is
"intuitively" correct: it fits with their experience - that of women as much as that
of men.
In addition, various versions of sexual miscommunication theory are in common
use amongst ordinary men and women seeking to explain their own, and each
others', sexual behaviours. Both sexes provide accounts of their own and each
others' sexual behaviour which rely on notions of "misunderstanding",
"misinterpreting" or "miscommunicating" sexual signals. Men accused of rape
often say they "misunderstood" - that the woman didn't communicate clearly
enough, that she gave off mixed messages, and that even if she did say "no", she
didn't say it as if she meant it. According to Gager & Schurr (1976 cited in
Check and Malamuth, 1983: 346), probably the single most used cry of rapist to
victim is "you know you want it. You all want it", and afterwards, "There now,
you really enjoyed it, didn't you". Consistent with these observations are the
results of more systematic studies demonstrating that rapists generally believe
their actions did not in fact constitute rape (i.e. that the woman was a willing
participant or enjoyed the experience) (Check & Malamuth, 1983).
Women, too, often provide accounts which explain unwanted sexual behaviour
in terms of miscommunication: they say that the man didn't understand that they
didn't want sex, and that it was probably their own fault anyway for not
communicating effectively enough. Often they express guilt over having
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possibly miscommunicated (Cairns, 1993a) - and the label "miscommunication"
apparently serves to remove the act of forcible intercourse from the category of
"rape". In Mary Koss's (1988) study, only 27% of the students whose sexual
assault met the legal definition of rape believed they had been raped: almost half
of them (49%) labelled the experience "miscommunication" instead. Women
often believe that they have "failed to make their refusal sufficiently clear"
(Cairns, 1993a: 205).
Miscommunication theory was also popular with the young women who
participated in focus group discussions in the current study. I have already
described (in Chapter Two, section 2.6) how my own analysis of the focus group
data will revolve around two axis: transparent versus constructed analyses, and
feminist versus non-feminist analyses. In this section I present the data on sexual
miscommunication from this study and show how, when subjected to a
transparent reading, it parallels the existing social scientific literature on sexual
miscommunication, and in the next section I present an alternative (constructed)
analysis.
During the focus group discussions, then, women frequently frame their
experience in terms of sexual miscommunication theory. Young women are
often explicit about their use of "miscommunication" theory as an explanatory
framework for their experiences of sexual coercion:
I mean, like, a lot of times there is just a total
misunderstanding between men and women... I don't
think the bloke realises that you're just going back for a
chat or whatever. I think that he always thinks that
you're going back for a shag. (Carol, 4)
I think, for me, the whole sort of thing about misreading
people ... I had misread his character and behaviour, and
he mine - a lot of men don't believe it when you're saying
1 8
Chapter Four: Sexual Miscomrnunication and Refusing Sex
no because you're still, as far as they're concerned, you're
giving contradictory messages. (Tina, 1)
According to these female students, males believe that they want sex, whereas in
fact they are just "being friendly":
I mean, how many times have we heard, in our four years
here, boys say 'she's gagging for it'... All you have to do
is be friendly and they're all like 'she's gagging for it'.
And whilst it's funny, and we can all have a good laugh
about it, we've all had to dig ourselves out of situations,
and been and to look really stupid, when all we've
wanted to do is carry on a friendship... (Megan, 13)
In the group discussions women often told stories about their sexual experiences
which featured sexual "misunderstandings" between themselves and men. For
example:
and he sort of like started making advances, and I said
'no I don't think so, I don't think this is right', and he
said, 'well what on earth did you invite me in for? Why
did you ask me here, you know, if you didn't want
anything like that? Why did you ask me to stay the
night?' (Sharon, 1)
I push him away and try to show by words and actions
that this is not what I want and that I am not ready for
this. I am not sure how I appear to him as I am doing
this. He doesn't appear to understand. (Lisa, 4)
I had a misunderstanding with Dave... He invited me
back to his room for a cup of coffee and I went thinking
'yeah, this is just coffee'... and he asked if he could kiss
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me... I thought it was just coffee and friends but
obviously he meant something else .... (Natalie, 14)
Susie: I went out with this bloke about a year ago, and
he'd just split up with his girlfriend and after about five
or six weeks he says, 'do you want to sleep together?', or
whatever... I felt very pressured to do it, because I
thought, 'if I don't, then he's going to look for someone
else, or go back to his girlfriend or whatever'. I think
that's got a lot to do with it - whereas men don't read
women as being pressured.
Janet: Did he know that you didn't really want it?
Susie: He just assumed that I would, because everyone
else that he'd been out with had - because he just
basically thought he was a complete sex God.
(Group, 14)
The kind of data presented above reflects many of the issues raised in the social
scientific literature in this area, including a distinction between men's poor
comprehension skills and women's poor communication skills. These women
lament that men don't "realise" what women mean, that they don't "believe"
what women say, or that they simply don't "understand". They concur with the
social scientific evidence that men overperceive sexual intent; they "always think
you're going back for a shag", or assume that you're "gagging for it" when
you're being friendly. Women also worry about the status of their own sexual
communications, whether they are giving mixed messages and feel unsure about
whether their "words and actions" are being interpreted correctly. There are,
then, lots of examples of women talking about specific instances in which men
misunderstand them, and lots of examples of women talking more generally
about misunderstandings and miscommunications as a problem in male/female
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relationships. A transparent analysis assumes that these women are neutrally
reporting on their experiences in a relatively straightforward way. Using a model
of participant-as-informant this talk can be used as supporting evidence for
miscommunication theory - women talk about misunderstandings because men
and women do misunderstand each other. Using a model of participant-as-
psychological-subject, women's reports of sexual miscommunication represents
their own understanding and interpretation of their experiences, which may or
may not map onto what really happens in sexual relationships. In either case
what women say about sexual miscommunication maps directly onto what social
scientists say about sexual miscommunication. The women who participated in
this study are saying the same kinds of things in focus groups that participants in
other studies have said in response to questionnaires and other self-report
measures. The data I present here could be used to strengthen and support the
existing literature on sexual miscommunication theory as women refer
pntaneously to misunderstandings and misperceptions, rather than (as is the
case in much of the miscommunication literature) being able to frame their
experiences in terms of miscommunication theory when asked to do so by the
researcher. For example, Antonia Abbey asked students to respond to questions
about 'misperception', while in other studies miscommunication is inferred. In
Charlene Muehienhard' s (1 988b) research college students read dating scenarios,
in which items such as who initiated and paid for the date and the dating activity
were varied, and rated how willing the woman in the scenario is to have sex. The
discrepancy between the ratings of male and female students (males consistently
rated the woman as more willing to have sex than females) is interpreted by
Muehienhard as evidence that men and women miscommunicate. This study in
which women spontaneously refer to miscommunication could be seen as a
methodological innovation within the pre-existing miscommunication literature
which provides persuasive supplementary evidence for miscommurncation
theory.
In sum, then, women explain experiences of sexual coercion in terms of
miscommunication and use notions of misunderstandings and misperceptions
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between the sexes to explain sexual relationships more generally. By treating the
data as transparent, as (more or less) accurately reflecting real world events, such
an approach could be used to provide supporting evidence for the social
scientific theories on sexual miscommunication. In section 4.4 I discuss the costs
and benefits of this kind of transparent reading for feminists. Having outlined a
transparent reading of the data I now go on to provide an alternative explanation
for women's talk about sexual miscommunication which relies on a constructed
reading of the data.
4.3 Talk About 'Sexual Miscommunication':
A Constructed Reading
As the preceding section illustrates, one explanation for the popularity of
miscommunication theory is that it is an accurate reflection of experience: it
reveals a truth about the social world. Most of the social scientific research on
miscommunication aims to test this first possibility. This first approach assumes
(by using a model of participant-as-informant or participant-as-psychological-
subject) that participants' talk is an appropriate route through which to gain
accurate knowledge about the world. In other words, when women talk about
their experiences of sexual negotiation and rape in terms of sexual
miscommunication, then this represents an accurate reflection of what really
happens in sexual encounters between the sexes. It is this first approach which I
have outlined in section 4.2 above.
The second possibility - and this is the one which I am interested in here - is that
miscommunication theory is popular (both in the social scientific literature and
in ordinary people's accounts) because it serves some useful functions. I noted
previously that a focus on the function of talk is key to the (discourse analytic
variation of the) social constructionist approach (see section 2.6.1). From this
second approach talk about sexual miscommunication is not read as a transparent
account of what 'really' happened, but rather as a means by which women
explain, and account for, their experiences. This approach then, uses a model of
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participant-as-social-interactor - participants are not neutrally reporting on their
lives, but rather the way in which events are described or constructed serves
particular functions in the interaction. The aim is not to assess the accuracy of
participants' reports or to establish their validity or otherwise, but to look at the
implications or consequences of describing an event in a particular way and to
establish the functions which this description serves. Just as Billig (1992) looked
at the functions of talk about the royal family (reviewed in chapter three section
2.3.2ii) in this section I explore the ways in which talk about sexual
miscommunication serves particular functions for the women who use it. In this
section, then, I illustrate the use of miscommunication theory as a resource
through which women seek to explain their experiences and to maintain their
heterosexual identities and relationships. This approach asks what are the
functions and implications of sexual miscommunication theory for the women
who use it - in other words, what's in it for women?
The advantages for men of using miscommunication theory may be fairly self-
evident. For example, Frank Saal, says of miscommunication in relation to
sexual harassment that: "... if we [men] could appeal to honest misperceptions to
explain our unacceptable social-sexual behaviors in organizational setting
("Everyone makes mistakes!"), we might thereby render sexual harassment less
premeditated and therefore less deserving of criticism and punishment" (Saal,
1996: 81). In other words, talk about miscommunication may function to excuse
men's bad behaviour. The advantages for women of talk about sexual
miseommunication may not be immediately apparent. I argue that sexual
miscommunication theory is useful for women attempting to sustain heterosexual
relationships because: (a) it avoids blaming men; (b) it gives women a sense of
control; and (c) it obscures institutionalised gender power relations. Because it
enables women to sustain heterosexual relationships - by dismissing male
exploitation of power as simply "misunderstandings", it is also useful in the
maintenance of heteropatriarchy.
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4.3.1 Miscommunication Avoids Blaming Men
Feminist critics point out that one negative consequence of miscommunication
theoiy is that it obscures the fact that men are responsible for rape (see section
4.4 for further details of this critique). However, for heterosexual women, the
belief that men are manipulative and coercive abusers, but are well-
intentioned (if clumsy) sexual partners, may be necessary in justifying their
continuation in heterosexual relationships. Miscommunication theory by
diverting attention and blame away from the man may be instrumental in
permitting the woman to continue her relationship with him. In one focus group
discussion, for example, Sarah, describes how she spent the night with a "really
nice bloke" who was quite "forceful" and who was pressurising her to have sex.
Initially Sarah places the blame for this incident with the forceful man, but this is
reformulated by the group into a problem with Sarah's poor communication
skills. Sarah is practically accused of 'leading him on':
where do you draw the line? And where the hell does
he know where he is if you're getting into bed with him. I
mean it's like you're saying 'no' but you don't really
mean it. (Tina, 1)
The "forceful man" described by Sarah is deleted from this scenario; instead he
becomes a well-intentioned person, subjected to mixed signals by Sarah. The
solution, then, lies not with changing his sexually aggressive behaviour, but in
encouraging Sarah to communicate more effectively. As another member of the
group advises her "It's best just to make clear what you feel about sex"
(Michelle, 1).
It was often the case that "miscommunication" was used by women in focus
groups as an explanatory resource to account for sexual coercion in women's
cwrent relationships, while sexual coercion in previous relationships was judged
more severely. Explanations in terms of miscommunication enables women to
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maintain their relationships with coercive men and avoids women having to
confront the possibility that men are abusing their power in heterosexual
relationships. In essence, miscommunication allows women to remain friends
with their rapists. For example, the Ms. survey found that about three-quarters of
the women had some contact with the attacker after the incident; in fact 25% still
considered the man a friend and 11% still considered the man their boyfriend
(Warshaw, 1994).
4.3.2 Miscommunication Gives
Women an illusory Sense of Control
Women often take responsibility for sexual assault upon themselves. About
three-quarters of the women in the Ms. survey on date rape (Warshaw, 1994)
indicated that they felt they were at least partly to blame for the incident. In
diverting the responsibility for sexual assault from the rapist to the victim,
ironically women derive a sense of control over sexual violence. If the cause of
rape is attributed to a set of "risky" behaviours (hitchhiking, going out alone at
night, dancing provocatively, wearing a miniskirt, not saying no clearly) then
refraining from these behaviours is supposed to guarantee the avoidance of rape.
As Carole Corcoran (1992: 135) points out, "Most acquaintance rape programs
stress misinterpretation as the cause of date rape and therefore suggest that the
remedy lies in assertive verbal communication on the part of the female". As
Camille Paglia (1995: 25) puts it, with characteristic bluntness, "The only
solution to date rape is female self-awareness and self-control". The burden of
rape prevention lies with women and:
If you were unfamiliar with our [North American] culture and you
happened to attend a typical college date rape program, you might
have a hard time figuring out that men have any responsibility for
rape or rape prevention. It is impolite to say that men rape and
outrageous to point out that the only way to change the incidence of
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rape and eliminate rape is for men to stop raping. (Corcoran, 1992:
137)
Paradoxically, this is experienced by many women as empowering, and as giving
them ways of protecting themselves. Miscommunication theory offers to the
woman who adopts it the hope that if she can learn to communicate more
effectively, she will avoid male abuses of power. In one focus group discussion,
for example, Kate describes an experience of date rape, and goes on to say that
she now takes precautions to ensure than this does not happen again.
And sort of since then it's sort of changed in a way,
because if I'm with a bloke and they think they're going
to stay the night, I sit there and say 'no way, you can stay
if you want to but there's no way that I'm going to have
sex with you because I don't want to just yet'. And I feel
more confident about getting out of that, but at the time it
was like 'Oh my God, is it my fault, how do I say no?'
(Kate, 1)
The 'precautions' that Kate advocates involve clearly communicating the limits
of a sexual interaction. Implicit in this is the assumption that the initial
experience of rape was the result of faulty communication, and that clearer
communication will prevent the re-occurrence of rape. As Corcoran (1992: 134)
says, "the victim-control point of view., can serve a self-protective function. It
may preserve one's belief in a just world.., and reinforce the idea that "rape
won't happen to me". Similarly, according to Camille Wortman (1983: 203)
"Blaming oneself may be more tolerable than the conclusion that no one knows
who is to blame, and/or that the person is living in a meaningless chaotic world
where events occur at random". Janoff-Bulman (1979) has drawn a distinction
between two different types of self-blame and has suggested that the impact of
self-blame attributions will be dependent on the type of attribution that is made.
She suggested that people who make characterological attributions, (attributions
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to their own character or personality), may show subsequent deficits in
motivation and considerable distress. In contrast, attributing the victimization to
some aspect of one's behaviour (e.g. miscommunication) may be quite adaptive.
Such an attribution may provide people with some hope that if they can change
their behaviour such outcomes will be prevented in the future.
4.3.3 Miscommunication Obscures
Institutionalised Power Relations
Finally, "miscommunication" theory obscures unequal power relations between
men and women. In presenting rape as the unfortunate, but innocent, by-product
of cultural differences, sexual miscommunication theory obscures male power
and female subordination. But as Henley and Kramarae (1991) ask, is rape in
such a circumstance truly a matter only of "missed" communication? They
answer their own rhetorical question:
No; in actuality, power tracks its dirty feet across this
stage. Greater social power gives men the right to pay
less attention to, or discount, women's protests, the right
to be less adept at interpreting their communications than
women are of men's, the right to believe women are
inscrutable. Greater social power gives men the privilege
of defining the situation - at the time, telling women that
they "really wanted it", or later, in a court. (Henley and
Kramarae, 1991: 27)
In sum, then, unlike previous researchers, I interpret young women's accounts of
sexual miscommunication not as transparent data providing evidence for
miscommunication theory, but as a participant resource, an accounting
mechanism used by some women in making sense of their experience. I have
indicated the ways in which sexual miscommunication theory is useful to young
heterosexual women insofar as it enables them to avoid blaming men, gives them
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a sense of control, and obscures institutionalised gender power relations. For
heterosexual women struggling to maintain (sexual) relationships with men, it
may well be that as Henley and Kramarae (1991: 42) point out, "the construction
of miscommunication emerges as a powerful tool, maybe even a necessity, to
maintain the structure of male supremacy".
4.4 A Feminist Analysis? The Costs and Benefits of a
Transparent Versus Constructed Reading
As I have already demonstrated, the data from focus group discussions in which
women describe their experiences in terms of sexual miscommunication theory
can be interpreted in two different ways (i.e. as transparent data or as constructed
data) resulting in some very different conclusions. In the first (transparent)
reading, the data are used to support the existing social scientific literature on
miscommunication which argues that rape is the result of a misunderstanding or
communication breakdown between men and women. In the second
(constructed) reading, the question of whether or not men and women actually
miscommunicate is put to one side. Instead the consequences, implications, and
functions (for the women themselves) of describing sexual experiences in terms
of miscommunication are examined. As I described in chapter two, my analysis
is differentiated along two different axis. The two readings of the data presented
above represent the first axis (transparent and constructed readings), in this
section I discuss these two different readings of the data in relation to the second
axis - feminist and non-feminist readings. I discuss the implications of these two
vely different readings for feminist theory and analysis.
As I noted above, the first (transparent) reading of the data can be used to
support miscominunication theory and strengthen the pre-existing social
scientific literature. In trying to decide whether or not this analysis would
'qualify' as feminist it is important to note that misconimunication theory has
been widely criticised by feminists for presenting women as deficient, for
obscuring male responsibility for rape, for disguising structural inequalities
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between men and women,, for blaming women for their own abuse, and for
holding women as primarily responsible for rape prevention. Ironically, some of
the researchers whom I have identified as part of the miscommunication tradition
would consider themselves to be feminist. In the light of this contradiction it is
clear that attempting to decide whether or not miscommunication theory, and a
transparent reading of the data which supports this theory, 'qualifies' as feminist,
is not an easy task. I look first at the advantages of producing a transparent
analysis which supports miscommunication theory, and second at some of the
reasons why feminists have criticised miscommunication theory and so why
supporting such a theory might be disadvantageous for feminists.
One of the attractions of miscommunication theory for feminists is that, in stark
contrast to the once dominant 'female deficit model' in which female
communication styles were seen as inferior to men (see for example Jespersen,
1922; Lakoff 1975), miscommunication theory offers a 'different-but-equal'
approach to understanding sex differences in communication styles. In
miscommunication theory, women are not seen as having an inferior
communication style but simply as having a different communication style to
men. The result of these diverse communicative styles is that men and women
find it difficult to communicate effectively with each other and misinterpret or
misunderstand each others' cues. In this respect, miscommunication theory can
be seen as a move away from the 'victim precipitation' model of rape (cf. Amir,
1976) in which women were blamed for inviting sexual assault. When applied to
rape, miscommunication theory removes blame from women. Women are no
longer blamed for wearing skirts too short, or for wearing revealing clothes
which invite sexual interest. Such an approach mistakenly assumes that women
share men's (over-sexualised) view of the world, and recognise (as men
apparently do) that such behaviours signal sexual availability and invite sexual
interest. Rather, miscommunication theory assumes that men and women inhabit
different social locations in which these behaviours might mean very different
things; neither understanding is 'wrong', but the disparity between them may
have unfortunate consequences. Theoretically, then, miscommunication theory
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may be useful to feminists for countering victim blaming theories which are still
prevalent (although perhaps more subtle) in social science research.
In addition, one further advantage of treating the data as transparent is that it taps
into women's understandings about the nature of sexual experience, it follows
feminist advice to 'take women seriously' and to allow women to be the 'experts
on their own lives'. By giving scientific legitimacy to the ways in which women
themselves understand and explain their experiences a transparent reading of the
data would 'validate their reality'. This approach 'gives voice' to women's
experience allowing them to explain difficult sexual situations in their own terms
using their own language (i.e. the language of miseommunication). Women's
own explanations, their own understanding of their experience are seen as
primary. As demonstrated in chapter two (section 2.1) these methodological
innovations are the defining feature of feminist research, and by this criterion a
transparent reading of the data which supports miscommunication theory
'qualifies' as feminist.
Perhaps one of the greatest advantages for feminists of explaining sexual
coercion in terms of miscommunication is that it offers easily implemented,
practical solutions to date rape. According to sexual miscommunication theory,
men force women into unwanted sexual experiences because women simply
don't communicate their desires (or lack of them) effectively. Sexual violence is
portrayed as an unfortunate breakdown in communication, so the logical solution
is to improve communication between the sexes and so eradicate date rape.
Indeed, many psychologists (some of whom would identify as feminists)
recommend just such interventions. Antonia Abbey suggests that "educational
programs need to be implemented to teach dating-age youth how to honestly and
clearly convey their intentions" (Abbey, 1991: 108). Others suggest the need to
find "a way to reduce the risk of date rape by facilitating more open
communication between the sexes, which could reduce misinterpretations of
dating behaviour and perhaps cause males to feel less 'led on" (Muehienhard,
1988b). Many researchers proclaim the value of preventing rape by teaching
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women assertiveness techniques and/or self-defence (e.g. Barth et al., 1991;
Mann et al., 1988, Muehlenhard et a!., 1989), and many educational programs
focus on problems with cross-sex communication (e.g. Haggard, 1991; Feltey et
a!., 1991). Attempts to influence male com prehension include social skills
training with rapists (Dobash et a!., 1995), feminist campaigns with messages
such as "No means No" or (poking fun at the idea that it is male comprehension
which is at issue here) "What part of the word 'no' do you not understand?", and
the highly controversial Antioch College rules for dating which emphasise the
importance of men acquiring verbal consent for each sexual activity they initiate.
The advantage for feminists of supporting miscommunication theory is that it
provides concrete, workable, easily implemented suggestions for ending, or at
least decreasing, sexual violence generally and date rape in particular. It offers
women practical advice and the chance to avoid sexual coercion and abuse by
taking it upon themselves to improve their faulty communication skills. This
approach might provide a more palatable alternative to the model of eliminating
rape through social change which is, at the very least, a "formidable" task
(Corcoran, 1992: 139).
By contrast, those who criticise miscommunication theory point out that
although in theory it emphasises that men and women have 'different-but-equal'
conversational styles, in practice it is women 's communication which is seen as
problematic (Crawford, 1995). It is women who are seen as the cause of
miscominunication, women's communicative styles which are seen as
"handicapped, maladaptive, and needing remediation" (Henley and Kramarae,
1991: 19). In common with other psychological research which takes male
experience as the norm and which pathologises women (see for example, the
research reviewed in section 1.1.3), 'male' styles of communication are
presented as the unproblematic norm while 'female' styles are, by comparison,
considered deviant and ineffectual. Rather than being accused of 'asking for'
rape by wearing tight skirts, too much make-up, low cut tops and the like,
miscommunication theory suggests that women invite rape by giving off mixed
messages, sloppy signals, or by generally ambiguous communication. As one
199
Chapter Four: Sexual Miscommunication and Refusing Sex
study argues "it is the passivity and lack of assertiveness of many individuals
[i.e., women] that often allows date rape to manifest itself' (Mann et a!., 1988:
271). Miscommurncation theory is not devoid of victim blaming but implicitly
blames women for their abuse and as such represents a 1990s modification of,
rather than repudiation of, the victim precipitation model (Crawford, 1995).
In addition, critics of miscommunication theory point out that often women are
still held responsible for rape prevention. Despite a cursory nod in the direction
of gender neutrality, the vast majority of the advice derived from these attempts
to improve cross-sex communication is aimed at improving women's
communication skills, rather than men's comprehension skills. While women are
implored to say what they do not want, men are not equally encouraged either to
make clear their intentions or to ensure that their partner consents - the examples
given above represent rare exceptions (Crawford, 1995: 119). For example, the
American College Health Association (cited in Turner and Rubinson, 1993: 605),
advises women to "be aware that your non-verbal actions send a message: if you
dress in a 'sexy' manner and flirt, some men may assume you want to have sex";
they go on to point out that "Often most men interpret timidity as permission", so
it is important to "Say 'no' when you mean no". Assertiveness training
workshops aim to "provide women with the skills to avoid victimisation by
learning to say "no" effectively" (Kidder, Boell and Moyer, 1983: 159). Women
who may be "at risk for sexual coercion" can be identified through
administration of a battery of psychological tests (the Sexual Assertiveness
Questionnaire, the Sexual Assertiveness Role-Play test, and the Sexual
Assertiveness Self-Statement Test), and these women can then be enrolled on a
three-session cognitive-behavioural group training program "for preventing
sexual coercion" which includes cognitive structuring and behavioural rehearsal
(Muehlenhard et a!., 1989). According to Cameron assertiveness training, of the
kind advocated by miscommunication theory, "tells women that something is
wrong with the way they are: it assures them that it is not their fault, society is to
blame, but nevertheless it is they who have to change" (Cameron, 1994: 10).
Assertiveness training attempts to fit women into a world in which they do not
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operate effectively without ever challenging the organisation, and the
institutionalised power differences, which excludes them. In short, it provides
individualised solutions to social problems, and encourages women to think that
there is something wrong with the way they communicate rather than collectively
challenging the ways in which their communications are over ruled or not
attended to.
While women are held responsible for rape and rape prevention, feminist critics
of misconimunication theoiy have also pointed out that the 'different-but-equal'
approach suggests that men are responsible for rape. Within
miscommunication theory rape is not something which one person (usually a
man) does to another (usually a woman) but rather it is something which 'just
happens'. Men are presented as inadvertently raping women, not because they
are deviant monsters, not because they wanted or thought that they could get
away with it, but because they interpret (just as any man would do) her
behaviours in a sexualised way. Rape occurs to the "honest bewilderment of men
who rape women without realising that they are doing so" (Crawford, 1995:
118). Miscommunication theory has been accused of 'letting men off the hook';
men's selfish, rude and ignorant behaviour is excused under the guise of
conversational style (Troemel-Ploetz, 1991). Women are urged to stop blaming
men and to accept what they cannot, and should not, change. By contrast,
feminist critics of miscommunication theory argue that gender differences in
communicative styles can also be interpreted as evidence of conflict and
inequality (Cameron, 1992), or as cultural dominance (Henley and Kramarae,
1991) rather than cultural difference. In contrast with miscoinmunication theory
Henley and Kramarae argue that "Greater social power gives men the right to pay
less attention to, to discount, women's protests, the right to be less adept at
interpreting their communications than women are of men's" (1991: 27).
Finally, despite the emphasis on women being 'different-but-equal',
miscommunication theorists often portray women in very negative ways. In an
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early paper which clearly illustrates this, Weis and Borges argue that women's
sex role socialisation leaves them vulnerable to sexual assault:
Through the process of sex-role learning, the girl is
taught to conceive of herself as more or less permanently
passive, weak, childlike, mindless, and in need of
economic and emotional independence upon men [.,.]
when faced with a sexual attack and realizing their
psychological and physical inability to protect
themselves, are immobilized with fear. (Weis and
Borges, 1973: 81 & 83)
In other words women are (at best) positioned as passive victims of men's sexual
aggression, unable successfully to resist their advances having been intensively
inducted into the female sex role. Women are portrayed as weak, ineffectual, and
infantile beings who are unable to communicate their desires, or lack of them,
clearly or effectively. Women are presented as victims rather than as victimised,
and this is a tendency which has been criticised by some feminists (e.g. Roiphe,
1993; Wolf', 1993).
It is clear then, that a transparent reading of the focus group data on
miscommunication would entail some serious costs for the feminist researcher.
In taking such an approach feminist researchers risk supporting a theoiy which
holds women responsible for rape prevention, which denies male responsibility
for rape, and obscures men's abuse of power in heterosexual relationships. There
are, however, also some potential benefits of such an analysis; it recognises the
contextual factors associated with sexual coercion, and provides clear
suggestions for eliminating some types of rape (particularly date rape). These
apparent contradictions highlight the difficulty of identifying the feminist
interpretation of a piece of data.
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By contrast, a constructed reading sets aside many of the questions raised by a
transparent reading. A constructed reading of the data sets aside questions about
the accuracy of miscommunication theory for describing women's experiences,
and questions about the link between the social scientific theory of
miscomniunication and women's talk about sexual misunderstandings. A
constructed reading does not provide information about why rape happens, about
why it happens to some women and not others, or why some men rape while
others do not. A constructed reading provides no evaluation of
miscommunication theory's attempts to answer these questions. What a
constructed reading does do is to provide information about how women talk
about sexual encounters. This is important for a number of reasons. First, it has
implications for feminist concerns with validating women's experience, second,
it has implications for the representation of 'other' women in feminist analysis,
and third, it has implications for feminist theorising/activism about rape. I
discuss each of these in turn.
As I noted above a constructed reading does not allow the researcher to evaluate
the social scientific literature on miscommunication theory. But, what it does
allow the researcher to do is to disagree with the miscommunication theory
without discrediting those women who use a lay version of miscommunication
theory to explain their experiences. When evaluating the value of a transparent
reading of the focus group data on miscommumcation I noted than one
advantage for feminists was that the easy fit between what women say and the
social scientific literature on miscommunication theory validates women's own
understanding of their experiences. The disadvantage (at least for critics of
miscommunication theory) is that this means supporting a theory which
depoliticises rape. Alternatively, if I disagree with my participants' assessment of
what 'really' happens in sexual negotiations (which allows me to critique
miscommunication theory), I may be accused of invalidating their experience
and of appropriating their talk to serve my own ideological and political agendas.
If I insist that miscommunication is an inadequate or antifeminist explanation for
rape, I risk characterising those women who 	 consider miscommunication
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adequate (i.e. my participants) as deluded, feeble-minded or as falsely conscious.
By insisting on calling their experiences as rape while women themselves call
describe it as miscommunication, feminists risk creating a distinction between
feminists and 'ordinary' women where feminist knowledge is privileged - i.e. if
only 'they' were more enlightened they would label what they currently describe
as a misunderstanding, rape, just like 'we' do. If I describe miscommunication
theory as central to the obfuscation of gender power relations (i.e. instances of
'sexual miscommunication' are excluded from the more explicitly political
category of 'rape'), I risk characterising my participants as complicit in their own
oppression and in this process of 'erasure' (cf. Kitzinger and Thomas, 1995). By
focusing on the functions of talk, a constructionist reading of the data allows me
to critique miscommunication theory while recognising that there may be
specific advantages for women of describing their experiences in this way. A
similar approach has been used by Nicola Gavey (1992) to explain why women
do not label experiences of rape as rape, and by Kitzinger and Thomas (1995) to
explain why women might describe instances of sexual harassment as 'just a bit
of fun'. By focusing on the advantages for women of explaining their
experiences in this way, a constructed reading portrays women who talk about
miscommunication as rational, coherent, women rather than as passively soaking
up patriarchal doctrine, unable to see beyond the confines of male definitions of
sexual situations.
This also provides an important contrast between the ways in which women are
represented in transparent and constructed readings. Earlier I pointed out that
miscommunication theory often presents women as deficient in some way - as
possessing poor communication skills, as being socialised into passivity and/or
learned helplessness. By contrast a constructed reading re-presents women in a
way which does not present them as victims or as victimised, but as
knowledgeable women, who are working hard to present themselves as having
learnt from past mistakes and who are able to avoid 'unpleasant' sexual
encounters including rape. A constructed reading recognises the ways in which
women present themselves as conducting sexual negotiations with men who are
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well intentioned, with whom they have equal relationships, and who they are
able to control and manage.
Finally, focusing on these advantages (miscommunication theoiy avoids blaming
men, gives women an illusoiy sense of control, and obscures institutionalised
power relations) may have serious implications for feminist politicisation of
rape. Feminists cannot hope to politicise women's experiences, naming them
rape, without recognising the costs that such an approach might have for the
women they are trying to 'help'. A constructed reading explains why women
might be so resistant to labelling their experiences as rape despite feminist
attempts to encourage them to seen them as such. What it doesn't address is how
knowing about these advantages can help take feminist activism around rape
forward. What is less clear from a constructed reading (both my own and in other
literatures) is how the information gained could be used to politicise rape.
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
In chapter one I introduced the social scientific literature on miscominunication
theory as an explanation for sexual violence, and for date rape in particular. In
this chapter, I described how the women in my research also talked about
experiences of date rape, sexual violence and unwanted sex as the result of
'misunderstandings' or 'miscomrnunication' between themselves and their male
partners. Miscommunication theory, then, would seen to provide a readily
available framework within which to explain this focus group data. In order to
make sense of this talk I reviewed the literature on miscommunication in more
detail, looking both at explanations which focus on men's apparently poor
comprehension skills and at women's apparently poor communication skills. I
demonstrated how my own data can be read either as transparent data which
supports the theory of sexual miscommunication, or as constructed data which
illustrates the functions which miscommunication serves for the women who use
it. I demonstrated how a transparent reading parallels the existing research on
sexual misconimunication in which participants are treated as informants or as
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psychological subjects, and can be seen as making an important contribution to
this area. When read as constructed data I illustrate how talk about sexual
miscommunication can be seen as serving particular functions for the women
who use it, including the ways in which talk about miscommunication avoids
blaming men, gives women an illusoiy sense of control, and obscures unequal
gender power relations. These functions may account for the popularity of
miscommunication theory in the social scientific literature, in 'pop' psychology
best sellers, and in the talk of ordinary men and women. The idea that talk serves
particular functions is key to a constructionist reading of the data and while the
concept is introduced in this chapter it is developed and built upon in chapters
five and six. Importantly then, I have illustrated that rather than reporting on
their experiences neutrally, the ways in which women describe events has certain
implications and serves important functions.
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In talking about their sexual negotiations with young men, young women often
report being concerned about, and anxious to take care of, men's emotions. They
routinely express concern about 'hurting his feelings' by saying no to sex; they
assert that they 'don't want to hurt him in the slightest way'; they express guilt at
the possibility that their partner might 'end up getting really hurt' and 'might not
be able to understand' why they have refused to engage in sexual activity. In this
chapter I explore how these accounts of sexual refusal might be explained by
existing research on 'emotion work', which explores the ways in which
individuals manage both their own and each others' emotions. In chapter one
(section 1.3.2) I gave a brief summary of the literature which describes women's
emotional involvement with men, and women's greater emphasis on the
emotional rather than sexual aspects of relationships, and indicated how this is
seen as a contributory factor in women's acquiescence to unwanted sex. In this
chapter I link this to the sociological literature on 'emotion work' theory which
argues that women are required to care for the emotions of others, often at the
expense of subjugating their own emotions, both in the public and private
spheres. I illustrate the link between these two literatures with reference to the
focus group discussions in which women discuss the kinds of emotion work
required in refusing sex.
Following the same kind of analysis which I introduced in chapter four, I present
two different ways of analysing my data. The first (transparent) reading of the
data parallels the kind of analysis typically found in the emotion work literature.
The second (constructed) reading looks at how talk about 'emotion work'
performs important functions for young women themselves. Finally, I consider
the costs and benefits of these two different readings for feminist researchers.
5.1 Emotion Work Theory
In this section I offer a broad overview of the concept of 'emotion work' as it is
generally used in the social scientific literature, including an outline of its use in
relation to unwanted sexual behaviour. I indicate the ways in which emotion
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work theory is underpinned by both an essentalist and a social constructionist
framework - particularly in relation to the methodological approach used. I
demonstrate the ways in which the majority of the research on emotion work
takes an essentialist approach to data analysis by treating data as transparent.
The concept of 'emotion work', initially developed and popularised in Arlie
Hochschild's classic study, The Managed Heart (1983a), is generally used to
refer to the work involved in "dealing with other people's emotions" (James,
1989: 15). It includes regulating and managing others' feelings - "soothing
tempers, boosting confidence, fuelling pride, preventing frictions, and mending
ego wounds" (Calhoun, 1992: 118). Emotion work has also been used to refer to
the work we do on ourselves in order to conform to socially designated 'feeling
rules'; rules which "govern how people try to feel or try not to feel in ways
which are appropriate to the situation" (e.g. feeling sad at a funeral, or happy at a
party) (Ulochschild, 1979: 552). When a discrepancy arises between the
experienced and expected/appropriate emotion, individuals will engage in
'emotion work' in an attempt to "change in degree or quality the emotion or
feeling" (Hochschild, 1979: 561).
Hochschild's classic study of the commercialisation and marketing of the
emotion work performed by female flight attendants provided a template for
many other studies that followed. Using interviews with female flight attendants
and the training materials used at Delta airlines, Hochschild demonstrated that in
a commercial setting emotion becomes a resource to be sold in exchange for a
wage. She illustrated how, as part of the job, flight attendants are expected to
perform 'emotional labour'. Of particular importance is the flight attendants
smile which, they are told, is their "biggest asset"; flight attendants must always
be seen to be happy and smiling (p. 4).These 'feeling rules' dictate appropriate
emotions on the job. The flight attendant's smile is, then, part of the job; it is
offered as part of the service which is sold to consumers such that the "emotional
style of offering the service is part of the service itself" (1-Iochschild, 1983a: 5).
Emotion work is therefore a required, non-negotiable, part of the job of a flight
attendant. The emotions of flight attendants are commodities which are bought
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and sold for profit. In an industry of fierce competition airlines compete with one
another on the basis of the service they provide. Flight attendants have the most
customer contact and the service the customers are sold through advertising,
argued Hochschild, is "human", personal and often sexualised.
Hochschild argued that it is not enough for flight attendants to simply change
their outward expression of emotions in order to match the 'feeling rules' which
dictate the expression of emotion on the job (e.g. that flight attendants must
smile and look happy and not express anger). Rather, flight attendants must
actually alter the way that they they must actually feel happy. It is in this
respect that 'feeling rules' differ from 'display rules'. As Flochschild describes it
"the flight attendant is obliged not only to smile but to try to work up some
warmth behind it" (p. 19). It is in this alteration of feeling that flight attendants
perform 'emotion work' upon themselves. Flight attendants told Hochschild
during interviews that they regularly attempted to alter their own emotional
states in order to meet the expectations of the job. As one flight attendant said:
Even though I'm a very honest person, I have learned not
to allow my face to mirror my alarm or my fright. I feel
very protective of my passengers, Above all, I don't want
to be frightened. If we were going down, if we were
going to make a ditching in the water, the chances of our
surviving are slim, even though we [the flight attendants]
know exactly what to do. But I think I would probably -
and I think I can say this for most of my fellow flight
attendants - be able to keep them from being too worried
about it. I mean my voice might quiver a little during the
announcements, but somehow I feel we could get them to
believe ... the best. (p. 107)
Others describe some of the methods they use to modify their feelings:
You think how the new person resembles someone you
know. You see your sister's eyes in someone sitting at
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that seat. That makes you want to put out for them. I like
to think of the cabin as the living room of my own home.
When someone drops in [at home], you may not know
them, but you get something for them. You put that on a
grand scale - thirty-six passengers per flight attendant -
but it's the same feeling. (p. 105)
Sometimes I purposefully take deep breaths. I tly to relax
my neck muscles. (p. 55)
I may just talk to myself: "Watch it. Don't let him get to
you. Don't let him get to you. Don't let him get to you."
And I'll talk to my partner and she'll say the same thing
to me. After a while the anger goes away. (p. 55)
The performance of emotion work on themselves is integral to the flight
attendants' ability to perform emotion work on others. Emotional labour is
interpersonal, it "requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the
outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others - in this
case, the sense of being care for in a convivial and safe place" (Hochschild,
1983a: 7, emphasis added). Referring to the sexualisation of flight attendant
work, a woman who was once active in Flight Attendants for Women's Rights
comments that:
The company wants to sexualise the cabin atmosphere.
They want men to be thinking that way because they
think that what men really want is to avoid fear offlying.
So they figure mild sexual arousal will be helpful in
getting people's minds off of flying. (Hochschild, 1983a:
94, emphasis in original)
In order to induce the proper state of mind in others (i.e. sexual arousal rather
than fear), the flight attendant may have to try to feel as if her passengers'
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flirtations are a sign of her attractiveness rather than as demeaning or intrusive
behaviour.
Since Hochschild's work on the flight attendants at Delta airlines there is now an
extensive literature identifjing and exploring the emotional labour required of
other service professionals, including: police officers (Pogrebin and Poole, 1991;
Stenross and Kleinman, 1989), supermarket clerks (Touch, 1993), clerical
workers (Rogers, 1995; Wichroski, 1994), medical students (Smith and
Kleinman, 1989) and nurses (Aidridge, 1994; James, 1989, 1992; O'Brien,
1994; Small, 1995; Smith, 1989, 1991, 1992). Researchers typically interview
participants about aspects of their job in order to assess whether emotion work is
an expected part of the job, and in what forms emotion work is manifest. Studies
looking at the emotion work performed by clerical workers are typical in this
respect. Clerical work, particularly that of the secretary, is primarily a female
occupation and as such has been the focus for some of the research on emotion
work. Expectations of women on the job are gender-based, aLthough this is not
formally recognised by the institution and many of the tasks performed by
secretaries remain invisible. Mary Anne Wichroski surveyed 61 secretaries and
did follow up interviews with 25 secretaries and 8 supervisors in order to explore
the various different kinds of labour performed by secretaries including the often
invisible emotional labour. Secretaries describe "covering" for their boss - a
procedure requiring tact, careful negotiations, and precise judgement. One
secretary reports holding back a memo dictated by her boss when she found out
that the circumstances requiring the memo had altered. She says "I held it back
for revision until my boss came back ... to save face. He would have looked like
an idiot. This was a sensitive matter that would have made my boss look
uninformed" (Wichroski, 1994: 37). Secretaries must also engage in impression
management which is considered important because they are often the first
person that clients meet, they must according to one physician be "well spoken,
pleasant, cheerful, and caring". (p. 36). In order to achieve this image workers
may (apparently) have to suppress what they 'really' feel. The temporary clerical
workers interviewed by Jackie Rogers related instances of having to take the
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blame for others' mistakes and having to accept abusive comments without
responding:
I know my boss has blamed me on this assignment for a
lot of things that he's misplaced, that he's screwed up,
and he goes, "Well, you see, Sarah didn't get it on time"
or "Sarah's lost it." And it's really embarrassing because
he asks me in front of people like, "Sarah, where did you
put this?" And I know full well that he didn't give it to
me. This has happened 3 days in a row now. After a
while you just go, "Well, you know, I'm just really sorry.
I guess I just really screwed up". (Rogers, 1995: 153).
From these descriptions Rogers concludes that "Emotional labor is a significant
component of temporary work. Temporary workers are expected to gain favor
with the agency and to manage difficult situations on the job" (Rogers, 1995:
154).
According to most researchers in this area, the concept of emotion work is
heavily gendered. In seeking to explain why emotion work is so heavily gendered
they rely on psychological research (e.g. Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982) which
indicates that women's socialisation makes them "better prepared than men for
the interpersonal demands of frontline service work" (Wharton, 1993: 225).
Some suggest that emotion work is closely associated with women's traditional
caring role, women are "deemed to be 'naturally' good at dealing with other
people's emotions because they are themselves 'naturally' emotional" (James,
1989: 22). The skills involved in 'people work' in the commercial sphere are
assumed to be the same as those which women employ in the private, domestic
sphere (James, 1989), some women are keen to highlight this affinity between
their personal and professional lives, as one nurse notes:
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we use past experience. We've brought up families and
been a long time in the job. It just comes naturally, you
don't think about it.(Original emphasis, O'Brien, 1994:
401)
Similarly, Hochschild argues that "[a]s traditionally more accomplished
managers of feelings in private life" women's emotional skills are 'naturally'
extended to the workplace (1983a: 11). Women are most likely to be employed
in jobs which require emotion work, Hochschild estimates that approximately
one half of all working women have jobs that call for emotional labour, and the
study of emotion work has, therefore, a "special relevance" for women and
relates more closely to their lived experience (1983: 11). Researchers argue that
the emotions bought and sold for profit in traditionally female occupations
include comfort, patience and compassion (in nurses, Smith 1989; O'Brien,
1994), and tact and discretion (in secretaries, Wichroski, 1994). By contrast,
emotional labour in traditionally male occupations includes stoical control (in
police officers, Pogrebin and Poole, 1991) or anger (in bill collectors, Rafaeli
and Sutton, 1991). Moreover, women in traditionally female occupations see
emotion work as a crucial component of their job. For the nurses in James' study
good care involves more than simply performing the physical tasks of nursing
(such as administering drugs or emptying bed-pans), it involves 'spending time',
'listening' and 'being there' (James, 1988). Part of the routine work of a nurse
involves: "establishing trust and confidence, comforting and consoling their
patients and clients as well as cheering them up and acting as a stable source of
support" (O'Brien, 1994: 398). Patients judge the quality of the nursing they
receive on the emotional style in which it is delivered, emphasising the
importance of attitudes and feelings, rather than technical competence. As one
patient comments:
A nurse has to be aware of the patient's condition and
how to tackle it. She has to have a lot of patience and
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forethought and to try and relieve pain and suffering, not
by medical means but by compassion (Smith, 1989: 50).
By contrast, emotion work is often considered marginal in typically male
occupations; the detectives in one study considered crime solving and arresting
criminals to be core to their job and although sometimes necessary (i.e. when
dealing with the victims of crime) emotional labour was considered peripheral
(Stenross and Kleinman, 1989).
Emotion work in personal relationships (i.e. in contexts in which it is unpaid) has
not been so extensively researched, although there is now a small and growing
body of work which presents emotion work as "an integral part of the work that
is done in the home" (Erickson, 1993: 888). Researchers have explored the
relative importance of 'emotion work' done at home and emotion work on the
job, and found that women's level of job-related well-being is threatened more
by their provision of emotion work in the family than by their performance of
emotional labour at work. In addition, those women whose jobs require
emotional labour are also more likely than others to perform emotion work in the
home. It seems then that women have a 'second shift' of emotion work on the
job as well as in the home (Hochschild, 1989). The authors conclude that
"Women's work and family lives are thus structured in ways that encourage their
disproportionate performance of emotion management." (Wharton and Erickson,
1995: 274). In a related study using the same data set Rebecca Erickson
examines women's perception of the distribution of household tasks (including
housework, child-care, and emotion work) between married couples and the
ways in which women's emotional labour might effect her "marital well-being
and relationship burnout" (Erickson, 1993: 889). Wives were asked to rate their
feelings of marital burnout in response to items such as "My relationship make
me feel emotionally drained", and to estimate the relative amount of household
tasks performed by their husbands (i.e. doing dishes, paying bills etc.) and their
husbands' level of emotion work - assessed by items such as "Offers me
encouragement" or "Acts affectionately towards me". The results suggest that
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while husbands' housework is associated with wives' marital quality the
contribution of husbands' emotional labour may be even more significant. The
major work on emotion work in the area of personal relationships is by
Duncombe and Marsden who claim that women are "left with emotional
responsibility for the private sphere" (1995b: 150; see also Hochschild, 1983b
and 1989; Cahill and Eggleston, 1994; Wharton and Erickson, 1995; Zajdow,
1995, for further accounts of emotion work in interpersonal contexts). The
women interviewed as part of their study report having to make the "emotional
running" in the relationship, having the sole "emotional responsibility" for the
children, and having a need to feel emotionally "special". They complain of their
male partners' "inability or unwillingness to express intimate emotion - to 'be
there' emotionally, to 'do intimacy' and to assume their fair share of emotional
responsibility in the private sphere" (Duncombe and Marsden, 1995b: 151).
Women's expressed dissatisfaction with their relationships is in contrast to
discourses of love and intimacy and the 'ideologies of coupledom', a discrepancy
which, according to Duncombe and Marsden, is minimised through emotion
work in which women convince themselves that 'we're ever so happy, really'
(1995b: 162).
More recently Duncombe and Marsden explore how women perform 'sex work'
(a concept they describe as analogous to emotion work) in order to "bring their
sexual feelings more into line with how they suspect sex 'ought' to be
experienced" (1996: 220). In an 'ideal' relationship, argue Duncombe and
Marsden, sex work would be unnecessary; there would be no mis-match between
women's expectations about sex and their lived experience of sex. However, in a
phallocratic society obstacles to this ideal relationship (such as men's disregard
for their partners' sexual needs) means that "sex work is performed by dependent
women upon themselves, in order to suppress their distaste or to protect male
self esteem." (p. 223). Using self-report data from 38 white couples who had
been married for 15 years (as well as some additional data from pilot interviews)
Duncombe and Marsden illustrate the mis-match between women's expectations
about sex and their reported experience of sex claiming that "it was surprisingly
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common for women now to confess that they had always 'at some level' found
their sexual relationship unfiulfilling" (p. 226, emphasis in original). Couples
may attempt to 'restage romance' (p. 234) through sexual experimentation,
pornography and/or masturbation which is usually initiated by the male in order
to get his partner 'worked up'. Demands made by husbands on their wives to
watch pornography, to perform oral sex, or to behave erotically were resented by
women, who felt that their husbands were not providing the emotional intimacy
necessary for them to feel comfortable engaging in such acts. In such situations a
woman may engage in 'sex work' in order to quell their distaste for her
husband's body or sexual practices. Therefore Duncombe and Marsden suggest
that women may engage in unwanted sexual activities in order both to meet
expectations about what sexual relationships should be like (i.e. by performing
emotion work on themselves) and in order to protect their male partner's
feelings.
As I outlined in chapter one (section 1.3.2) there is abundant evidence in the
social scientific literature which suggests that 'emotion work' may be an
important explanatory factor in women's apparent willingness to comply to male
sexual demands, and to engage in sexual activity which they themselves do not
want. Young women are portrayed in the social scientific literature as having
greater emotional investments in sexual relationships than men. Young women's
emotional involvement in sexual relationships are seen as key to their (in)ability
to refuse unwanted sexual attention (Quinn eta!., 1991). Popular advice to young
women reiterates this view by purportedly offering ways to say 'no' without
hurting their partners' feelings (Fisher, 1994). Research in which women express
concern about causing feelings of "hurt" or "rejection" when refusing unwanted
sexual attention illustrates how such investments are implicated in sexual
coercion. According to Cairns (1993), who carried out an extensive interview
survey of students' attitudes to unwanted sexual attention, "women were more
likely to be concerned about the impact of their refusal on the offender" (Cairns,
1993: 203). While men had no difficulty assigning responsibility for the incident
to their harrasser, and did not express concern about her possible feelings of
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rejection but rather "let the emotional chips fall where they may" (p. 203),
women described feeling confused about how to respond and about whether their
own behaviour had contributed to the incident, and "often tried to soften refusals
out of concern that the man in question would be hurt" (p. 205). Young women
also report feeling obliged to have unwanted sexual activity with a male partner
because, they say, 'I love him' (Warzak et a!., 1995). Mansfield and Collard
(1989: 167) report that married women find it difficult to refuse sex with their
husbands and worry about whether they will feel rejected:
In courtship the lack of opportunity kept a check on
ardour, so that it was always possible to avoid intercourse
without either partner having to say 'no'. In marriage the
only way to refuse was not to be interested and this could
seem like a rejection.
In responding to a hypothetical scenario in which a man issues "an unmistakable
invitation that you do not feel ready to accept", 75% of women expressed the
view that the woman would feel "concerned that she has hurt the man" if she
refuses to have sex (Lewin, 1985: 186 & 188). A survey of over 1,000 sexually
active girls aged 16 and under revealed that, from a choice of over 24 different
options, 84% of teenage girls said that they would like more infonnation about
"how to say 'no' without hurting the other person's feelings" (Howard, 1984
cited in Howard and McCabe, 1990: 22). In her study of heterosexual coercion,
Nicola Gavey describes how women often report 'consenting' to unwanted sex
because of 'nurturant' reasons - i.e. deciding to have sex with a man because he
appears 'needy', 'pathetic' or because she wants to 'give him something', to
'take care of him', or in order to 'not hurt his feelings' (Gavey, 1992: 242-3).
There is, then, a great deal of evidence to suggest that women are responsible for
doing emotion work for others, both at work and in their private lives and sexual
relationships. Women's responsibility for the emotional welfare of others,
particularly male partners, is implicated in their experience of unwanted sex.
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Before moving on to look at how this emotion work theory can inform an
analysis of the data gathered as part of this research I first briefly consider the
epistemological framework which underpins this body of literature.
In contrast to miscommunication theory which was very clearly essentialist on all
three of the aspects I identified in Chapter One (i.e. origin of social phenomenon,
relationship to science, and methodology), emotion work theory is a little more
difficult to place. Emotion work theory (which is primarily a sociological, rather
than psychological, theory) incorporates notions of what emotions are and how
they work which are very different to those of the mainstream (primarily
psychological) work on emotions. This psychological literature relies on
essentialist notions of emotions. Emotions are seen as private and hidden within
the individual, and are usually thought of as innate or biological drives. As such,
emotions are often studied by measuring physiological changes which are
associated with changes in emotional states such tears, sweating, and changes in
heart rate or skin conductance (e.g. Berry and Martin, 1957; Shamavonian et al.,
1965). By contrast, emotion work theory sees emotions as arising in response to
social arrangements rather than as pre-existing biological attributes. Referring to
their work on sex differences in emotional behaviour, for example, Duncombe
and Marsden argue that their claims are essentialist because they do not
claim that all men cannot express intimate emotions (i.e. they reject the view that
emotional inexpression is an essential part of man's nature and a part of their
biological make up), and argue instead that:
under the prevailing conditions of persistent gender
inequalities of power and gender divisions of labour and
emotion work - most men find themselves 'unable' or
'unwilling' or 'do not choose' to [express intimate
emotions] in the context of close heterosexual
relationships. (Duncombe and Marsden, 1996: 156)
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In other words, gender differences in emotion are the result of socialization. So,
Duncombe and Marsden's claim not to be essentialist rests on the (mistaken)
assumption that essentialist theories rely on biological explanations, while social
constructionist theories rely on the social (usually thought of as socialisation).
Contrary to popular belief, socialisation also plays an important part in
essentialist theories of emotional expression, including, for example, research
which demonstrates the tendency of parents to mould sex appropriate emotional
expression by responding to crying as a sign of anger in boys or fear in girls (see
Condry and Condry, 1976). Although these approaches differ in their
understanding of the origin of social phenomenon (i.e. as the result of biological
factors and/or socialisation) they are all essentialist because they share the view
that emotions pre-exist their expression. For example, a person feels angry and
then his/her heart beat increases, or feels angry but then disguises this anger
because it is not polite to express it. In both of these cases the emotion is there in
essence before it is expressed, both of these are based on an essentialist
understanding of the origin of emotions. In addition, these approaches are all
essentialist because they locate emotions within individuals, as individual traits,
capacities or features. So, although Duncombe and Marsden claim not to be
essentialist because they argue that men and women are not biologically
programmed but rather learn to have different emotional styles, by assuming that
there is some kind of emotional essence which is developed in women and
supressed in men, and by locating emotions within individuals, their approach is
clearly essentialist.
Emotion work theory is most clearly associated with social constructionism in
relation to the work of }Iochschild and her notion of 'feeling rules'. In contrast to
essentialist theories which see emotions as biological drives or as moulded by
socialisation, social constructionist theories reject the idea that emotions are pre-
social, innate or pre-existing bodily sensations. Rather, emotions are seen as
defined by, and brought into being by, systems of cultural beliefs and values.
Social constructionists argue that the capacity to experience certain emotions
depends on the cultural knowledge which brings them into existence. Members
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must learn the 'feeling rules' which dictate emotional life in their community;
they learn what emotions exist, when to feel them, what they feel like, which
emotions are appropriate in which situations, and how to react to the emotions of
others. This differs from the 'display rules' which govern the expression of
emotion favoured by essentialists, feeling rules are not simply regulative of
emotions but constitutive of emotions. Celia Kitzinger (1995: 142) makes a
distinction between 'weak' versions of social constructionism which argue for
the importance of socialization and environmental factors on behaviour, and
'strong' versions which look at "the ways in which the taken-for-granted
categories we use are themselves social constructions". Strong versions of social
constructionism document the ways in which taken-for-granted emotional
vocabularies have developed and gained meaning, and the social, ideological and
political functions which they serve (e.g. Averill, 1982, Armon-Jones, 1986).
This includes research which looks at emotional vocabularies in their historical
(Crespo, 1986; Harré and Finlay-Jones, 1986) and cross cultural contexts (Lutz,
1990). Clearly, then, although, much of the research on emotion work tends
towards the side of social constructionism this approach rarely explicitly defines
itself as social constructionist and is often infused with essentialist notions.
Nowhere is this tendency more apparent than in the methodology adopted by the
emotion work literature. I will now outline in some detail how the majority of
the research on emotion work adopts an essentialist approach to data analysis by
treating data (and I focus on qualitative data) as transparent.
The majority of evidence in support of the existence and nature of 'emotion
work' relies on self-report data - usually in the form of interviews or focus group
discussions (e.g. Hochschild, 1983; James, 1989; O'Brien, 1994; Rogers, 1995;
Zajdow, 1995), less often on the form of questionnaires (e.g. Wichroski, 1994;
Wharton, 1993) and occasionally a mix of both (e.g. Wharton and Erickson,
1995). Extracts from self-report data are taken as unproblematic evidence that
emotion work is being performed, in other words data extracts are being treated
as transparent evidence in support of 'emotion work' theory. I will illustrate this
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more fully with reference to two fairly typical extracts of data analysis from the
emotion work literature.
The first extract is drawn from Duncombe and Marsden's (1993) research. They
claim that "the dominant pattern of our female respondents' experience of
coupledom was an asymmetry of emotional response" (1993: 225) and they
support this claim with the following data extract:
I think I always loved him too much. I didn't really have a 'falling in
love' ... but I had a deep love for him, but it was all very unequal ... I
never really felt very loved, and I think that for every one of the
sixteen years of my marriage, it was a struggle to make him love me
more and to get the relationship equal (Divorcee: group discussion).
Note that this extract has been framed as an example of how women
'experience' (rather than, for example, 'describe') coupledom as asymmetrical.
In other words, this woman's description of her marriage is treated as a
transparent window through with analysts are clearly able to see what the
marriage was 'really' like. Although there is no further discussion of this extract
at the time they later refer back to it to forcefully conclude that "there was clear
evidence of emotion work devoted to attempts at managing the emotions of 'the
beloved' - for example, the woman who spent sixteen years struggling to make
her husband love her" (p. 236). Because this woman she tried to make her
husband love her, the analysts take this as evidence that she did indeed try (i.e. as
an accurate reflection of her marital situation), and this trying is in turn, taken as
evidence for her performance of emotional labour within this marriage.
The second example is (a condensed version of) an extract quoted in Nicky
James' (1989) discussion of 'emotional labour' in a hospice. The following
extract is introduced with the comment: "one 19-year-old nurse described the
intensity of emotion being dealt with as she gave a moving account of her
supposed failure to care adequately for patients":
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[...J You remember Mr Toon? The time he was buzz,
buzz, buzz, calling for us. And it was never really very
much he wanted. It worked as well to come and stand by
his bed, and just hold his hand. Often he'd just grab your
hand, someone to hold onto. Walking in the valley of the
shadow of death. It's not the physical act of dying, it's all
the mental anguish that goes round it. That's what this
place is trying to treat. There are so many instances of
people being scared, patients being scared. Crying out for
someone to help them. I feel very inadequate.
Other than the introductory material quoted above, James provides only one
sentence of analysis of this data: "This is a dramatic example of a relationship
between carer and cared for which involves the management of emotion." (p.
21). These two extracts are interesting because the analysis offered by both is
very brief. The authors expect that the reader will 'see' the data as a clear
example of 'emotion work' or 'emotional labour' without needing further
detailed explanation. The value of letting women 'speak for themselves' (and, by
implication, letting the data speak for itself) is that the reader can hardly fail to
be persuaded by this 'moving' and 'dramatic' account. Research on emotion
work, then, relies predominantly on a transparent reading of self-report data.
Emotion work theory, then, is a well established approach to explaining
women's emotional labour, the labour involved in caring for others, in their
occupational roles. More recently researchers have explored the utility of
emotion work theory for explaining women's emotional labour in their personal
and sexual relationships. In addition, psychological research suggests that young
women's emotional involvement with male sexual partners may constrain their
ability to refuse unwanted (or unsafe, or inappropriate) sex. This theory, then,
which purports to explain women's management of others' emotions, would
appear to be an appropriate starting point from which to explain why young
women in this research describe being unable or unwilling to refuse sexual
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activities with their male partners because they do not want to hurt their feelings.
It is this last possibility which I explore in the following section.
5.2 Emotion Work and Refusing Sex:
A Transparent Reading
In this section I explore the ways in which a transparent reading of the data in
which young women talk about sex could make a positive contribution to
research on unwanted sex and on emotion work. In other words, I provide a
methodologically parallel analysis to that presented in the work of Duncombe
and Marsden, James, and many of the other researchers on emotion work which I
presented above. I treat women's talk about emotion management as transparent
evidence in support of the idea that young women engage in emotion work
during sexual negotiations.
Young women express concern about hurting a man's feelings, and they
anticipate that men will react to sexual refusals with feelings of hurt and
rejection. In focus group discussions these young women (like women in other
research) express concern about "hurting his feelings" by saying no (Carla, 4),
they assert that they "don't want to hurt him in the slightest way" (Michelle, 1),
and they express guilt about the possibility that he might "end up getting really
hurt" (Jill, 10). Tn the following extract, two university students discuss the
problem:
Tarn: I've got that sort of problem where somebody's
keen, I just can't ... I just can't say to somebody, 'Look,
sony, I'm not', and I'll end up ... I'll avoid it in the end,
but I'll quite often end up speaking to them for hours and
hours, and I'm just thinking like, 'I really don't want to
be here; I want to be doing something else' [...] I just
can't drop it.
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Hannah: Why?
Pat: You don't want to hurt their feelings. [
... 1 I really try
and avoid ever having to be in the situation of having to
say to somebody, 'Look, no, I'm sony' [...J I wouldn't
really risk to have a sort of flirty jokey conversation with
someone that I don't know very well in case they
suddenly just say, 'Okay, how about it?', and then it
would just be like 'uuuuhhhh!'.
(Group 13)
In this extract, Pat is quite clear that she "couldn't ever just say 'oh well no" in
response to a (sexualised, but not explicitly sexual) invitation: she would "just
have to do it" (accept the invitation), and Tara agrees, saying "I do that, yeah".
Tara describes how, although she would rather be "doing something else" she
finds herself spending "hours and hours" talking to men who are "keen" to have
sex with her: although she does "avoid it [sex] in the end", she 'just can't" reject
them outright. When the interviewer asks why she finds herself in this position,
Pat (apparently with some empathy for Tara's predicament), explains that "you
just don't want to hurt their feelings". The difficulty of refusing sex is, then,
intricately bound up with the emotional implications of such an act. There are
many examples from my data in which women describe their concern about
"hurting" men, or causing them to "feel bad in themselves":
I try to think of a way to turn him down without hurting
his feelings ... Next time I do see him, in a way I make a
special effort to talk to him to show that there are no hard
feelings (Carla, 4)
Just saying 'no' I think is not good enough if you've got a
good relationship, because if you just say no it puts
doubts in other people's minds, and they think, 'Oh no,
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what's wrong with me?' or' Why does she not want to?'
or whatever. So if you explain it, then there's more
chance that they're going to think 'Oh it's OK, it's not
that she's not attracted to me', or whatever. It's so that
they don't feel bad in themselves.
(Wendy, 11)
But I mean if it was like someone you'd been going out
with, like I can see that in a way because I mean they
might get a bit offended and think 'what's wrong with
me', or they might think 'don't you feel the same way'
kind of thing.
(Pam, 9)
Yeah I got into that kind of situation with a best friend of
mine because er ... We used to go out a lot together, and
we used to sleep in the same bed and nothing happened.
And one night he was trying to come on to me and that,
and it was such an awful feeling because we're best
friends and that, and I didn't want to hurt him in the
slightest way, or anything like that, and yet I definitely
knew that I didn't want to have sex. And it was just such
an awful feeling, a really awful feeling. But obviously I
just turned over and pretended to be asleep ... But it was
an awful feeling, and I really did love him and everything
like that. I didn't want to reject him and ruin our
friendship, but I didn't want to go ahead with it because
that would probably ruin our friendship, and it's a very
tricky situation to be in.
(Michelle, 1)
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Clearly then, refusing sex is problematic, young women worry about the
emotional effects that a refusal might have on a potential sexual partner. They
discuss the various strategies they might use, either to avoid a refusal ("I just
turned over and pretended to be asleep"), to turn him down gently and so
minimise the hurt (as Wendy suggests, "if you explain it" then "they don't feel
bad in themselves"), or to try to bolster his ego after a rejection (by making "a
special effort to talk to him"). Such strategies might even include engaging in
sexual activity which they themselves do not want, as the following story from
Kate illustrates:
Kate: But have you ever slept with anyone because you
didn't want to lose them as a mate, or
Sharon: But you do, that's the worse thing.
Kate: ... because I mean, I went out with this bloke for
three months, and I finished with him because I didn't
fancy him at all. And the night we finished we had this
massive row, and we'd both had a bit to drink, which
probably didn't help. But all the time I was seeing him, I
said no, I didn't want to sleep with him. And the night I
finished with him, I felt so upset and so guilty that I'd
hurt him that I ended up having sex with him. [...] I just
felt so guilty because he was so upset that I just gave in.
(Group 1)
Despite reporting that she "didn't fancy" this young man, and that she told him
she "didn't want to sleep with him", Kate "ended up" engaging in sexual
activities which she did not desire. Refusing sex in addition to terminating the
relationship apparently made her feel "so guilty" at being the cause of this man's
"upset" that she "just gave in".
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The women in this study (just like those in other studies) are paralysed by a sense
of responsibility for 'taking care of' men's emotions. Sometimes, they say, they
go along with sex as a result of worry about hurting men; other times they say no
but feel "awful" or "guilty" about refusing. They are expected, and expect
themselves, to take care of men's emotions and avoid causing them hurt or
distress. The management of men's emotions is, then, portrayed as a crucial and
integral part of the business of refusing sex. It is these very sentiments which,
according to some of the psychological literature, make them especially
vulnerable to sexual coercion (e.g. Muehienhard et a!., 1989; Warzak et a!.,
1995).
In this data then, women talk in ways which map on to the social scientific
research on 'emotion work'. In this section I have presented the sort of
transparent reading of the data which is typical of existing research on emotion
work as exemplified by the work of Duncombe and Marsden and of James. Such
an analysis has several implications as I discuss in section 5.4.
5.3 Talk about 'Emotion Work':
A Constructed Reading
This alternative analysis treats the data not as transparent evidence in support of
emotion work theory, but as constructed data, as a resource used by young
women to account for their experiences, construct their identities and manage
their reputations. As in the previous chapter, the question with which I am
concerned from this perspective is not what 'really happens' in sexual
negotiations (i.e. whether or not women actually provide emotion work), but
rather, how young women talk about their own (and men's) emotions, and what
functions this talk serves in their collaborative constructions of what
(hetero)sexual relationships are like. This approach then, does not treat the data
as neutral descriptions benevolently supplied by women simply to further the
researcher's understanding of a situation: rather, women are treated as having
specific investments in the sorts of descriptions they produce, such that talk about
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'emotion work' functions to meet these concerns. This approach then, treats
'emotion work' not, as is the case in the emotion work literature, as an analyst
resource (an analytical category used by social scientists to explain the behaviour
of their participants) but as a participant resource (a resource used by participants
themselves to explain and account for their own behaviours).
In seeking to explore women's use of 'emotion work' within a constructed
reading of the data, we need to consider the particular interactional context
within which these accounts were produced and occasioned. These young
women are being asked (by me) to explain why, and in what circumstances, they
do not refuse unwanted advances but instead engage in sexual activities that they
do not desire. As Widdicombe notes, "Having sex (or indeed doing anything)
when you don't want to is an accountable matter" (Widdicombe, 1995: 110), it is
an unanticipated or untoward behaviour that requires some form of warrant or
explanation (Scott and Lyman, 1968). In the course of this analysis I demonstrate
how talk about 'emotion work' provides just such a warrant. I look first at the
ways in which young women describe men as emotionally vulnerable and in
need of emotion work, and I then move on to look at the functions of such an
account for mitigating blame and fostering moral accountability, and for
constructing identity.
One of the most striking features of young women's talk about 'emotion work' in
relation to refusing sex is the way in which they portray men as emotionally
vulnerable, full of self-doubt, and as in continual need of reassurance. This
vulnerability is evident in the following extract from a discussion between Jill,
Karen and the researcher:
Jill: But if you were in a relationship and you said no,
then he could end up feeling 'Oh god', you know, 'what's
going on?' [...] he could end up getting really upset about
it, and you wouldn't really want that [...] If you had a
boyfriend and you said no, then they would think things
like -
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Karen: 'Oh what's wrong with me? She should enjoy it'
Jill: Yeah, get worried, and think whether you were still
interested or not
Karen: Yeah, so you'd have to be very careful -
Jill: - and then they might ask questions, and you might
end up saying, 'Well there's nothing actually wrong' -
Hannah: 'I just don't feel like it, actually'
Jill: I think boys would find that very difficult
Karen: 'Don't you find me attractive?', and all this stuff
and you think, 'No just...'
(Group 10)
Here (as in many of the other extracts presented in section 5.2), men are
described as worrying about their sexual attractiveness, as vulnerable to being
hurt by rejection, and as introspectively assessing their characters for potential
flaws. It is this emotional vulnerability which necessitates 'emotion work'. If
men are known to react to sexual refusals with emotional pain and self-doubt,
then this opens up the implication that by saying 'no' young women are
deliberately inflicting pain. While the researcher (and much social scientific
literature) asserts that saying 'no' is the event which is accountable, these
young women assert that it is, conversely, saving 'no', refusing sex which is the
event which must be accounted for. Although one may be tempted to conclude
that this 'double bind' puts women in an impossible position which constrains
their sexual autonomy, these young women provide their own answer - excuses.
Women construct excuses as a way to avoid unwanted sexual attention and to
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"soften the blow" of sexual rejection (Judy, 4). Jill, Deb and Karen have a
discussion about the utility of different excuses which leads into their talk about
'emotion work':
Jill: but if you were in a relationship and you said no then
he could end up feeling 'Oh god' you know, 'What's
going on'. Whereas maybe if you talked
Karen: It's more difficult in a relationship to say no
Jill: maybe if you talked about it and everything., but he
could.. but if you didn't want to - there's no reason - not
for any reason, but if you just didn't want to, and then
you said, he could end up getting really hurt about it. And
you wouldn't really want that, so period would be a good
excuse
(Group 10)
In this extract Jill makes a distinction between having "no reason" to refuse sex -
"you just didn't want to" is (apparently) not considered a good enough reason -
and providing an excuse - such as menstruation. The former would, according to
Jill, result in the man "getting really hurt", while the latter would prevent such an
outcome. Using excuses may be a way of 'framing' the situation differently.
Cheshire Calhoun expands this idea and describes how emotion work may
involve "telling a story differently": an angry father "just wants to get his project
finished without interruption." (Calhoun, 1992: 120). By re-framing the situation
in this way the emotional sting is removed. Telling a male partner that you are
menstruating rather than that you just don't feel like having sex may be a way of
'telling a story differently' so that he no longer has to feel hurt and rejected.
Emotion work, as these young women construct it, is about redefining the
situation, changing or altering the frame surrounding accountable actions, in
order to make negative emotional reactions (such as hurt and rejection)
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untenable. Regardless of whether we, as researchers, can see the value of this
approach and regardless of whether this strategy is actually used by women in
their lived sexual relationships - or whether it is successful - there is clearly a
benefit for women talking as thou gh this kind of 'emotion work' is effective.
Talk about emotion work also serves to construct issues around sexual refusal as
morally accountable and as involving a difficult moral dilemma. As I pointed out
at the beginning of this analysis, engaging in sexual activities when you do not
want to is an accountable matter, but talk about emotion work serves to construct
refusing sex as morally accountable. In so doing young women provide a warrant
for not saying 'no' to sex which presents them not as incompetent
communicators, or as docile easily manipulated emotional wrecks, but as
morally responsible, emotionally strong individuals.
Talk about emotion work also provides a useful function for the women who use
it by countering common assumptions about young women's emotional lives. In
academic and professional writing, in the media, and in ordinaiy lay theory,
young women are often presented as passive victims who engage in unwanted
sex because they are coerced into it by young men who abuse their power;
because they have been socialised to meet male needs at the expense of their
own; because they are emotionally needy and crave love which they hope to find
through sex; or because (as Duncombe and Marsden, 1993 suggest) they are
suffering from "false consciousness" and "colluding" with their own oppression.
Young women are often presented as lamentably ignorant about men and male
sexuality, as easily persuadable, as 'carried away' by love and as obsessed with
romance. These approaches share a characterisation of young women as victims.
As Sue Widdicombe comments (in relation to discourses around youth
subculture), ideas 'filter' into common usage to the young people to whom they
refer, and they, in turn, attend to "what is generally known or assumed about
their lives, their lifestyles and identities" (Widdicombe, 1995: 123). These
women attend to what is generally known about their lives by presenting an
alternative version of their emotional entanglements with men. These young
women present themselves as 'knowing' about men, and as knowledgeable about
the kind of emotional pressure which men attempt to exert. In several group
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display their 'knowingness' by interjecting their own examples into Deb's list
(Karen), and by providing ironic commentary (Jill):
Deb: But then you'll often get these kind of 'Oh, you're a
tease' or 'You led me on'. I mean, you don't actually get
it like that, but you know that's what they mean: 'Well if
you didn't want it you shouldn't have flirted -,
Karen: - 'led me on-'
Deb: - 'that way.' Exactly. So they put that on you and
sometimes you feel, 'Oh god, maybe I am a real tart or
whatever, and I have led him on', and that makes you feel
really shitty
Jill: But that's just their way of-
Deb:-yeah-
Jill: - making you do something you don't want to do
(Group 10)
They address the issue of (what analysts might call) sexual coercion by showing
their awareness of the kinds of 'lines' men might use, while at the same time
being able to provide some sort of translation for what they 'really' mean.
Although the young women here are talking about their experience of sexual
coercion, these men are constructed as rather clumsy and predictable caricatures
who are clearly no real threat to these 'sophisticated' and 'knowledgeable' young
women. I would like briefly to draw attention to two of the ways in which
women achieve this appearance of knowledgeability (I return to discuss these in
more detail in chapter six). Firstly, then, these women talk about (what are
presented as) hypothetical rather than actual experiences. Jill, for example (see p.
231) does not talk as though she were discussing a particular occasion in which
she did not want to have sex with her boyfriend, or give details or her actual
thoughts or remembered conversation. Rather she (and others in this extract) talk
about young men in general. The 'he' is never named and refers only to a
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generic, putative or hypothetical boyfriend. Secondly, by 'filling in the gaps' in
each other's talk - in the way that, for example, Karen and Jill, added to and
commented on Karen's list of corny lines - the women corroborate each other's
talk. Both of these features of the talk (using generic terms and filling in the
gaps) serve to build up consensual versions of what men are like. By talking
about men in general the knowledge which they espouse is, by implication,
available to anybody simply by virtue of knowing some men, any men. Their
knowledge is not limited to specific men (e.g. of their own age, social class, etc.)
or tied to particular individual males with whom they happen to be acquainted,
rather what each of them knows about men is general knowledge about what
men are like. By displaying high levels of apparent agreement about 'what men
are like' (either by explicitly agreeing with what the previous speakers has said
or by 'filling in the gaps') the construction of consensus serves to add credibility
to what all the participants are saying by implying that it is shared rather than
idiosyncratic knowledge. By implication, it is not what they know about men, but
what everyone knows about men. Clearly then these young women both attend
to, and dismiss, common knowledge about themselves, while simultaneously
creating or constructing common knowledge about men - including their
apparently rather feeble and predictable attempts at sexual coercion, as well as
their emotional vulnerability.
In sum then, by describing experiences of unwanted sex in relation to what could
be described as emotion work young women construct a vision of sexual
negotiations as involving emotionally strong women, and emotionally vulnerable
men. By characterising sexual refusal as a sexual rejection likely to cause pain
and upset, women justify and account for their engagement in unwanted sex by
portraying themselves as strong enough to have unwanted sex in order to protect
the feelings of their emotionally weak male partners. This way of constructing
sexual negotiations changes the focus from a context in which not saying 'no' is
accountable to one where refusing unwanted sex, rather than acquiescing to it, is
seen as accountable. In addition, by talking about sexual negotiations in this way
young women can both attend to, and dismiss, common knowledge about young
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women's status as emotionally vulnerable and easily manipulated. In short,
young women use talk about emotion work to construct a shared, consensual
version of men as emotional weaklings, whose feelings are easily hurt, and in
turn, to construct themselves as active agents - knowledgeable about sexual
relationships, able to negotiate their sexual refusals without hurting men based
on informed choices. A constructed reading of the data serves to highlight the
particular functions which talk about emotion work serves for young women
themselves. Young women have certain investments in describing sexual
encounters in particular ways. By describing them in terms of emotion work,
young women present a very positive image of themselves. Whether or not
women 'really' do emotion work when involved in actual sexual negotiations
with young men (and whether this is knowable solely on the basis of self-report
data), there is clearly a benefit for them in talking jf they do.
5.4 A Feminist Analysis? The Costs and Benefits of a
Transparent versus Constructed Reading
Unlike miscommunication theory which, as I demonstrated in chapter four, has
been heavily criticised by feminists, emotion work theory can be seen as pro-
feminist in many of the claims that its researchers make. As noted earlier (see
section 5.1) the provision of emotion work is seen as profoundly gendered. For
many researchers in this area the value of exploring women's provision of
emotional labour is that it makes visible aspects of women's work which have
often remained 'hidden from history' (cf. Rowbothom, 1973). Women's role as
the carers and nurturers of others has been central to feminist debates since the
1960s, In particular, the "invisible work" (cf. Daniels, 1987) involved in
housework and in providing care for others have come under detailed scrutiny by
feminist sociologists (e.g. Finch and Groves, 1980; Stacey, 1981; Graham, 1983).
At a time when liberation was thought to hinge on paid employment and
economic independence for women, the exploitation of women through their
informal, privatised and unrewarded work in the home, which both restricted
opportunities for paid employment outside of the home and was reinforced by
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social policies which assumed women's continued (free) provision of services,
was seen as central to women's oppression. The focus on the conimercialization
of women's emotional labour reflects concerns that women's invisible labour is
now being exploited in the public, as well as private, sphere. Analysts emphasise
that expectations of women on the job are gender based, the expectation that
women will provide emotional labour ensures that women in paid employment
"go beyond" the reasonable requirements of providing mental and physical
labour (Wichroski, 1994: 36). Feminists have fought to redefine those aspects of
women's work which, because they are supposed to come "naturally" and
because they are often unrewarded, remain unrecognised as work. The concept
of 'emotion work' is popular with feminist social scientists in part because it
names as work behaviours which, whether performed in the private or in the
public sphere, are typically invisible and unrecognised work. According to
Cheshire Calhoun the concept of emotional work is attractive to feminists
because it names "work women do and are expected to do, especially in
managing the domestic household." (1992: 118). Such a task is necessary when
we consider the myriad of ways in which women are made invisible within
mainstream social science (see section 1.1.1). Making women's emotion work
visible is often an explicit aim of those conducting research in this area (e.g.
Wichroski, 1994; Rogers, 1995).
In addition to the exploitation of women through invisible or taken-for-granted
labour, emotion work has also been identified as detrimental to women's well-
being. Emotion work in the labour market is described as resulting in 'emotive
dissonance' (Hochschild, 1983a), such that workers are unable to distinguish
between their 'true' emotions and those that have been artificially created for a
wage. Terms like "alienation", "inauthenticity" and "self-estrangement" are
common place in the literature (e.g. Rogers, 1995; Tolich, 1993). In the sphere of
personal relationships this concern is paralleled by the concept of "marital
burnout" (Wharton and Erickson, 1995). Emotion work is described as a
'pressure' and 'constraint' which "locks" women into behaving in ways which
may be "against their own best interests" (Zajdow, 1995: 545). Emotion work
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has been directly implicated in women's acceptance not only of unwanted sexual
activity (Duncombe and Marsden, 1996) but also explicit physical abuse and
violence (Zajdow, 1995). Additionally, the concept of 'emotion work' is
described as "the last and most obstinate manifestation and frontier of gender
inequality" (Duncombe and Marsden, 1995b: 161). These studies then, attempt
to challenge the idea that women's caring is natural, the idea that women are
emotional carers, and replace it with the idea that emotional caring is something
which women do. They also hope to emphasise the ways in which women are
exploited and abused through emotion work. As such a transparent reading of the
focus group data which supports emotion work theory is not problematic in the
same way that a transparent reading of data supporting miscommunication theory
was in the last chapter.
The implications of a transparent reading of the emotion work data are very
different. First, from this (transparent) perspective it is possible to argue, as other
studies hy argued, that women do indeed engage in emotional labour. They
monitor and assess the feelings of others, and moderate their own emotions in
order to ensure the proper emotions in others. In other words, this approach
allows the researcher to make strong statements about the existence of emotion
work, its unequal distribution along gendered lines, and its constraining effects
on women's sexual negotiations. Second, it could be argued, as it been
argued in other studies, that the required provision of emotion work is implicated
in women's oppression - women must subjugate their own feelings of disinterest
in, or distaste for, sex to those of their male partners, engaging in sex because he
wants to rather to satisfy their own sexual desires. Or, alternatively, the
emotional costs (of guilt, distress etc.) of prioritising their own feelings by
refusing unwanted sex, are understood to outweigh the emotional costs of
suppressing such feelings. Such processes, it could be argued, lead to alienation
from their own feelings of desire such that women are unable to distinguish their
own 'authentic' sexual feelings from those feelings which are artificially created
to please their partners. In this way the potential for the development of an
autonomous sexuality are severely constrained. However, although this approach
allows the researcher to make strong claims about women's oppression it does
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have some drawbacks. In particular it obscures the ways in which young women
work hard to present themselves as assertive and capable young women. This
approach to data analysis presents women as victims of a patriarchal social
system which insists that they nurture and provide emotional care for men.
Conversely, from an alternative (constructed) perspective talk about doing
'emotion work' may offer women a legitimate and socially acceptable language
for explaining and justifying their actions, and for presenting themselves in a
favourable light. Young women present themselves as emotionally literate, in
control and powerful, while men are emotionally needy and highly predictable. It
is not too difficult to see that young women might prefer this version of sexual
negotiation to the version offered by assertiveness training classes and date rape
prevention programmes which have been accused of presenting women as
emotionally needy dupes or victims, and men as all powerful aggressors (e.g.
Roiphe, 1993). 'Emotion work' talk may enable a woman to present herself as
engaging in (what an analyst might call) 'unwanted sex' as a chosen act of
emotional generosity on her part, rather than manipulation on his. I suggest that
women's talk about 'emotion work' cannot be adequately addressed if we
assume that research participants are earnestly trying to relate, in a neutral and
disinterested way, the experiences of their lives. It is clear that women have
specific investments in talking about the doing of 'emotion work' and that
'emotion work' is used as a participant resource in self-presentation and to
achieve interactional goals. Considering emotion work as a participant resource,
and treating the data as constructed rather than transparent, involves a
completely different image of what young women are like. While a transparent
reading of women's emotion work represents them as passive victims of men's
coercive strategies, a constructed reading shows how young women represent
themselves as wily sexual negotiators, able to handle 'tricky' situations in a
mature and confident fashion.
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5.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter I have demonstrated how emotion work theory is a useful
conceptual tool for explaining young women's accounts of sexual negotiation, as
such this chapter makes a positive contribution to the growing body of literature
which looks at emotion work in personal relationships. This chapter expands the
debate about the relative value of transparent and constructed reading of
qualitative data presented so far. I argued that the majority of the existing
literature on emotion work relies on a transparent reading of qualitative data and
demonstrate this in detail with the aid of two emblematic cases. A transparent
reading of my own data demonstrated the 'ordinariness' of the data and the
claims that can be made about the data using such an approach. This may include
claims about the gendered nature of emotion work, and the victimization of
young women by a patriarchal society which insists that they subjugate their own
emotional needs to those of others. In contrast to this transparent reading, I then
presented a constructed reading of my data which starts from the assumption that
women have certain investments in the ways in which they describe their lives
and looks at the functions which talking about sexual refusals in terms of
emotion work serves for the women themselves (rather than for patriarchy). In
Chapter Four I introduced the idea that the ways in which participants describe
events serves certain functions. I build on this in this chapter by examining the
functions for young women of describing sexual negotiations in terms of emotion
work. I expanded on the social constructionist notion of 'function' introduced in
Chapter Four by linking it more closely to the interactional context in which the
talk is being produced, in other words, looking at what function talk about
emotion work serves for these women, at this time and in response to this
particular question. This chapter also introduced the idea that participants have
certain investments in the ways in which they describe events and feelings. In
other words, it matters to them whether they are seen as emotional dupes or as
providing emotion work to protect weak male partners. I also introduce the
distinction between emotion work as an analyst resource (a way for analysts to
explain behaviour) and emotion work as a participant resource (a way for women
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themselves to explain behaviour). This chapter, then, presented two different
ways of analysing the same data, each of which has particular costs and benefits
for the feminist researcher. The first (transparent) reading allows the researcher
to make strong claims about the gendered and exploitative nature of emotion
work in sexual relationships but presents young women as victims and as cultural
dupes. The second (constructed reading) says little about whether or not women
actually perform emotion work in sexual relationships, but it does help explain
why women might talk about their role in sexual relationships as about
protecting men's feelings in a way which allows them to present themselves as
strong and capable sexual agents.
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"You Can't Say 'No' Because You've Gone
Too Far"
Chapter Six: Sexual Scripts and Refusing Sex
In talking about their sexual negotiations with young men, young women talk as
if sexual behaviours follow routine patterns which are recognised both by
themselves and by their male partners. They talk about different 'stages' in
sexual activity and about one stage progressing inevitably to the next
Psychologists have called these patterns 'sexual scripts'. Women also report that
these patterns and the expectations contained within them influence their ability
to refuse sexual activities. In Chapter One (section 1.3.3) I demonstrated how
psychologists (and feminists) have used the notion of sexual scripts to account
for the prevalence of rape and the ways in which men ignore women's sexual
refusals. In this chapter, I first review the literature on sexual script theory in
more detail indicating the ways in which it is either social constructionist or
essentialist in relation to the key three features (e.g. the origin of social
phenomenon, language of scientific discovery and methodology) which I
identified in Chapter One. Then (as in previous chapters) I present both a
transparent reading of the data which treats scripts as pre-existing cognitive
structures which can be accessed through talk (i.e. using a model of participant
as psychological subject), and a constructed reading which treats the data as talk
as if sexual activities are scripted or 'script formulations' (Edwards, 1994; 1997).
6.1 Sexual Script Theory
According to psychologists all behaviour (not just sexual behaviour) is scripted
(Schank and Abelson, 1977; Abelson, 1981). Scripts are described as mental
representations of everyday objects, they include "stereotyped events" and the
sequence in which these events occur (Abelson, 1981: 715). Scripts are brought
into play when an individual encounters a recognisable event and then
anticipates the events which are likely to follow. In this way scripts apparently
allow us to simplify information and to fill in gaps in our knowledge. Abelson
gives the following example to illustrate this:
John was feeling very hungry as he entered the restaurant
he settled himself at a table and noticed that the waiter
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was nearby. Suddenly, however, he realized that he'd
forgotten his reading glasses
(Abelson, 1981: 715).
According to script theory, people make sense of this by drawing upon their
scripted knowledge about what usually happens in restaurants. The significance
of the lost glasses lies in John's implied difficulty in reading the menu, since no
mention of a menu has been made people use their scripted knowledge to fill in
the gaps. Script theory has been used in many different areas of psychology (e.g.
developmental, organisational, and legal psychology) and has been applied to
many different aspects of human behaviour including: looking at children's
scripts for familiar events (such as going grocery shopping or to the beach) and
how these scripts can be used to develop plans to prevent mishaps (Hudson et al.,
1995); sex typing in children's scripts (Levy and Fivush, 1993); behaviour in the
workplace (Gioia et al., 1989); and for investigating memory in eye-witness
testimony (Hoist and Pezdek, 1992).
The idea that sexual behaviour is scripted and the development of sexual script
theory is usually attributed to John Gagnon and William Simon in their 1973
book Sexual Conduct (e.g. by Laws and Schwartz, 1977; Luria and Rose, 1979;
Thome and Luria, 1986; Edgar and Fitzpatrick, 1993; Moore and Rosenthal,
1993; Rose and Frieze, 1993). Gagnon and Simon's approach has been variously
described as 'sociological' (Edgar and Fitzpatrick, 1993) or as offering a 'social
perspective' on sex research (Laws and Schwartz, 1977) and as an 'interactionist
sociological' approach (Evans, 1993). Gagnon and Simon describe scripts as
"blueprints" for sexual behaviour:
Scripts are like the plans people have in their heads for
what they are doing and what they are going to do ... the
who's, what's, where's, when's and why's for given types
of activity ... [w]e use scripts to choose courses of action,
to check our behaviour against our plans, and to recall
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prior concrete steps in our behaviour through thinking
about the elements in our script (Gagnon., 1977: 6).
The concept of a 'script' is drawn from a dramaturgical metaphor: just as
theatrical actors have to learn a script which tells them where to stand, what to
say, who to, and what to do: so sexual actors have to learn a sexual script which
tells them what to do sexually, with whom, at what time and in what place.
According to script theory, scripts are a device for guiding action, they tell us
what 'counts' as sex, how to recognise sexual situations, and what to do in sexual
encounters. Script theory represents a radical departure from mainstream
sexology and sexuality research which has traditionally depicted sexuality as
dictated by biological drives. Script theory problematises the link between
physical activities and the meaning attributed to such behaviours - i.e. the link
between the biological and the social. Script theory contests the idea that some
behaviours are inherently sexual and that the meaning of sexuality can simply be
'read off' from bodily activities. It is this assumption which informs Freud's
controversial claims about childhood sexuality. Freud's evidence for sexuality in
childhood stems from observations of children engaged in genital play. Studies
of infants and children have shown that they do have a tendency to play with
their genitals and Gagnon and Simon do not dispute this, rather they disagree
with Freud on the meaning of this behaviour. "The observation of children in
what appears to be sexual activity from the point of view of adults", argue
Gagnon and Simon "fails to account seriously for the differences between adults
scripts and motives and those of children" (1973: 41). Although children can and
do play with their own and others' genitals, and may experience arousal and even
orgasm, Gagnon and Simon argue that this cannot be understood as sexual. What
is important, according to these researchers, is not the actual activities in which
the child .engages, but the meaning attributed to these behaviours. Commenting
on infant masturbation they say:
For the infant touching his penis, the activity cannot be
sexual in the same sense as adult masturbation but is
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merely a diffusely pleasurable experience. Only through
maturation and learning these adult labels for his
experience can the child come to masturbate in the adult
sense of that word (Gagnon and Simon, 1973:14).
According to Gagnon and Simon, there is nothing inherently sexual about any
physical activities; what is important is not the behaviour itself but the meaning
given to that behaviour. These meanings, and the scripts which give behaviour
meaning, have to be learned. Sexual behaviour and sexual arousal are not
possible, they argue, without this learning process:
The capacity for sexual arousal itself (including physical
tumescence) depends on the presence of culturally
appropriate eliciting stimuli composed of persons,
motives and activities ... [the] combination of various
periods of development into the articulate behavioural
sequence that leads to orgasms is not fated or ordained at
any level; it is neither fixed by nature or by the organs
themselves. The very experience of sexual excitement is
a learned process and it is only our insistence on the myth
of naturalness that hides these components from us
(Gagnon and Simon, 1973: 9).
In other words, although there is a widespread cultural assumption that sexual
arousal is spontaneous and natural, in fact, they argue, it is a learned process.
People learn to feel excitement only when with the 'right' person, in the 'right'
place with the 'right' motives. For example, we may observe someone
undressing, a behaviour that may be linked to sexual arousal, but if this person is
the 'ong' sex, is situated in a changing room, and is about to go swimming we
are less likely to become aroused than if they are a sexual partner, who is in our
bedroom and with whom we want sexual contact. The scripts we learn tell us
who is an appropriate sexual partner, where to have sex, and with what motives.
246
Chapter Six: Sexual Scripts and Refusing Sex
In short, script theoiy proposes that sexual behaviour is guided by social rather
than biological concerns, is learnt rather than innate, that meanings associated
with behaviours are more important than the behaviours themselves, and that
sexual behaviours can be understood not in relation to the individual but in
relation to the social context.
Sexual script theory, then, contrasts sharply with essentialist theories of
sexuality, particularly in relation to its conceptualisation of the origin of social
phenomenon. According to Jeffrey Weeks, essentialist theories of sexuality
assume that sex is:
a driving, instinctual force, whose characteristics are
built into the biology of the human animal, which shapes
human institutions and whose will must force its way out,
either in the form of direct sexual expression or, if
blocked, in the form of perversion or neuroses (Weeks,
1981:2).
Against this, script theory argues that sexuality is learned and that "nothing is
intrinsically sexual or rather that anything can be sexualised" (Weeks, 1981: 3).
In her book Sex Surveyed, Liz Stanley describes script theory as "highly
influential" and a "classic critique of 'drive reductionist' ways of thinking"
(Stanley, 1995: x), while Evans praises its "uncompromising anti-essentialism"
(Evans, 1993: 28). At the time Gagnon and Simon were writing their key text
Sexual Conduct, script theory was not offered as an explicitly social
constructionist approach - indeed this approach was barely articulated or named
as such. However, since then other writers drawing on script theory have
explicitly defined it as social constuctionist. For example, Judith Laws and
Pepper Schwartz describe their approach to theorising female sexuality, saying:
"In applying the idea of social construction to the area of sexuality, we are saying
that sexuality is scripted" (Laws and Schwartz, 1977: 6). More recently, John
Gagnon himself claims that script theory "anticipated the emerging social
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constructionist and postmodern tradition in the social, and behavioural sciences"
(Gagnon, 1990: 3).
6.2 Sexual Scripts and Refusing Sex:
A Transparent Reading
Since the early exposition of this theory by Gagnon and Simon, the notion of
scripting has been used to explain may different aspects of sexuality including:
dating (Frieze, 1989; Rose and Frieze, 1993); sex therapy (McCormick, 1987;
Gagnon, 1990); sexual harassment (Popovich et al., 1995); condom (non)use (De
Bro, Campbell and Peplau, 1994; Maticka-Tyndale, 1991; Abraham and Sheeran,
1994; Holland et al., 1990); and extramarital sexuality (Spanier and Margolis,
1983; Thompson, 1983). In addition, and of most relevance here, sexual scripts
have also been used to explain instances of rape. As I outlined in Chapter One
(section 1.3.3), script theorists argue that men and women are scripted to behave
in very different ways when it comes to sexual relationships. Notably, women are
expected to restrict or say 'no' to sexual activities while men are expected to
initiate or say 'yes' to sexual activities (McCormick 1979; LaPlante, McCormick
and Brannigan, 1980; Green and Sandos, 1983; Grauholtz and Serpe, 1985;
O'Sullivan and Byers, 1992). The women in this study also talk about men as the
initiators of sexual activity and women as the restrictors. They describe men as
unlikely ever to refuse sex. According to Karen (10) "boys always feel like it
[having sex]", and while girls are more likely to say 'no' "boys will get turned on
and just want to do it whether or not they felt like it before". She says that "it's
very unlikely" for a boy to refuse sex, and adds "in fact I've never heard of it in
my life". Jan and Rose agree:
Jan: blokes our age don't say no
Rose: yeah exactly
Hannah: what.. ever ever?
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Jan: well hardly ever, they're all on the pull for .. well
they're on the pull for sex
(Group 8)
This same group later explain that men have a "higher libido", that they have
"more sex drive" than women so that "it's more rare" for a guy to say 'no'. In
this respect, then, the young women in this study are no different from those who
participated in the research cited in chapter one. They express similar views
about the roles of men and women in sexual encounters. As I also noted in
chapter one Stevi Jackson (1978) has argued that this adversarial notion of
sexual relations creates a context for rape, and others have argued that men are
socialised to ignore a woman's 'no' assuming that it is part of a script. Men
expect women to say 'no' but are also expected to continue on the assumption
that sooner or later she will say 'yes'. In the following section I demonstrate bow
a transparent reading of my data could be used to contribute to the literature on
sexual scripts and sexual coercion by highlighting the ways in which women's
'no's are scripted in particular ways. I look at the ways in which women's 'no's
are expected only at particular times, and in relation to particular sexual
activities, and I explore the ways in which these expectations constrain women's
ability to refuse unwanted sexual activities.
When young women talk about (hetero)sexual activities they describe how
sexual encounters follow routine, easily identifiable, patterns. There is talk of
'stages' of sexual activity (e.g. Liz, 6). The women in this research talk about
starting with 'snogging', or "kissing and hugging" (Karen, 10); going, or not
going, "further" (Zoe, 9); of activities being "in the middle" (Jane, 9) or "half
way through" (Liz, 6); and "all the way to sex" (Karen, 10). Indeed Liz provides
an almost perfect 'textbook' description of the scriptedness of sexual activities:
in between the kissing stages blah-de-blah you've had
the touchy feely bit and (laughing - its true) and then you
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had the heavy petting bit and all that palaver and then the
sex
(Liz, 6)
This highlights the idea that sexual activities happen in progressive stages with a
distinct start, middle and end. Sexual activities are not just ranked in terms of the
order in which they occur, they are also ranked in order of importance with the
most "important" activities coming last in the scripted sequence. Jill, for
example, indicates that although sexual intercourse is seen by most people as
"the actual bit" as "something special", she considers anything "more than
kissing" to be very intimate (Jill, 10). Karen recognises that some people, she
indicates that she means people from different cultural or religious backgrounds,
might place a high importance on French kissing, in her culture "you wouldn't
think anything of it" (10). Rachel describes how penetrative sex is like an
invasion whereas 'foreplay' can be seen as not so important - "nothing major" -
because it doesn't involve "changing anything" or losing your virginity (11).
The women in this study are by no means unusual when they describe their
sexual experiences in this way. The idea that sexual behaviours are scripted to
occur in a certain sequence is an aspect of Gagnon and Simon's theory which,
according to Luria and Rose (1979) is best supported by empirical evidence. As
Gagnon and Simon put it:
The script for the physical elements of this relationship [a
sexual one] is apparent to all who participate in it. First
there is kissing, then tongue kissing, then touching of the
breasts through the clothing (perhaps here a break in
sequence), touching of the breasts under the clothing or
the genitals through the skirt or outside the underwear,
then finally the genital contact with either a branch to
mouth-genital contact (in some few circumstances) to
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coitus. Most frequently culmination is in coitus. (Gagnon
and Simon, 1973: 75-6)
Empirical research supports their claims (e.g. Brady and Levitt, 1965; Bentler,
1968; Sorenson, 1972; Vener et al., 1972; Mahoney, 1980). In one study, for
example, students were asked to sort a deck of cards, each of which bad a
description of a sexual/dating activity on the reverse, into the order which they
would expect them to occur in a one night stand (Edgar and Fitzpatrick, 1993).
These cards include activities in a public place such as 'He greets and introduces
himself', 'He sits very close to her', 'She agrees to go someplace', and activities
in a private place such as 'He initiates nonintimate touching', 'She undresses
him', and 'He indirectly suggests they have sex'. The authors found a very clear
consensus both about the kinds of activities which are expected on a one night
stand and the order in which these activities are expected to occur. Focusing
more specifically on trying to establish the order of specific sexual activities,
Geer and Broussard (1990) gave their participants paired sentences describing
sexual activities and asked them to indicate which of the two activities would
come before the other in a typical sexual encounter. These sentences described
more explicitly sexual activities than in Edgar and Fitzpatrick's study, including
for example: 'He feels her vaginal lips through her panties'; 'She kisses his
penis'; and 'They kiss each other on the lips'. Participants were then asked to
indicate which of the two activities comes before the other in a typical sexual
encounter. The authors found that the specific acts involved in coitus follow a
systematic and identifiable pattern, and concluded that:
we now have solid empirical evidence that the
sequence of behaviors that make up coitus fulfils one of
the general criteria used in scripting models ... The coital
pattern follows a predictable sequence across individuals
(Geer and Broussard, 1990: 669)
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Interestingly, it appears that this sequence applies to only young, white,
heterosexual men and women. Research comparing Black and White adolescents
found that for Black teenagers the pre-coital sequence was less predictable aiid
often they engaged only in 'necking' (i.e. without light or heavy petting) before
intercourse (Smith and Udry, 1985). These two studies are typical of those in this
area, and although I discussed how script theory is social constructionist in
relation to how it conceptualises the origin of social phenomenon (i.e. sexual
behaviour is culturally defined and learned) these two studies show how script
theory is essentialist in the methods it uses and the use to which these methods
are put. In other words, script theory uses tests, scales and experiments to
'uncover', 'reveal' or 'discover' the 'truth' about sexual scripts. Scripts are seen
as pre-existing entities which can be brought to light through research. Script
theory, then, uses the rhetoric of scientific discovery.
In sum, then, the young white women in this study (like those in other studies)
report that sexual activities are expected to occur in a particular sequence. In
other words, sexual activities are scripted and these women are able recognise
and articulate this script. This research could be used to provide further evidence
in support of script theory. Unlike the existing research which relies on explicitly
asking people to generate scripts, this research could represent a significant
development because it demonstrates that people conceptualise sexual behaviour
as scripted without being prompted to do so by a researcher.
Having demonstrated that women conceptualise sexual activities as occurring in
a particular sequence I now go on to show how it is possible to analyse my data
using script theory and a transparent reading. Such a reading of the data can be
used to make important contributions to the literature around sexual coercion
and around women's sexual refusals in particular. I look first at the ways in
which the sequence of sexual activities includes both legitimate and illegitimate
points at which to say 'no', and then at the ways in which there is a point at
which women have gone "too far" into the sequence and forfeit the right to say
'no'.
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6.2.1 Legitimate and Illegitimate Times to Say 'No'
If sexual activities are expected to occur in a particular sequential order because
of the meanings related to them (i.e. intimacy and relationship status) then this
would imply that activities which occur 'out of sequence' would be subject to
sanction. As I have already noted empirical data on the traditional (hetero)sexual
script suggests that women are expected to resist sexual advances, and, indeed,
women do report using strategies to restrict sexual intercourse more than they
use strategies to initiate it (LaPlante et al., 1980; McCormick, 1979; McCormick
et a!., 1984). What this research doesn't address is at what point in the sexual
sequence women are expected to restrict, refuse, or say 'no' to sexual activities.
There is little discussion in the sexual scripts literature about where in the coital
sequence saying 'no', either to intercourse or to any other sexual activity, could
or should come. However, among the women who participated in this research
there is some consensus around the idea that there is a 'right' time to say 'no'
and that there are also times where saying 'no' simply isn't possible. It would
perhaps be common sense to assume that those activities which are considered to
be most important and most intimate, such as sexual intercourse, would be the
most difficult to refuse (as there may be more at stake), while those activities
which are considered to be less important or intimate, such as kissing or
'petting', would (because of their more trivial nature) be easier to refuse.
However, the young women in this study suggest otherwise; Rachel (11)
comments that "it's probably harder to say no to foreplay than sex", and Pam
indicates that "it's definitely easier if they want a shag than if they just want to
feel you up" (9). They explain this in relation to men's expectations and men's
understanding of the scripting of sexual activity. Young women say that men
expect rejection at certain points in a sexual encounter, for example Jane says:
I don't know I think with sex and snogging they are the
two moments when the bloke is most prepared to be
turned away
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(Jane, 9)
This may be because 'snogging' is seen as the initial point of contact, the point at
which the man finds out if his feelings are reciprocated, while sexual intercourse,
because it is defined as 'real sex' and imbued with symbolic significance may
also make rejection more likely. Young women, as script theory would predict,
are able to anticipate men's reactions and to recognise that 'no's at certain points
in the sequence are expected (and perhaps more readily accepted) by men.
Saying 'no' at these points is legitimate. As Rachel states saying 'no' to sexual
intercourse is "more understandable to the man" because this is an "invasion";
'other' activities, precisely because they are seen as less important ("you're not
doing anything wrong", "nothing major"), are more difficult to refuse. As well
being seen as less important activities other than 'snogging' and sexual
intercourse, refusing 'other' activities may be more difficult to excuse.
According to Deb there's "less of an excuse" for refusing oral sex because, she
explains, "it's not such a big thing so you can't really say "oh rm not ready for
this" (10). As I demonstrated in chapter three (section 3.3.2) women often use
excuses as a way of refusing sex, if there is no good excuse then they may not
feel that they have a right to say 'no'.
What is also implied in both Rachel's and in Jane's comments about men
anticipating rejection is that there are times when men do not expect to be
stopped and are not prepared to be 'turned away'. This is made more explicit in
the following extract between Jane and Pam:
Jane: whereas in the middle ... kind of all the other stuff
a bloke kind of ... I don't think they really expect to
be kind of stopped [Laughter], do you know what I mean?
And in a way ... In a way that's quite tricky, because
they're not really expecting
Pam: It's sort of a bumper pack - a snog and a
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Jane: It's kind of... it just follows on
Pam: That's kind of what most people think anyway
(Group 9)
Saying 'no' to 'other activities' occurring in the 'middle' stage is more difficult
because men do not expect to be stopped at this stage. As well as illustrating the
idea that there are times when men don't expect rejection, this extract also
demonstrates how sexual activities are seen as following some kind of natural
progression which culminates in intercourse. The problem is that once entered
this sequence is seen as a 'bumper pack' and culmination in intercourse is
expected to be inevitable. Women are not given the opportunity to say 'no' and
there is no legitimate point at which to do so. The following extract of
conversation between Jill, IDeb and Karen further exemplifies this 'bumper pack'
approach to sexual encounters:
Jill: [saying no] gets more difficult as the things are
considered less far, if you know what I mean, because -
Deb: Well it's not like you don't.., if you are... I don't
know, you don't really feel like you have to ask
permission to, whereas sex
Karen: Yeah, it's naturally assumed
Deb: -Yeah, yeah, it's just like carry on
Karen: Yeah, you go really
Deb: and then you go more and more into it
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Karen: It's like a natural progression
Jill: And then if you pull their hand away then,
Karen: I think a lot of blokes would be so
surprised if you stopped them at things like that, [I] think
a lot of people ... because they just naturally assume
(Group 10)
This extract illustrates many of the points I have been making. As activities are
considered less important, as "less far", they become more difficult to refuse.
Men do not, according to these young women, expect to be stopped at these
activities, nor to have to "ask permission" to engage in them. Consent to one
activity is automatically seen as consent to the next. As Karen bluntly puts it:
you start off kissing and hugging and then you go
further and further you know [...] and blokes might think
'oh well if she's doing that then she's going to do that, and
I expect her to do that'
(Group, 10)
In other words, according to these young women, the idea that one thing leads to
another can make it difficult to refuse unwanted sexual activities.
So, according to the women in this study the sexual sequence includes certain
key points (such as 'snogging' and intercourse) at which refusing a sexual
activity is easier and other points at which saying 'no' is more difficult. The
arduousness or otherwise of saying 'no' is linked not to the particular act in
itself women say, but to the expectations of their male partners who anticipate
sexual rejections at some points in the sexual sequence but not others. Such a
view of sexual interactions may severely constrain a woman's ability to refuse
unwanted sexual activities or to feel confident that her refusals will be effective.
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6.2.2 Going Too Far: Forfeiting the Right to Say 'No'
I have demonstrated that young women talk about sexual encounters as following
a particular set of 'stages' or a sequence, and that within this sequence they
identif' both legitimate and illegitimate times to say 'no'. In this section I draw
attention to the ways in which women talk about the dangers of going "too far"
into this sequence and of forfeiting the right to say 'no'. Although the notion of
"going too far" was talked about a great deal and was seen as a dilemma by at
least some of the young women, the point at which one could be said to have
gone 'too far' was far from clear cut. For Liz (6), it is after kissing and
somewhere between the "touchy feely bit" and "heavy petting". For others, such
as Jill (10), "getting off with a guy" is "just a bit of fun" and is not going too far,
while Zoe (9) argues that after 'snogging' saying 'no' "could get really difficult".
It is at the point of having gone 'too far' that the women talk about how they
"can't" say 'no' rather than about saying 'no' as being more or less difficult. Sara
and Liz demonstrate this subtle difference in the following extract:
Sara: it's not rude but it's the same sort of feeling it's
like oh my god well I can't say no now can I
Liz: it's like you're at that late stage when it's just about
to happen and you're thinking I don't want to do this but I
can't say no it's gone too far [...] I should have said no I
should have stopped him before and I can't stop him now
because I'm half way through the swing of it all
(Group, 6)
That there are times when it is apparently unacceptable for young women to say
'no' to sex is supported by empirical research on sexual aggression and rape. in
one study which exemplifies this kind of research, male and female students
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were given scenarios of sexual situations in which the timing of 'Diane's' protest
was varied to occur at different points in an already assumed scripted sequence
of sexual behaviours. Protest was timed at early, middle or late stages; early
protest occurred immediately after a 'French' kiss, middle protest began when
'Lee' began to caress 'Diane' below the waist, and late protest was when both
were undressed. The scene was consensual until protest was first introduced.
They found that the longer 'Diane' waited to protest, the greater was her
perceived desire for sex, such that, if Diane was naked before she began to
protest she was perceived as desiring sex to an equal extent as Lee regardless of
the amount of force he subsequently used. The authors conclude that this finding
supports the rape myth that:
• . if a woman goes too far, such as by removing all her
clothing, a red flag is raised indicating to an observer that
she desires sex, and the male's behaviour is not likely to
modify this perception (Shotland and Goodstein, 1983:
224).
In addition, 'Diane' was perceived as being more to blame if she waited until
after she was undressed (a late protest) than if she made an early or middle
protest, and Lee was perceived as being less violent.
This analysis, then, treats the data as transparent evidence for the existence of
sexual scripts. Scripts are conceptualised as pre-existing - 'out there' - and
accessible either by asking people directly through questionnaires (as is most
common), or, less commonly, by looking at how individuals talk about sexual
encounters in interviews or focus groups (as is the case here). This talk is taken
as transparent evidence for the existence of scripts which women draw upon to
make sense of their experiences and to guide their sexual decision-making and
behaviour. That these current sexual scripts have unfavourable consequences for
women is seen as simply unfortunate. From this perspective, then, scripts are an
nahst resource for explaining participants' actions.
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6.3 Talk about 'Sexual Scripts':
A Constructed Reading
Instead of treating the focus group talk as transparent we can, as in the previous
chapters, consider talk as constructed data. So, rather than treating talk as
evidence for the existence of sexual scripts which govern 'what really happens'
in sexual encounters between men and women, we can consider the descriptions
of sexual encounters as following identifiable patterns as 'script formulations'
(cf Edwards, 1994 & 1995). Script formulations are "descriptions of actions and
events that characterise them as having a recurring predictable, sequential
pattern" (Edwards, 1995: 319). If young women's descriptions of sexual
encounters are not conceptualised as being tied to real-world events (as is the
case in a transparent reading), the interesting question becomes why choose to
describe events as scripted, and what functions does this serve? This section
looks at the business being done and the functions it serves to talk J_f sexual
encounters are scripted, jf they follow easily identifiable, predictable patterns.
Instead of assuming that people's behaviour is guided by sexual scripts, and that
snippets of these scripts can be seen in their talk, in this section I look at how
people's descriptions of events and actions characterise them as following a
ordered and sequential pattern. Rather than seeing sexual scripts as a framework
for understanding sexual experiences, I look at bow talking about sexual
encounters as scripted re-constructs experiences as orderly and predictable and
as performing particular functions for the speakers involved. In so doing, I build
on the distinction (introduced in the previous chapter) between sexual scripts as
an analyst resource (an analytical category used by social scientists to make
sense of behaviour) and sexual scripts as a participant resource used by research
participants • to achieve certain interactional goals. Rather than assuming that
women are objectively and neutrally reporting on their experiences, I argue that
women have certain investments in their talk. Women have something to gain or
lose in their descriptions of sexual encounters. By attending to the particular
context of the talk I demonstrate how women display "sensitivity to, and
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reasoning about, the interactional consequences of the utterances so produced"
(Wooffitt, 1992: 70). I explore the ways in which, by talking about sexual
encounters as if they were scripted, women manage and negotiate 'tricky'
interactional business. In particular I investigate the ways in which the
'scriptedness' of sexual activities serves to normalise actions, to construct
identities (both of the speaker and others), and to deal with issues of
accountability and blame.
I look first (in section 6.3.1) at the ways in which young women construct sexual
activity as scripted and the features of their talk which can be identified as script
formulations. I then move on to look at the functions that script formulations -
talk about the recurring and predictable nature of sexual encounters - serves for
the young women in this study. In particular I focus (in section 6.3.2) upon the
ways in which script fonnulations are used to construct ambiguity about the
timing of 'no', to construct saying 'no' as morally reprehensible (in section
6.3.3), and to construct sexual coercion as an ordinary event (in section 6.3.4).
6.3.1 Constructing Sexual Activity as Scripted
Rather than assuming that there are pre-existing scripts of which analysts can
catch glimpses through talk, I would like to identify the features of talk which
discursively construct sexual encounters as scripted (i.e. the script formulations).
In other words, how talk is constructed in such a way to appear as f sexual
encounters are scripted. I draw attention to six particular features of the focus
group discussions: (i) reference to different 'stages' in sexual encounters; (ii)
reference to the predictability of past, present and future events; (iii) the use of
an 'if ... then' structure; (iv) explicit reference to consensus and to what 'most
people' thinlç (v) participants finishing off each others' sentences; and (vi)
reference to generalised (rather than individualised) events. The first three of
these six features (i.e. reference to different 'stages' in sexual encounters;
reference to the predictability of past, present and future events; and the use of
an 'if... then' structure) construct sexual encounters as scripted by talking about
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sexual encounters as sequentially ordered. Sexual encounters are described in
such a way that they appear to occur in a clear order which is repeated in more or
less the same format on many different occasions - i.e. as scripted. The last three
features (i.e. explicit reference to consensus and to what 'most people' think,
finishing off each others' sentences, and reference to generalised rather than
individualised events) allow women to construct sexual encounters as scripted by
implying that they are drawing on shared knowledge or a consensus about what
sexual encounters are like. Sexual encounters are described in such a way that
they appear to be part of some shared knowledge about what 'everyone knows',
about the 'what', 'where', 'why' and 'when' of such encounters. I do not mean to
suggest here that this knowledge is actually shared, but rather to point to the
ways in which shared knowledge is 'worked up' as shared, as something which
participants treat as shared (cf. Edwards, 1997). I briefly outline each of these six
features.
(1) As noted earlier (see section 6.2), participants talk as if there are easily
identifiable 'stages' in sexual encounters; "an early stage" (Cath, 7), a "heavy
petting stage" (Sara, 6), a "late stage" (Liz, 6). This reference to stages implies a
sequential orderliness to sexual encounters: one stage comes before or after
another; heavy petting comes before intercourse and "everything usually leads
from French kissing" (Karen, 10). This presents sexual activities as following a
set script with pre-set stages to follow. Sexual activities, then, are described as
sequentially ordered.
(ii) The young women in these groups also make reference to past, present, and
future events. Liz, for example, makes reference both to things which have
happened before, and to things which she expects to happen again:
Liz: and they're [meni going to think that I'm leading
them on and blah-de-blah, and it's not fair on them
Hannah: it's not fair on them?
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Liz: That's the sort of thing that I've had in the past, 'You
gone too far now', blah-de-blah
(Group, 6)
By thawing a comparison between what men are going to do and what they have
done in the past Liz implies a continual recycling of events where the same
things happen over and over again and evoke the same responses. Rather than
each event being described as spontaneous or different, sexual encounters are
depicted as routine and predictable. A little later, in response to a question about
what happens when you don't say 'no' to unwanted sexual activities, Liz says she
would think:
Liz: ... why didn't I say something when you should have
done, because you've sat there and all through it you've
been thinking 'I don't want to do this, I should have said
no, I should have stopped him before and I can't stop him
now because we're half way through the swing of it all
and I'm just so stupid. Next time I'm just going to sort it
all out, but' {...} but you never do, well you do but .. I
don't know, it is difficult
(Group, 6)
"Next time" suggests that these situations are recurrent. It is interesting that Liz
states that even despite some good intentions to do things differently "you never
do" which (although it is immediately repaired) implies some sort of inevitability
to events. Again, then, sexual activities are seen as being orderly, predictable or
scripted in nature, and as following a specific sequential order.
(iii) A further feature of young women's talk is the use of an "if x ... then y"
structure. Edwards (1997) notes that this use of the conditional 'if' implies that
some kind of routine action which will inevitably follow. Given a particular
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circumstance 'then' the following events will automatically follow: "if you turn
round and say that ['no'] then they'll think you're a slapper" (Sara, 6); "if you
start snogging them then they think that you really like them" (Zoe, 9). This gives
the talk a sequential element. They are describing, then, what normally, usually,
or routinely happens in sexual encounters, rather than an unusual, one-off,
specific event. Descriptions of events as 'scripted' serve to normalise actions, to
construct them as perfectly ordinary and as not requiring special explanation.
(iv) Young women make explicit reference to what 'everyone knows' about
sexual encounters. This serves to construct a sense of consensus or shared
knowledge. I demonstrate this with an extract of data in which Jane has been
considering the question of when in (what analysts call) the sexual sequence is
the best time to say 'no'; she decides (as we have seen in the previous section)
that 'sex' and 'slogging' are the times when "the bloke is most prepared to be
turned away" while "in the middle" it can be "quite tricky":
Pam: It's a sort of bumper pack - a snog and a
Jane: It's kind of ... it just follows on
Pam: That's kind of what most people think anyway
(Group, 9)
Pam draws on 'what most people think' which implies that there is a general
pooi of knowledge about sexual activities which most people, including Pam,
have access to. Pam is simply voicing what most people think and what most
people, if asked, would say. Similarly, other young women describe what
"usua1ly' (Karen, 10) or "often" (Deb, 10) happens, or things which guys will
"obviously" try to do (Karen, 10). This feature of the talk constructs a sense of
shared knowledge and consensus about sexual encounters.
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(v) Young women also 'fill in the gaps' in each others' talk and complete each
others' sentences. In the following extract, for example, Sara and Liz appear to
be telling a very familiar story, a story so familiar that they can finish off each
other's sentences and fill in the next line of the story so that it appears
continuous. Indeed if it were not for the fact that I have clearly indicated who is
articulating which part of the story it could almost have been told by one person.
Sara: I think there is a lot of pressure when it boils down
to it, because then you think, 'oh maybe I shouldn't have,
you know'
Liz: '- have led him on, maybe I shouldn't have touched
them'
Sara: 'maybe I shouldn't have gone upstairs with him or
maybe'. Yeah, I think it is really difficult to say no
(Group, 6)
By completing each others' sentences these women implicitly construct
consensus (ef. Edwards, 1997). By finishing off each others' sentences it appears
as f Sara and Liz are drawing on common knowledge about what happens in
sexual encounters - as if they are reading the same script. In chapter five (see
section 5.3) I argued that by 'filling in the gaps' women build up consensual
versions of what men are like, in this case I argue that by 'filling in the gaps'
young women build consensual versions of what sexual encounters and sexual
refusals are like.
(vi) Finally, young women also construct consensus by reference to generalised
(rather than individualised) events. They produce a generalised description of the
pressures on young women in sexual negotiations rather than an account of a
particular situation in which they themselves felt pressured. In chapter three
(section 3.1) I drew attention to those times when these women talked about
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(what were presented as) their own personal experiences of refusing sex. I noted
at this time that the majority of the focus group discussions focused not on
specific refusals but on generalised and hypothetical accounts of saying 'no'. In
chapter five (section 5.3) 1 noted that this feature of the talk might be useful to
young women because it constructs a version of what 'eveIybody' knows about
sexual encounters, which in turn, allows them to portray themselves as
knowledgeable and competent sexual actors. In this chapter I demonstrate how,
by drawing on generalised and hypothetical accounts of sexual encounters, these
women portray sexual activities as scripted - as following routine and predictable
patterns.
In this section, then, I have demonstrated the ways in which women describe
sexual encounters as scripted, as following easily identifiable patterns. I have
drawn attention to six particular features of talk which achieve this end
including: referring to 'stages' in sexual encounters; referring to past, present and
future events; using a 'if ... then' structure; referring to what 'most people'
think; completing each others' sentences; and describing generalised rather than
individualised events. From a constructed reading of the data these features of
the talk are best understood not as evidence for the existence of pre-determined
sexual scripts, but rather as 'script formulations' - as linguistic devices which
women use to present sexual encounter as f they were scripted. In the following
sections I move on to look at how these features of the talk which construct
sexual encounters as scripted perform particular functions for the speakers
involved.
6.3.2 Constructing Ambiguity
As noted earlier (see section 6.2.2), both the social scientific literature and young
women themselves report that when women go 'too far' in the sexual sequence
they forfeit the right to say 'no' to sex. However, as we have seen, exactly when
one is said to have gone 'too far' is both ambiguous and subject to disagreement.
Similarly, women also disagree about the 'right' time to say 'no' (see section
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6.2.1). The timing of 'no', then, seems rather ambiguous. One explanation for
this disagreement and confusion is that the timing of 'no' j ambiguous. Using a
model of participant-as-informant these women could be seen as neutrally
reflecting on how sexual encounters really operate. For young women who are
trying to say 'no' effectively (i.e. in a way that avoids unwanted sex) ambiguity
around the timing of 'no' can be extremely problematic. As we have seen, when
a woman says 'no' at the 'wrong' time (i.e. 'too late') she may be seen as having
led the man on and may ultimately be held responsible for her own rape (e.g.
Muehlenhard and MacNaughton, 1988; Goodchilds et at., 1988; Quinn et at.,
1991). There seems to be, then, few advantages for women of ambiguity and
confusion around the appropriate timing of a sexual refusal. By contrast, for
young men who wish to pursue their own sexual pleasures and to coerce their
partners into sex, such ambiguity is extremely useful. Since any activity which
men deem to be sexual (wearing a short skirt, getting into a car, kissing etc.) can
be construed as an invitation for increased intimacy, any woman who fails to
acquiesce to a man's request (demand) for sex can be accused of 'leading him
on', of having reneged on some agreement, or of having failed to live up to
expectations. An alternative (constructed) reading of the data might look not at
the advantages or disadvantages of ambiguity in the timing of sexual refusals, but
at talk about ambiguity around saying 'no' and the functions which this serves
for the women who formulate such descriptions. The function which ambiguity
serves is understandable only in relation to what is at stake for young women in
the way they describe sexual encounters. In other words rather than assuming
that women are neutrally reporting on sexual events, this approach assumes that
women have certain investments in producing descriptions of sexual encounters.
What is at stake here is young women's accountability for not saying 'no' to
unwanted sex, or for finding saying 'no' difficult. There are a number of possible
explanations. which women could draw upon to account for the difficulty of
saying 'no'. Women could provide internalised explanations (i.e. saying 'no' is
easy, but they find saying 'no' difficult because they are poor communicators or
emotional labourers) or externalised explanations (i.e. they find saying 'no'
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difficult because saying 'no' is difficult). Women have certain investments in
what type of explanation of their behaviour, identity, and actions are taken up.
To illustrate this I use as an example the discussion between Sara, Liz and
myself, in which they agree that saying 'no' is difficult. I, as researcher, am
pressing them to explain what exactly is difficult about saying 'no'.
Sara: It's not rude, but it's that same sort of feeling, it's
like 'Oh my God, well I can't say no now can I
Liz: It's like you're at that late stage, when it's just about
to happen, and you're thinking, 'I don't want to do this,
but I can't say no; it's gone too far'
Hannah: So you can't say it because you've gone too far?
Liz: And they're going to think that I'm leading them on
and blah-de-blah-de-blah, and it's not fair on them
(Group 6)
Liz introduces the idea that saying 'no' "at that late stage" because "it's gone too
far" and a man will think "that I'm leading them on" (6). Sara and Liz are, then,
working quite hard to formulate their explanation of the difficulty of saying 'no'
as something which 'eveiybody knows'. Using some of the script formulations I
identified in the previous section they construct their account as one articulation
of a stock of shared knowledge - a consensual picture of what sexual refusals are
like.
At this point I question whether it is "easier to say no before you've started doing
anything". By coming up with such an easy and readily available 'solution' I
make available a number of different implications: a) saying 'no' isn't that
difficult, women just have to say it earlier in the sexual sequence; and/or b) if
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these women find it difficult then maybe that's because they aren't saying 'no' at
the right time. Consequently my suggestion is ridiculed by Sara: "you can't just
turn round and say 'would you like a drink?' - 'yes but I'm not going to have sex
with you". Sara's rather far-fetched example is an 'extreme case formulation'
(cf. Pomerantz, 1986) in which one dimension (in this case saying 'no' earlier) is
taken to its limits. This example provides an effective warrant and legitimates
Sara's original claim that sexual refusals are difficult. This example, coupled
with the work done to present their version as part of some shared knowledge
serves to make my suggestion to look naïve or somehow disingenuous. This is
exacerbated by the laughter, from all of us, which follows Sara's example. A
short while later Sara elaborates on the idea that if you say 'no' to sex before the
invitation (expectation) of sex has been made explicit then men will "think
you're a right slapper" or will say "well I didn't want to have sex with you
anyway". In effect, then, Sara constructs the difficulty of saying 'no' as a
dilemma. According to Sara and Liz, it is hard to say 'no' when the invitation for
sex has not yet explicitly arisen; but postponing the 'no' may mean going 'too
far' to say 'no' at all. In what ways, then, does this talk about ambiguity and
dilemmas function to meet the investments of Sara and Liz? One way to
approach this is to consider the consequences of arguing that sexual refusals are
clearly scripted. If sexual refusals were described as clearly and comprehensively
scripted, then a) saying 'no' would be an expected and easily anticipated event
that would be relatively easy rather than difficult, and b) having led someone on
would be a clearly identifiable transgression of this script and would be an
accountable action. Saying 'no' at the 'wrong' time would be attributable to
causes internal to the individual (i.e. saying 'no' is easy therefore if Sara finds it
difficult then there must be something wrong with her). Consider, for example,
how different the conversation would be if, in response to my question "is it
easier to say 'no' before you've started doing anything", Sara had replied "oh
gosh, I never thought of that; of course it is, I'll do that next time". Sara would
have appeared naive, inexperienced and unsophisticated. Talk about ambiguity in
sexual refusals functions to present these women as possessing various attributes
and as being particular kinds of people. Talk about ambiguity presents them as
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aware of the difficulties involved in refusing sex, rather than as naively
blundering through sexual encounters unaware of the delicacy of the interaction
and the potential for getting it wrong. Ambiguity, then, is central to these
women's accounting process. The timing of 'no' has to be loosely or
ambiguously scripted to allow for the possibility of getting it wrong without
being held accountable for the mistake (i.e. without actually being open to the
accusation of being a slapper or leading men on). By emphasising the difficulty
of getting it right, and the idea that there is no easy way to refuse sex, these
women imply that this is not simply a problem for them as individuals but a
general problem in all sexual encounters in which one partner desires (expects) a
greater level of intimacy than the other. Such an account allows women to deal
with issues of accountability and identity which are at stake in their accounts.
6.3.3 Constructing Saying 'No' and NOT Saying 'No' as Ordinary
As noted above, women have certain investments in accounting for sexual
refusals in certain ways. As we have seen, one way to deal with issues of
accountability and identity is to construct the timing of sexual refusals as
ambiguous. Another way, and this is the one that is the focus of this section, is to
construct one's own behaviour as normal, ordinary, and the sort of thing that
everyone does. Scripted explanations are useful because they allow speakers to
place their own individual actions within the larger framework of cultural norms
(i.e. saying 'no' is difficult, women find saying 'no' difficult, it is always
difficult, everyone fmds it difficult and therefore they are just like everyone
else). This is most clearly demonstrated in accounts in which women refer to
consensus and what most people think. Earlier (section 6.3.1 iv), I illustrated this
particular script formulation with a piece of talk from Pam and Jane in which
they implied that most people conceptualise sexual encounters as a "bumper
pack" of sexual activities which automatically follow on from one another. The
reference to what "most people think" places Pam and Jane's version of events
into a wider social context. It implies that their version is not just the opinion of
two individuals but is a socially sanctioned, widely available, account shared by
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many. This serves both to reinforce the credibility of their version, and to counter
any possible accusation that they have got it wrong, or that their version is
somehow unusual or different. Without this reference to "what most people
think" Pam's characterisation of sexual activities as a "bumper pack", where one
thing naturally leads to another, could be seen as accountable. If most people do
agree then perhaps there is something peculiar to Pam which makes her think
this way. By implication Pam might be seen as the sort of promiscuous young
woman for whom 'snogging' does automatically lead to sex. The reference to
what "most people" think serves to undermine any such accusations which might
tarnish her reputation or pose a threat to her identity. A further example, also
from Pam, illustrates this more clearly. In response to a question about the ease
or difficulty of saying 'no' to different types of sexual activities Pam says:
Pam: if it's in a nightclub you can just snog them and
walk off again [Laughter] I don't do that all the time OK,
but like most people do that
(Group, 9)
Pam attends to the accountability of this formulation, the implication that she is
sexually 'loose' the sort of person who 'loves them and leaves them', both by
indicating that this is not always her reaction, and by implying that this response
is usual and predictable - it is what "most people" do. In this case, then, Pam's
method of refusing sexual activities by walking away is made ordinary (and
therefore requiring no special explanation or account) by reference to what most
people think, say or do.
But, just as script formulations can be useful for accounting for the ease of
saying 'no' and for the particular method of sexual refusal used, so too can they
be used to account for the difficulty of saying 'no' and for NOT saying 'no'. In
the rest of this section I look at the ways in which acquiescing to unwanted
sexual activities can be made ordinary through script talk.
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Rather than drawing on explicit references to what most people think, say, or do,
script talk can also construct a sense of group consensus about the social norms
governing sexual refusals. One way to account for the difficulty of saying 'no',
then, is to put sexual refusals into a moral frame governed by 'rules' for
appropriate moral behaviour. This moral frame is reflected in discussions about
the 'fairness' of particular actions, whether certain courses of action are 'right'
or 'wrong', whether you 'should' or 'shouldn't' have done something, and
whether you can or "can't" do certain things. There are several indications that
talk about saying 'no' has a moral frame. For example, Sara and Liz woriy "..
maybe I shouldn't have [...] maybe I shouldn't have gone upstairs with him"
(Sara, 6), ".. maybe I shouldn't have touched them" (Liz, 6). Here the implication
is that Sara and Liz have done something accountable, something they shouldn 't
have done, and that they are responsible for having got themselves into a tricky
situation. Immediately though, Sara shifts the focus commenting that "I think it
is really difficult to say no". It is not that this rather general statement contrasts
with the previous comments about her own activities. Rather than saying "I find
it really difficult to say no", which might imply a particular defect in her
character, she implies that saying 'no' is ipso facto difficult. This time to explain
why saying 'no' is difficult Sara and Liz draw on a moral framework:
Liz: it just doesn't seen right to say no when you're up
there in the situation
Sara: it's not rude, it's not rude - it sounds awful to say
this doesn't it
Liz: Iknow
Sara: it's not rude, but it's that same sort of feeling, it's
like 'oh my god I can't say no now can I'
(Group, 6)
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Sara and Liz problematise saying no. This contrasts with the social science
literature which problematises jp saying 'no'. Saying 'no' is, according to Sara
and Liz, "rude", impolite or discourteous. You can't say 'no', not because you
are unable, but because it doesn't seem right to say 'no'. Here, saying 'no',
far from being reprehensible, is not only appropriate but required behaviour.
Interestingly, this moral imperative comes into operation only at a particular (but
unspecified) 'stage' in the sexual encounter: "I can't say no now", "at that late
stage when it's just about to happen", "when you're up there in the situation".
This is linked to the accusations of having lead someone on, of having gone too
far to say 'no' (identified in section 6.2.2). The image of sexual encounters
presented by these young women is one in which certain activities are expected
to follow others, if I go upstairs with a man (or kiss him, or get in his car etc.), he
will expect sexual intercourse; having made an implicit promise or commitment
to do this, it is then not right for me to refuse. By putting sexual refusals in a
moral frame women do not depict themselves as passive victims of manipulative
men, but rather as acquiescing to unwanted sex because they are morally
responsible people. In other words, script talk serves to make acquiescing to
unwanted sex ordinary, expected, and proper.
6.3.4 Constructing Sexual Coercion as Ordinary
One of the most interesting features of this talk is the ways in which young
women describe the behaviour of young men, and in particular, what young men
are likely to say. Often this is done in the form of 'reported speech' (Holt, 1996),
or 'active voicing' (Wooffitt, 1992), where speakers report dialogue with others -
the words they use and the things they say. This may be marked by intonation or
more explicitly through a preface such as "she said" (cf. Potter, 1996; Holt,
1996). There are many examples of this in my data: "that's the sort of thing I've
had in the past 'you've gone too far" (Liz, 6), or "that's what I said to my
present boyfriend 'I'm not having sex with you" (Liz, 6), and this joint
construction from Cath and Helen:
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Cath: You can't assume, especially with the male ego,
because they'll just say to you -
Helen: 'Well, I didn't want to in the first place'
Cath: Because I was at this party and these blokes were
just talking to us and they were complete Kevins, and one
bloke said to me 'Do you want to dance', so I said 'no',
and he said to me 'Well nor do I' and walked off
(Group, 7)
In all of these extracts young women are apparently reporting the words of young
men. If, as in the previous analysis, I were treating the data as transparent, I
might assume that these extracts relate (in more or less accurate detail) to actual
conversations between these young women and their boyfriends. However,
following Wooffitt I would argue that "it is more useful to begin with the
assumption that the speakers are designing certain utterances to be heard as
they were said at the time" (Wooffitt, 1992: 161). Indeed, often these utterances
cannot be tied to a specific conversation. Deb illustrates this when she says
"you'll often get these 'Oh you're a tease' or 'You led me on' [...] 'Well if you
didn't want it you shouldn't have flirted' (Deb, 10). Here, rather than tagging the
reported speech to a particular person, Deb says "you'll often get these ..." which
implies that it is unlikely to be an actual quote but is "taken to be emblematic, as
the kind of thing that they would have said" (Potter, 1996: 161). Young women
also impute motives and psychological states (as well as actual words) to young
men, they talk about what young men think, feel, expect and want: "they're a bit
on edge as to whether they think it's going to work or not" and "if you start
snogging them then they think that you like them" (Zoe, 9) "I think with sex and
snogging they are the two moments when blokes are most prepared to be turned
away" (Jane, 9), "they're going to think that I'm leading them on" (Liz, 6), "They
haven't got the impression that you want anything" (Pam, 9), "I think a lot of
blokes would be very surprised if you stopped them at things like that [...]
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because they just naturally assume,.." (Karen, 10). Moreover, speakers directly
report other peoples' thoughts (bit, 1996), as demonstrated by Karen - "blokes
might think 'oh well if she's doing that then she's going to do that and I expect
her to do that" (10). Karen's comment cannot be based on actual knowledge but
instead is constructed as a specific instance of a more general pattern of
behaviour. This general pattern is constructed as shared knowledge using non-
specific plurals such as 'they' and 'blokes'. This indicates a general experience
something that all men, any man, would say, think, feel and do rather than
particular knowledge of a specific man. It presents a kind of collective or general
response, a response which all men can be expected to have. In other words
men's responses to being told 'no' are routine, predictable and scripted. The
scripted nature of this talk is further evidenced in the following passage in which
Liz constructs the reactions of men to women's actions as so predictable that it is
not necessary to explicitly explicate them:
Liz: It's like you're at that late stage, when it's just about
to happen, and you're thinking 'I don't want to do this,
but I can't say no; it's gone too far'
Hannah: So you can't say it because you've gone too far?
Liz: And they're going to think that I'm leading them on
and blah-de-blah-de-blah, and it's not fair on them
Hannah: It's not fair on them?
Liz: That's the sort of thing that I've had in the past,
'You've gone too far now', blah-de-blah
(Group, 6)
Men's reactions then, are boringly predictable and hardly worth fully
articulating. What is interesting is that many of these reactions which the young
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women reportedly expect involve some kind of explicit accusation - 'You've
gone too far', 'You've led me on', 'You're a tease'. As noted earlier (section
6.3.2), from a perspective of transparent analysis the advantages for men of this
construction may include being able to accuse women of having led them on and
pressurising them to have sex. The vagueness and ambiguity which makes
pinpointing the point at which one is said to have gone 'too far' serve to make
this accusation unavoidable for women. However, if we look more closely at the
intricate detail of the interaction (using the above example from Sara and Liz) we
can see how these young women attempt to manage such accusations and the
advantages for women of formulating their description of events in this way.
Firstly, by describing these accusations in the form of reported speech (either
direct or indirect) Sara and Liz are able to make their reporting of such
accusations appear more neutral. They avoid giving their own opinions directly,
but instead report someone else's, leaving the listener free to make up their own
minds about the appropriateness of the comment (cf. Wooffitt, 1992). Sara and
Liz remain non-committal about whether the accusation is justified or not, about
whether their actions do or don't meet the criteria of having 'gone too far'. But,
by describing men's accusatoty reaction as routine and predictable (i.e. scripted),
Sara and Liz subvert the potency of the accusation of having led someone on at
the same time as they formulate it. If the accusation of having 'gone too far' and
'led someone on' is a predicable and anticipated feature of sexual encounters
with men then the accusation is undermined as being a genuine complaint of
any particular man upset by the actions of his girlfriend, but rather as being a
stereotypical accusation that all men will routinely make regardless of the
individual actions of women, and regardless of when exactly she says 'no' to sex.
Woman cannot then be faulted for not knowing when to say 'no'. There is never
a 'right time' to say 'no'. Women's 'no's will always be open to the accusation
of coming too late, when sexual activity has gone too far. This is stated more
explicitly in the following extract between Jill, Deb and Karen:
Deb: But then you'll often get these kind of, 'Oh you're a
tease', or 'you led me on'. I mean, you don't actually get
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it like that, but you know, that's what they mean. 'Well, if
you didn't want it, you shouldn't have kind of flirted,'
Karen: '- led me on -
Deb: - that way'. Exactly. So they put that on to you, and
sometimes you feel, 'Oh god, maybe I'm a real tart or
whatever, and I have lead him on', and that makes you
feel really shitty and
Jill: But that's just their way of-
Deb: -yeah-
Jill: - making you do something you don't want to
(Group, 10)
The accusation of having 'led someone on' is described as scripted, expected and
as being (for this very reason) not a genuine complaint, but as a rhetorical device
used by men to coerce women into engaging in unwanted sexual activity.
According to Deb, Jill and Karen, men will use this device regardless of what a
woman says or does, and therefore she cannot really be blamed if her actions
lead to such an accusation. The taken-for-granted, predictable and expected
nature of male sexual coercion is entirely necessary for their account to work.
Just as script formulations (cf. Edwards, 1994) can serve to normalise the actions
of the speaker herself, they can also be used to normalise the actions of others.
Here, scripts serve to nonnalise the sexually coercive behaviour of men as
expected, as requiring no special explanation, and as warranting no complaint or
attention. In addition, by describing the reactions of young men as scripted, as
routine and predictable, these young women construct themselves as
knowledgeable sexual actors, as able to easily identif' and negotiate the
manipulative strategies of young men.
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So, rather than treating talk about sexual scripts as evidence for the pre-existence
of such scripts this approaches looks at the ways in which script formulations
construct sexual encounters as following recurrent, predictable patterns. As I
have demonstrated this approach assumes that women have certain investments
in describing sexual encounters as scripted, and script talk functions to protect
these investments. Script formulations allow the women who use them to
negotiate issues of accountability and identity by constructing their own opinions
and actions in the context of wider social nonns and social expectations.
6.4 A Feminist Analysis? The Costs and Benefits of a
Transparent versus Constructed Reading
The contrastive readings of the data on sexual scripts presented above (just like
the readings of miscommunication and emotion work data) have vety different
implications for those conducting feminist research.
In the first (transparent) reading, women's talk about sexual encounters is seen as
providing evidence for the existence of sexual scripts which guide sexual
behaviour. Women's talk, then, is seen as revealing the detail of these scripts.
What we find is that while sexual encounters are very clearly scripted the timing
of sexual refusals is very ambiguous and confusing. Such an approach has many
advantages for the feminist researcher. Rather than relying on women-blaming
explanations of rape which, for example, claim that women have difficulty
saying 'no' because they are under-confident or because they do not possess the
appropriate communication skills (see for example the literature reviewed in
Chapter Four section 4.1), script theory argues that rape is the result of the social
organisation of sexual and gender relationships. Script theory looks not to
individual pathology to explain rape, but rather to social causes. This attention to
social context is congruent with feminist prescriptions for 'good' psychological
theory, and with radical feminist explanations of rape (Brownmiller, 1975;
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MacKinnon, 1987). Script theory is a more politicised account of rape than (for
example) miscommunication theory because it does not argue that women
cannot say 'no', but rather that even when women do say 'no' their 'no's are over
ruled. It is not that the man fails to understand 'no', but that social nonns dictate
that he is permitted to override her refusal and to rape her.
Using a transparent analysis which supports script theory the feminist researcher
is able to make strong claims about the social organisation of sexual behaviour.
This might include claims that sexual scripts are male defmed, to meet male
needs. For example, the idea of 'stages' which lead progressively and inevitably
to intercourse ignores and obscures the myriad of ways in which women
experience sexual pleasure without intercourse. Feminists have criticised the
phallocentric definitions of sexuality which hinder women's sexual pleasure,
have challenged the centrality of penetrative sex and have exposed the 'myth of
the vaginal orgasm' (Koedt, 1972). A transparent reading of my data adds to this
sustained critique by arguing that the timing of sexual refusals is scripted to
meet male needs. In other words, although women are held responsible for
refusing sex (e.g. Zimmerman et al., 1995), sexual behaviours are scripted in
such a way so as to make saying 'no' extremely difficult. While the sequence of
sexual activities appears to be very clearly scripted (i.e. from kissing, to light
petting, to heavy petting, to intercourse) - a finding confirmed by other social
scientific research - the place of sexual refusals in this sequence is far from clear.
There is some agreement among these women that there is a 'right' time to say
'no', but there is considerable ambiguity about when exactly the 'right' time is.
From a transparent analysis this ambiguity could be interpreted as serving the
interests of men, and more specifically those men who wish to 'persuade' or
coerce their partners into unwanted sex. For example, the women in this study
identify both legitimate and illegitimate times to say 'no'. Legitimate sexual
refusals, they argue, occur when men are expecting a rejection or refusal,
refusals are illegitimate, then, when they are unexpected. So, according to these
women, it is men who dictate whether or not a refusal is legitimate. This
ambiguity about the timing of 'no' and the cut off point between legitimate and
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illegitimate sexual refusals is implicated in women's experience of unwanted sex
and rape. Evidence from both this and other research suggests that when a
woman consents to any form of sexual activity a man can argue that she was
'leading him on' - leading him to expect that further intimacy will be
forthcoming. Indeed, even if a woman consents to activities which are
explicitly sexual (such as having dinner paid for etc.) both men and women agree
that she has implicitly agreed to something more. The greater the sexual intimacy
between the couple the greater the risk that the woman will be seen as 'leading
the man on' and both men and women agree that when a man has been 'led on'
he is justified in raping the woman (e.g. Muehlenhard and MacNaughton, 1988;
Goodchilds et a!., 1988; Quinn et al., 1991). This may explain why the legal
profession places great importance on establishing the prior intimacy of rapist
and victim in rape trials. The problem is that women simply do not know
whether by consenting to a kiss they are forfeiting the right to say 'no' to
unwanted sex. So, while ambiguity around the timing of 'no' may be
advantageous for men, it has veiy serious repercussions for women.
Feminists have challenged this 'bumper pack' approach to sexual encounters in
which consent to one sexual activity is taken as implicit consent to a whole range
of other activities. A transparent analysis of the data has veiy clear implications
for feminist activism. If the problem is that sexual scripts, and the timing of
saying 'no' within these scripts, are poorly defined, then the answer is to clearly
define issues of consent. Strategies have ranged from asserting that women have
the right to say 'no' at any stage of an interaction to challenging men to seek
explicit consent from women. This latter approach is adopted in the much
maligned sexual offences policy produced by Antioch College. According to
Debbie Cameron (1994) the code, because it states that explicit consent should
be acquired.for every sexual act, undermines the idea that one thing 'naturally'
leads to another and that consenting to a kiss means implying yes to anything
else. The code also gives women the explicit opportunity to refuse sexual
activities, in a way which indicates that this is an appropriate time to refuse.
Attempts to alter sexual scripts have also been suggested by those concerned
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with unsafe sex and the promotion of condom use (e.g. Maticka-Tyndale, 1991,
Abraham and Sheeran, 1994).
However, clearly defined scripts are not always the answer. The script for a
'typical rape' is clearly defined as one where the rape occurs outdoors, at night,
between strangers, where the rapist is male and is often described as unattractive,
angry, aggressive, or as socially or mentally unfit (Ryan, 1988). But, according to
Kahn, Mathie and Torgler (1994), if women have a clear idea about what a
'typical' rape is like (i.e. a stranger or 'blitz' rape) then they will be less likely to
label their own experiences of non-consensual sex as rape if they do not match
this script, if, for example, they are raped by an acquaintance (see also Popvitch
et al. 1995, for similar conclusions in relation to sexual harassment). According
to these researchers women are unable to recognise or acknowledge their abuse
because their experiences do not match their definition of rape. The problem in
relation to this research is that sexual coercion is scripted as such a pervasive
feature of 'ordinary' heterosexual activity that it is not recognisable to these
young women as something extra-ordinary, or recognisable as coercion. In this
way a transparent reading of the data which characterises the timing of 'no' as
ambiguous, puts sexual coercion firmly into 'ordinary' heterosexual
relationships, and builds on a tradition in feminist research for making links
between sexual violence and 'normal' heterosexual activity (Kelly, 1987; Stanko,
1985; Cameron and Frazer, 1987).
However, there are also disadvantages to adopting this approach. By focusing on
poorly defined scripts as an explanation for rape this approach depoliticises rape
(in much the same way as miscommunication theory) by failing to hold men
responsible for rape. Men are not held responsible for coercing women into
unwanted sex, rather both men and women are the victims of poorly defined
scripts which fail to make sufficiently clear when sexual refusals are expected to
occur. Moreover, at least some of the research which I cite implicitly suggests
that women are to blame. For example, the research conducted by Shotland and
Goodstein (1983) in which participants had to rate how much 'Diane' wanted to
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have sex when she protested at an early, middle or late stage, implies that if only
'Diane' had said 'no' earlier then rape could be avoided.
In addition, much like the transparent analyses presented in the previous
chapters, a transparent reading of the data on sexual scripts depicts young
women as victims. A transparent analysis, sees women as caught between a rock
and a hard place, unable to say 'no' too early for fear of looking gauche or naïve,
and unable to say 'no' too late for fear of accusations of having led the man on.
Women are portrayed as passive, hesitant and easily manipulated. Some have
argued that men may be more adept at learning the sexual scripts of women than
women are of men. Moore and Rosenthal (1993), commenting on the idea that
women are scripted to have sexual relationship for love while men have sexual
relationships for pleasure, claim that "The pleas, 'If you really loved me, you
would have sex with me' or 'You wouldn't make me suffer in this way', suggest
that some young men are well attuned to the female sexual script, with the male
script allowing for the exploitation of young girls' own needs" (p. 85, emphasis
added). Women are seen as the victims of sexual scripts, who are manipulated
and exploited by men who understand scripts better.
An alternative, constructed, analysis of the data has rather different implications.
Whether or not there really are scripts (and whether this is ever knowable
through talk) script talk has important implications for the feminist researcher. A
transparent analysis treats script talk as an analyst resource, as a framework for
understanding sexual experiences. By contrast a constructed analysis treats script
talk as a participant resource to achieve certain interactional goals. Rather than
assuming that women are objectively and neutrally reporting on their experiences
a constructed analysis, as I have shown, demonstrates that women have certain
investments in the way that they talk about sexual encounters. By failing to
acknowledge these investments a transparent analysis misses crucial information.
It misses, for example, the work that women do to present themselves as
competent sexual actors. Women portray themselves not as gullible, naive and
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ignorant about sexual interactions, but as knowledgeable about the routines and
patterns of sexual behaviour - knowledgeable enough to be able to anticipate
men's coercion and to guard against it. As I have demonstrated, script talk allows
young women to normalise their own behaviour (including acquiescing to
unwanted sex) and to present their own responses as the sort of thing which
anyone would do when faced with the same situation. It is therefore not
surprising that (some) women are resistant to the kinds of innovations which
attempt to alter and clarify scripts (such as Antioch rules) which perhaps suggest
that they are naïve and incompetent sexual actors who need rules and regulation
to guide their behaviour because they are incapable of handling men. Attempts
by feminists to alter current sexual scripts must take into account the investments
women have in talking about sexual activities as scripted and the investments
they have in maintaining the status quo.
6.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter I have explored the ways in which sexual script theoiy provides
useful conceptual tools for explaining young women's accounts of sexual
negotiation. As such this chapter makes a positive contribution to the growing
body of literature which looks at how sexual encounters are organised. In
particular, I expanded and developed the current literature on sexual scripts
which argues that women are more likely to refuse sex than men by looking at
the timing of sexual refusals in a sexual encounter. Paralleling the previous
chapters, I examined both a transparent and constructed analysis of the data. In
this chapter I paid particular attention to providing a more detailed transparent
analysis in which the contribution which such an analysis makes to the literature
is clearly mapped out. I have developed the distinction (introduced in Chapter
Five) between talk as an analyst resource for explaining behaviour, and talk as a
participant resource for accounting for behaviour. In the transparent analysis,
then, women's talk about legitimate and illegitimate times to say 'no', and about
going too far and forfeiting the right to say 'no' is seen as evidence of male
defined scripts which disadvantage women. By contrast, a constructed analysis
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which treats women's talk about scripted sexual encounters as attending to issues
of blame and accountability, sees script talk as serving useful functions for the
women who use it. The costs and benefits of both of these approaches for
feminists are discussed in relation to issues of victimhood and agency, and in
relation to activism.
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The initial impetus for this thesis and the research upon which it is founded was
a television programme - the name of which I can no longer remember. The
presenters were bemoaning the ways in which young women appeared unable to
say 'no' to sex. It was not clear (or at least I can no longer recall) whether this
was in relation to wanted or 'unwanted sex'; indeed the implication was that this
question was of only peripheral interest - what was more important was that
young women were supposed to say 'no'. The tone of the programme was not
accusatory but patronisingly sympathetic: young women were not refusing to say
'no'; rather they couldn't say 'no'. Young women were portrayed as mindless
dupes, who were unable to control their own destinies; they were pitiful
creatures, easily manipulated, easily taken advantage of, unworldly and unwise.
"How ridiculous! ", I remember thinking at the time, "of course heterosexual
women know how to say 'no' to sex with men; we do it all the time". Angered by
what I considered to be the gross misrepresentation of young women
promulgated by this programme, the idea for this thesis was born. It has come a
long way since then, and in this chapter I want to reflect upon the ways in which
I think this research has contributed to feminist psychology, and to make some
suggestions for future developments in feminist work.
In chapter one I argued that this thesis would make three major contributions to
feminist psychology: (i) by re-placing women (and more specifically young
women) within psychology; (ii) by contributing to the literature on young
women's sexual negotiations; and (iii) by contributing to epistemological debates
about the relative merits of essentialism and social constructionism. Moreover,
this thesis also makes important contributions to (vi) discussions of feminist
method and (v) to discussions of researching and representing 'Others' in
feminist psychology. In this fmal chapter I reflect on the nature of the
contributions made in these five areas. I conclude by looking back on the
strengths and limitations of the research, and by looking forward at how to take
forward both research on young women, power, and sexuality, and feminist
psychology more generally.
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7.1 Re-Placing Young Women in Psychology
In chapter one I reviewed the literature on feminist psychology, and briefly
outlined the three key aspects of the feminist critique of mainstream psychology:
(i) making women invisible, (ii) taking male experience as the norm, and (iii)
pathologising women. Feminist research strives to avoid the androcentrism of
'malestream' research by producing research which is centred in the lives of
women.
I observed in Chapter One (section 1.2) how young women have been noticeably
absent in both mainstream psychology and (until recently) in feminist
psychology. By contrast, this thesis places young women centre-stage. This
research takes as one of its basic assumptions the idea that women's lives are
worthy of study in their own right. For this reason, the sample used in this study
consisted entirely of women, and the aim of the research was to investigate
young women's talk about sexual negotiation and saying 'no' to sex. I do not,
therefore, present a comparison of men and women's sexual refusals. In addition,
I have attempted to re-place young women in psychology by giving detailed
attention to three social scientific theories which could be (and have been) used
to explain women's experience of unwanted sex (I will return to this point in the
following section). These theories have typically spoken about young women
(when young women are addressed at all) without including the voices of young
women themselves. What this thesis does, then, is to take women's views as
central. This thesis represents young women, in their own words, as they talk
about issues around sexual negotiation.
This thesis reports research which takes female, not male, experience as the
norm, and theories which do take male experience as the norm are challenged.
For example, women are not judged in terms of how well they make themselves
understood to men, or on how well men are able to interpret their refusals.
Rather, women's sexual refusals are investigated in relation to what these
refusals mean for women themselves. Similarly, women's emotional
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(over)investment in sexual relationships is not compared to men's
(under)investment, rather women's talk about emotional investment is seen as
serving particular functions for the women themselves.
Women's experiences are not regarded as pathological. In other words, women
are not accused of failing to make their refusals clear, nor are they accused of
mindlessly adhering to sexual scripts which disadvantage them. I am not
suggesting that young women are unable to say 'no' because of individual
personal shortcomings nor do I position them as passive victims, silenced by
patriarchy.
7.2 Young Women and Sexual Negotiation
Young women's sexual refusals are at the heart both of right wing and religious
campaigns to curb and control sexuality, and are central to feminist campaigns
for sexual freedom. While public health messages implore young women to 'Just
Say No' to premarital or teenage sex, the feminist 'No Means No' campaign tries
to ensure that women's 'no's are not ignored or disregarded. Women's sexual
refusals are central to rape cases tried in court, and to academic research on
sexual assault. In this thesis, I have made the negotiation of sexual refusals an
explicit focus of my research and as such have brought to the fore an important
feminist issue. By focusing on saying 'no' to sex, rather than explicitly on sexual
violence or coercion, this thesis makes an important contribution to the blurred
borderlands between coercive and 'ordinary' heterosexual sex. Although the
women who participated in this research did talk about their own personal
experiences of refusing sex, and, in several cases, of having their refusals
overruled and of being raped, the majority of talk was concerned with more
mundane refusals. It is in this non-threatening, impersonal, talk that the
intricacies and pervasiveness of sexual coercion, and the normalisation of
coercion, become apparent.
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This thesis makes four key contributions to the literature around young women's
sexual negotiations and sexual refusals: in relation to (1) identity/reputation, (ii)
miscommunication, (iii) emotion work, and (iv) sexual scripts.
Feminists (e.g. Lees, 1986 & 1993) have previously pointed out that sexual
reputation is a mechanism for the control of women's sexuality - women must be
simultaneously sexually attractive and yet sexually unavailable. This thesis has
contributed to that literature by linking work on reputation to issues around
saying 'no'. In chapter three (section 3.3.1)1 presented a (transparent) analysis of
how 'sexual reputation' functions to constrain young women in their sexual
negotiations. Feminists have documented the ways in which young women tread
a fine line between being seen as sexually attractive and yet sexually unavailable,
between being seen as a 'slag' or as a 'drag'. This thesis builds upon and
develops this feminist literature when in chapter three (section 3.3.1) I discussed
the ways in which women describe concern about sexual reputation as
influencing their ability to say 'no' to unwanted sex. These young women
describe how girls who don't say 'no' are seen as 'slags' while those who do say
'no' are seen as 'tight' or 'frigid'. While most of the feminist literature
emphasises the ways in which the label 'slag' serves to constrain the
development of an autonomous and active female sexuality, very few studies
focus on the importance for young women's sexuality of being labelled a 'drag'.
It is to this aspect of sexual reputation that I paid particular attention. The
embarrassment of refusing sex, women argue, may be more painful than
acquiescing to unwanted sex.
In Chapter Four I gave detailed consideration to sexual miscommunication
theory, which, as I outlined in chapter one (section 1.3.1.) has been widely used
to explain instances of date rape and 'unwanted sex'. I assessed the utility of this
theory for explaining my own data on young women's talk about sexual refusals.
This chapter contributes to the literature on sexual miscommunication by
demonstrating how women themselves use a lay version of miscommunication
theory to explain their experiences.
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In Chapter Five, I gave detailed consideration to emotion work theory. In chapter
one (section 1.3.2) I noted that social science researchers often portray young
women's emotional investments in sexual relationships as constraining their
ability to refuse 'unwanted' sex. This thesis makes an important contribution to
this literature by explicitly linking emotion work theory to sexual negotiation. I
explore the ways in which emotion work theory could provide a common
theoretical base with which to link the many disparate studies which look at the
interplay between emotional investments and sexual refusals.
In Chapter Six I gave detailed consideration to sexual script theory, and provide
a powerful analysis of the timing of refusals within sexual scripts. At present
there is no analysis of this kind in the literature. Although there is some
consensus within the literature that saying 'no' is scripted as women's
responsibility, there is little on exactly how or why or when women are expected
to say 'no'. In addition, much of the current literature on sexual scripts relies on
people's self report responses to pre-coded questions. The value of this thesis is
that it demonstrates that (some) women talk about sexual activities as scripted
even when not prompted to do so by the researcher.
In sum, I have explored in detail four literatures on sexual negotiation, and have
investigated their utility for explaining my own data on young women's talk
about refusing sex. I have shown that each of these theories provides valuable
insight into my data, but also that a careful examination of young women's talk
provides challenges to and contributes to the development of each of these
theories.
7.3 Epistemological Debates:
Essentialism and Social Constructionism
The vast majority of both feminist and non-feminist work in psychology and
sociology, as I have demonstrated, relies on essentialist (transparent) readings of
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data. I have explored and illustrated the differences between essentialist
(transparent) and constructed readings of my data, and have discussed some key
advantages, for feminists, of constructed readings. This thesis, then, represents
part of a growing body of feminist literature which adopts a social constructionist
approach to data analysis (see, for example, the contributions to Feminism and
Discourse, Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1995). I have argued that perhaps
essentialism and social constructionism are best understood as a continuum
rather than as opposing poles. Theories can be more (i.e. script theory) or less
(i.e. miscommunication theory) social constructionist. For example, some of the
emotion work literature, and most of the sexual script literature, is grounded in
social constructionism when it comes to articulating the origins or location of
social phenomena, but remains steadfastly essentialist in its approach to data
analysis. Indeed most discussions of the relative merits of essentialism and social
constructionism have been at the level of ontology, and have rarely (with the
exception of those interested in discourse analysis) been at the methodological
level. Often when methodological issues are discussed they are conflated with
the difference between qualitative and quantitative methods. The value of this
thesis is that it provides an exploration of essentialism and social
constructionism in relation to the analysis of qualitative data (see also Kitzinger
and Powell, 1995 for a discussion of essentialist and social constructionist
readings of story completion data). I have discussed the implications of taking
what women say in research settings as transparent evidence of real world events
or of psychological phenomenon, and the implications of treating what women
say in research settings as talk produced in a particular interactional setting in
order to serve particular interactional functions. As I have demonstrated, each of
these approaches has costs and benefits, and of these approaches are
potentially useful.
Transparent (essentialist) analyses do have certain benefits for feminists. They
tap into women's own understanding of the nature of sexual experience. They
follow feminist advice to 'take women seriously' and to allow women to be the
'experts on their own lives'. By giving scientific legitimacy to the ways in which
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women themselves understand and explain their experiences, transparent
readings of qualitative data 'validate women's reality'. This approach 'gives
voice' to women's experience, allowing them to explain difficult sexual
situations in their own terms using their own language. Women's own
explanations, their own understanding of their experience are seen as primary.
Transparent analysis maps closely onto women's own analysis of their
experiences. But perhaps the greatest advantage of transparent readings of
qualitative data, is that they allow researchers to make strong claims about the
nature of social reality, and - crucially for feminist research - they allow
researchers to make strong claims about how to effect social change.
Because a transparent analysis allows researchers to go beyond talk, and to make
claims about social reality (i.e. using a model of participant-as-informant), or
about how women see social reality (i.e. using a model of participant-as-
psychological-subject), it allows researchers to make strong recommendations
for social change. For example, a transparent analysis allows researchers to take
women's talk about misunderstandings and communication difficulties as
supportive evidence for miscommunication theory, and hence to make concrete
interventions in, for example, date rape education and assertiveness training
programs. Similarly, a transparent analysis of talk about 'emotion work' leads to
the possibility of counselling women to put their own needs first, and a
transparent analysis of talk about 'sexual scripts' allows feminists to call for the
interruption or redefinition of current sexual scripts. Transparent analyses, then,
offer easy and immediately implemented programs, and clear cut solutions to the
problem of date rape and 'unwanted sex'.
By contrast, programs for eliminating date rape are not immediately available
from constructed readings of the data, and this is clearly a crucial omission for
feminist activism. But the crucial contribution of the constructionist approach is
that it draws attention to some of the reasons why the young women who are the
recipients of such programs might be reluctant to act upon the advice and
training they are given. In order to understand and alter heterosexual interaction
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which oppresses women, it is crucial to examine the ways in which ordinary
women (and men) explain and account for their sexual behaviours. Attempts by
feminists to alter the ways in which ordinary women talk about their sexual
experiences may be relatively unsuccessful if feminists do not take into account
the functions that current discourses serve for the women who use them. For
example, feminist attempts to replace miscommunication with the politicised
term 'rape' fails to address the advantages the term miscommunication might
serve for women who wish to obscure or minimise the sexual violence they face
from partners. Feminists cannot hope to encourage women to adopt different
ways of talking about their experiences without attending to the costs for women
of adopting such an approach.
A second key argument of this thesis has been that one important cost of
adopting a transparent analysis is that it very often presents young women as
victims. Women are portrayed as naïve and innocent; they are manipulated and
controlled by men who seduce and impregnate them while they themselves have
little idea what is going on. This so-called 'victim feminism' has come under
recent attack from some feminists (e.g. Roiphe, 1993; Wolf, 1993) and contrasts
sharply with the image which most young women present of themselves as active
agents free to make their own informed choices. It is this latter image which is
apparent in constructed analyses. I have shown how the young women in this
research work hard to ensure that I, as a researcher, do not pathologise them. As
feminists we should recognise the work that women do in their talk rather than
simply reiterating pathologising images or referring vaguely to young women's
resistance. This is not to deny that women may be victimised but rather to warn
against presenting women only and always victims, and basing activism and
pragmatic suggestions for change on such an assumption. Feminists have been
struggling with issues about how to represent other women in ways which
recognise oppression and victimization in a way which does not present women
as victims or as gullible cultural dupes (Kitzinger and Thomas, 1995; Davis,
1995), and my analyses in this research expands and develops ways of thinking
about this victimhood/agency dilemma.
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In sum, I would argue that data can be interpreted in many different ways and,
with many different feminisms, there is no 'right' analysis. The debate among
feminists about the relative merits of essentialism and social constructionism has
been fierce - with the accusation of essentialism often being used as a term of
abuse. According to Richardson (1996) and Lienert (1996) when feminists
accuse each other being essentialist they accuse each other of being theoretically
unsophisticated, naive, misguided, stereotypical or out-dated. Social
constructionists, on the other hand, are accused of belittling social and political
inequalities by suggesting that they are social artifacts which must, as a
consequence, be more easily altered than biological inequalities. By giving
careful consideration to the political implications of adopting an essentalist or a
social constructionist approach to qualitative data analysis, I hope to have made
some useful contributions to this rather heated debate. In discussing the costs and
benefits of different epistemological approaches to data analysis I have also
attempted to make visible the process of 'coming to conclusions' (Holland and
Ramazanoglu, 1994), the processes by which I as researcher made decisions and
compromises in reaching analytic assessments. The role of the researcher is
never simply that of 'bearing witness'; the researcher is always interpreting,
always selecting, and always making her own sense of what is said.
7.4 Focus Groups and Feminist Method
As a feminist and a social constructionist I chose to use focus groups in studying
young women's accounts of saying 'no' for two reasons. First I wanted to explore
the potential of focus groups as a feminist method, and second I was interested in
using a qualitative method which incorporated interaction between participants
as well as interaction between the researcher and the researched. Unlike most
other feminist researchers, who use focus groups unquestioningly and who
provide no rationale for their choice of method, I have explicitly addressed the
ways in which focus groups have the potential to be used as a feminist method.
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As I noted in Chapter Two (section 2.2), interaction between participants is one
of the hallmarks of the focus group method (Morgan, 1988). Despite this few
researchers quote extracts of data in which group members interact with each
other or, on the few occasions when they do, they do not analyse this interaction
(Kitzinger, J. 1994; Wilkinson, 1998). In this thesis, the interaction between
participants has assumed a central role in the analysis. One of the values of a
constructed reading of focus group data is that it draws attention to interaction
between group members. By focusing on qualitative data as rather than as a
route either to reality or to psychological processes beyond the talk, the analyst is
forced to consider the ways in which participants respond to each other and build
responses together.
As noted in chapter two (section 2.3.1), focus groups are assumed to afford
greater power to research participants simply because they outnumber the
researcher (Morgan, 1988; Frey and Fontana, 1993). Consequently, the
moderator/researcher has less control over the research process. For feminists
who are encouraged to create ways of conducting non-hierarchical, non-
exploitative research, focus groups may be an ideal method. Focus groups are
valued by feminists because their open-ended approach and the relative lack of
control by the researcher, allows participants to set their own agendas during the
group discussions (e.g. Schlesinger et at., 1992; Espin, 1995; Norris et al., 1996).
However, focus groups can do more than simply allow participants to assert their
own agenda: they might also provide a forum for participants to disrupt or
challenge the researcher 's agenda. One example of this from my own research is
the following extract of data in which I ask the group to provide examples of the
kinds of excuses they would use to avoid unwanted sex:
Cath: Do you mean like really naff excuses?
Hannah: Well, anything that you would use.
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Cath: That would be things like 'I'm on my period' and
things like that
Lara: But, I mean
Cath: - but it depends how far you've got because that
can go completely
Helen: No, but ..., but that just gives you a few day respite
doesn't it - and then I think after a few days you'd just
feel so shifty that you had to rely on that
Lara: That's horrible, why should you have to lie on an
issue that is just perfectly right and you feel strongly
about, why do you have to come up with excuses
Cath: That's right
Lara: I mean, I would much rather, it would just be so
nice just to be able to say no, for no particular reason. I
don't really know, I haven't felt the need to think about
it, Ijust don't particularly fancy it.
Helen: I just don't feel like it at the moment
Lara: Wouldn't that be nice!
(Group 7)
In this extract, then, I unproblematically introduce the idea of providing excuses
as a way of avoiding sex. But, although these three young women are able to
generate such excuses, they challenge the idea that this is an appropriate question
for me to ask, and that giving an excuse is an appropriate action to take. Of
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course, participants in one-to-one interviews may also challenge researchers'
agendas, but this process may be facilitated in a focus groups where group
members can support each other and collectively question the researcher's focus.
So, although in this case it is Lara who initially objects to my agenda she is
supported by both Cath who agrees "That's right" and Helen who reformulates
what Lara says as "I just don't feel like it at the moment".
Similarly, the group can collectively resist the researcher's attempts to challenge
their views and present her own. In the following example, I am trying to
challenge their views on the male sex drive, but Karen, Jill and Deb firmly and
consistently reaffirm their views. My suggestion that men might fake orgasms is
met by disbelief from the group:
Hannah: well, you know, guys get tired too, and -
Karen: - well they're more active -
Jill: - they've got higher libido
Deb: say that again
Jill - more sex drive than women and that's like
scientifically - or it could just be me talking crap - but I
have heard reports of it's a mental thing that guys have a
higher sex drive than women
Hannah: But surely there must be times when
Karen: Yeah, but in general
Jill: it's [faking] more rare for a guy
(Group 10)
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My own attempts to question or challenge their views are collectively resisted by
the group, who support and agree with each other to dismiss my own assertions.
Clearly, then, at least in this particular extract, I am not seen as an 'expert' on
heterosexual sex, and indeed other 'experts' (i.e. science) are used to undermine
what I am saying. In addition, participants also question or disagree with each
other in ways which might be inappropriate coming from a researcher, as the
following extract illustrates:
Hannah: Can you come up with any good or bad reasons
[for having sex]
Sam: Bad reason ... Because you're pressured into it by
your boyfriend, because you're scared he's going to dump
you
Becky: Yeah, that's probably one of the most common
ones, isn't it
Lynn: Or, I really ... 'You would if you loved me, and I
do love you', ha ha
Sam: Yeah, if you're in a relationship where you really
like the guy and you don't want to split up with him then
you might..
Lucy - but what are you doing really liking the guy if he's
going to behave like that
(Group 5)
Lucy forcefully challenges Sam's reasons for having sex in a way which might
not be acceptable from a researcher. The power to ask questions, both of each
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other and of the researcher, in a context in which disagreements have been
licensed (see section 2.5.3 ii on ground rules), is an important way of mediating
the researcher's control.
7.5 Insider Research: Similarities and Differences
Feminists have been discussing the problems inherent in conducting research
with, and in subsequently representing, 'Others'. This is most clearly exemplified
in discussions about men researching women, and white women studying black
women (Carby, 1982; Collins, 1990), and has recently been extended to include
a wide range of different Others (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996). Many of the
contributors to Wilkinson and Kitzinger's book Representing the Other struggle
with "questions of overlapping categories and shifting identities" in trying to
establish the ways in which they are both similar to and different from those they
study (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996: 24), and questions of sameness and
difference are relevant, too, in my own research. Like my research participants I
am white, heterosexual and a young women (although no longer a teenager). We
may share certain aspects of class, but certainly differ in our level of education. I
am the researcher and they are the researched. We are sometimes similar and
sometimes different on these dimensions, and, I suspect, on many more of which
I am not aware. The question though, is whether, and in what ways, these
similarities and differences matter. As Diana Reay (1996: 444) points out:
A researcher can state that they are a white, middle class,
heterosexual, male within their text but reflexivity
requires much more than that - it is about an honest
exploration of whether any or all of these aspects of self-
identity lead to bias,
While I am uncomfortable with the choice of the word 'bias' (which implies that
if we could be rid of these biases we would see the 'truth'), reflexivity certainly
involves more than simply stating those aspects of one's identity which one feels
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are most relevant to the topic under investigation. After all, how do we know
which aspects of our identity, which similarities and which differences, make a
difference to our research?
While feminists (e.g. Edwards, 1996) have been quick to point out the ways in
which they see themselves as similar or different from their participants, less
consideration has been given to the ways in which participants may view
researchers as similar or different. Researchers' views of themselves and their
own similarities and differences with the researched may or may not map onto
the views of the researched. For example, Ang-Lygate (1996: 53), says that as a
Chinese woman interviewing Chinese women it would be "methodologically
misleading for me to assume that I 'belonged' simply because I myself am
Chinese": this would, she says, mean privileging a racialized identity over any
other aspects of her identity. But although the author herself feels uncomfortable
about this, it is her status as a Chinese woman which gives her right of access to
a group of Hong Kong Chinese women:
I made initial contact with the leader of the group by
telephone, but to my initial dismay, she was reluctant to
let me attend their meetings. However, when I realized
that because she could not see me over the telephone
line, she had assumed from my Anglicized first name and
my local Scottish accent that I was Caucasian, I
specifically declared myself to be Chinese and her
subsequent response to me changed dramatically. 'Oh! If
you are Chinese, you are most welcome. I look forward
to seeing you next Tuesday' (Ang-Lygate, 1996: 54).
Although the author was uncomfortable about privileging her shared status as
Chinese as a basis for shared experience and similarity, we can perhaps infer
from her participant's response that they privileged her Chinese status in this
way. The two examples (from Ang-Lygate and from Edwards) indicate how
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participants can actively position researchers as the same as or as different from
themselves. Some researchers report being positioned as 'Other', not through
being denied or granted access, but through things that participants say. Song and
Parker both found that participants assumed both similarities and differences
based on what on what they knew about the researcher's cultural identity (Song
and Parker, 1995). In his interviews with young Chinese people David Parker
found that those who strongly identified as Chinese "often did so in contrast to
me" they were also, he reports, keen to establish the extent of his own Chinese
identity by asking questions such as 'how Chinese are you?', 'can you speak
Chinese?', or 'was it your father or mother who's Chinese?' (p. 244 & 245). As a
social constructionist it is these aspects of insider/outsider research which
particularly interest me. I am keen to explore the ways in which similarities and
differences are 'worked up' during the research and 'made relevant' rather than
simply assuming that they are already relevant.
One answer is to look at how differences and similarities are 'worked up' or
made relevant within the talk itself. I do not mean to suggest that this should
replace other ways of thinking about representing 'Others' or about differences
and similarities in research, but that it may provide a useful way of thinking
about some of these issues. Issues of similarity and difference were very muted
in my own research, partly I think, because our similarities remained
unproblematised and invisible. Other researchers have commented on the
problems inherent in a lack of critical distance from one's participants. Diane
Reay talks about the "dangers of proximity rather than distance" (Reay, 1996:
65), while Tracey Hurd and Alice McIntyre (1996: 78) warn against the
'seduction of sameness'. Looking back over the transcripts of my data I have
tried to identify the ways in which similarity is worked up in the group
discussions as a way of approaching the issue of insider research slightly
differently.
One of the ways in which similarity is worked up, albeit very subtly, in the group
discussions is through shared knowledge. In chapter six (section 6.3.1) I
300
Chapter Seven: Looking Back, Looking Forward
demonstrated how shared knowledge or consensus is - constructed between
research participants by 'filling in the gaps' in each others' talk (Edwards, 1997).
This is also a feature of my own interactions with group members. In the
following example, I suggest words/phrases to illustrate the previous speaker's
point:
Jan: in fact this happened to me just the other week [...]
he just wouldn't get out of my car and that was a
nightmare so I physically -
Hannah: - ejected him -
Jan: physically. But no, it was awful he just would not
take no for an answer
(Group 8)
Similarly, I fill in the gaps in the following extract in which Pam is talking about
how to negotiate sexual pleasure and tell a male partner that something is nice:
Pam: yeah, you'd make some kind of noise without
having to say anything wouldn't you, you kind of giggle
or something
Hannah: a moan or a groan
Pam: you wouldn't actually - yeah, because the blokes are
exactly the same, they do exactly the same, they don't go
'oh, I like that', they wouldn't do anything like that
(Group 9)
In both of these extracts, then, I provide an illustration of both participants and
researcher working up knowledge as shared. By providing appropriate examples
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(which are shown to be appropriate because they remain unchallenged) it appears
as if both I and the participant are drawing on shared knowledge. Again, I do not
mean to suggest that this knowledge is actually shared but rather that it is treated
as shared. This is demonstrated again in the following extract in which I am
talking to Karen:
Karen: I must admit before I left the school it was
something that I did want to do [have sexj because there
was so much hype about it, I did want to see what it was
like. But I still wouldn't have gone with anyone
Hannah: It's curiosity isn't it
Karen: yeah
(Group 10)
I could have responded to Karen's point in a variety of different ways. I could, as
textbooks recommend, have 'reflected back' what Karen was saying: 'You
wanted to see what it was like?'. Or, I could have clarified to check that I had
understood her properly: 'So, you were curious about sex?'. Both of these have a
very different feel from 'It's curiosity, isn't it'. It represents as shared knowledge
about how it feels to be surrounded by 'hype' about sex. My suggestion "It's
curiosity, isn't it" is accepted by Karen as an appropriate description of her
feelings and both my suggestion and her "yeah" function to construct a shared
understanding between us about what it is like to be curious about heterosexual
sex because of the 'hype' about it. More than this, because the suggestion is in a
generalized form "It's curiosity, isn't it" (rather than, say, 'You were curious' or
'I'd be curious') it appears to be factual, it's not just what Karen and I would
think in this situation, but what everyone would think. Similarly, in the following
extract, Jill and I construct a shared version of why menstruating might be a good
excuse for avoiding unwanted sex:
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Jill: I think most people would just say they've got their
period because that would stop the boy from blaming you
Hannah: Yeah, 'I would really like to but unfortunately'
Jill: yeah and it stops them from undoing the trousers in
the first place so, you know..
Hannah: It certainly helps!
[Laughter]
(Group 10)
In this example, I do two things. Again I give an illustration of a point which one
member of the group has just made. Second, 'It certainly helps!', does some
shared knowledge business: I 'know' that using the excuse 'being on your
period' means that men will not hassle you for sex. I do not question but rather
collude with this representation of men and perhaps also with their
representation of menstruation as being a taboo time for sexual activity.
There are also times when I 'do' difference or explicitly indicate that knowledge
is shared - regardless of whether or not I do actually know what they mean I
'play dumb'. Researchers sometimes cultivate an apparent naiveté about the lives
of their participants, pretending to know less than they do so that participants
will then expand fully on aspects of their lives in which the researcher is
interested. Such a tactic was employed by Rebecca Horn (1996) when she
interviewed police officers:
When researching the police I actively tried to cultivate
an image of being harmless and unthreatening ... My
attempts to be seen as naive and harmless were helped by
my age (23), my gender, and my low status as a student
I gave the impression that I knew very little, that I had
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had little experience, and that I led a very sheltered life
and so knew little about the world of offenders or the
police. This impression was largely based on fact, but I
was aware that I was exaggerating my naiveté. Male
officers were often very keen to 'impress' or 'shock' me
with their stories, and I received the co-operation I was
seeking. (Horn, 1996: 43).
There are also some (rather fewer) occasions in the talk where issues of
difference are made explicit. In the following extract, for example, Helen talks
about an incident with a man who is 'older':
Helen: well, basically I met this person and he was quite
a bit older than me and he did actually assume that I was
older than I was and er .. when he said to me 'Do you
want to come back to my flat?' it just frightened me so
much. I mean, I was probably being really stupid and
overreacting sort of thing [...] and he was 23 going on 24
and -
Hannah: - really old!
Helen: - and he was just - It's really old for me!
Lara: He had wrinides and everything
Helen: I'm sorry, Ijust think it's really old..
(Group 7)
It is I who draw attention to our difference in age in this extract. My ironic
comment "really old!" which interrupts Karen, forcefully focuses attention on
my own age as similar to the man in Karen's story, and challenges her
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categorisation of him as an "older man". Karen, however, twice reaffirms that to
her 23 or 24 is 'really old' and the difference in our own ages is, by implication,
made relevant. The following extracts are all examples when age is made
relevant in the talk. Interestingly, it is always me who makes a comment about
age.
Hannah: If I brought you in here and said to you what do
you think are the most important issues about sex for
people your age what would you say?
(Group 8)
Hannah: so what about all the other stuff like oral sex and
snogging and feeling up and.. I assume all these words
are..
All: yeah, yeah
Hannah: we used to call it copping off in my day, I don't
know whether that's still
Pam: er no
Hannah: what do you call it when you're getting off with
someone then?
Jane: pull, pull
(Group 9)
In these extracts, then, there are explicit references to differences in age between
the researcher and the researched. In addition, there are also references to
differences in vocabulary. In the second extract for example, I use terms such as
'snogging' and 'feeling up' but rather than assuming that the meaning of these
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terms is shared I explicitly 'check out' with participants that they know what I
mean. There follows a discussion for the 'correct' terminology with an explicit
searching out by me of the vocabulary used by young women. This implies that
the language is not shared and that there may be differences between the
participants and myself about the most appropriate way to describe sexual
activities. This is also reflected in the following question directed by me to a
different group:
Hannah: what about the idea of like - in your terms - if
you're not ready and you're with someone who is, how
do you get out of that situation
(Group 9)
By asking the group the question 'in their terms', I imply that their way of
describing sexual situations is not the same kind of description that I would
chose. Again this highlights a difference in our vocabulary.
The problem with this approach is that it misses attending to silence - to the
things which are talked about, to those silences which also signal similarity.
An interesting paper by Michael Billig (1997) explores this idea in relation to
Freud's interpretation of his conversations with 'Dora'. Billig points to the
'silence' about 'race' in Freud's interpretation of Dora's dreams. He argues that
as both Freud and Dora are Jewish and living in Vienna in a climate of attempted
assimilation into German culture and the subsequent climate of rejection from
that culture, it is remarkable that Freud does not interpret Dora's dreams in
relation to the politics of 'race'. Billig is able to highlight particular instances
where 'avoidance' of race becomes visible within Freud's writing. Of course,
Billig is talking about Freud and Dora avoiding discussing racial oppression, in
my own work, silence and avoidance is a function of unexamined race and class
privilege. For example, the language used to talk about sexual partners is often
purportedly gender neutral. The "they" to which these young women refer, is
'men'. The assumption that "they" are male is an assumption which is not
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challenged (either by myself or by other participants) in the groups themselves.
Similarly, there are no direct references to 'whiteness' in the transcripts. There is
nothing which I could point to and say 'look this is where we are doing
whiteness, or where whiteness is being worked up'. But, whiteness is significant
in its absence. There is, in the silences within the discussions, the assumption
that they are negotiating sexual relationships with male partners who are like
them. There is, for example, no discussion of 'cross-race' relationships or
relationships across religious boundaries. Such a discussion would not be
inappropriate. Just as they discuss the ease/difficulty of saying 'no' to men who
are older, or to boyfriends rather than strangers (see section 3.3.3) young women
could, for example, discuss how saying 'no' is harder for white girls than for
Asian girls because white girls are seen as sexually 'loose' or 'easy'. Or, they
could have discussed how, as a white girl, they find it more difficult to say 'no'
to a Black man for fear that their actions will be interpreted as racist. In fact, in
all of the group discussions there is only one occasion where racial or cultural
differences become visible, and this is in a comment from Karen (9) who is
talking about when is the appropriate time to say 'no':
yeah, a lot of people see different levels depending on
background and even religion and stuff, like so .. like,
some people see like kissing - French kissing - as, like, a
big thing, whereas if you've been brought up in a
Western civilisation you wouldn't think anything of it
particularly. So, it depends on how much you've seen
around you, how much is socially acceptable depending
on where you draw the line and if you draw the line.
In response, Jill immediately agrees that "people from other backgrounds" would
interpret behaviours in different ways. It is only here, in these fragments of
conversation, is there any acknowledgement that sexual negotiations with
'Others' may be problematic or different. For the most part, these differences
remain comfortably unexplored.
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This approach, then, suggests a careful and attentive focus on the details of talk
to examine the ways in which similarities and differences are worked up or made
relevant in the talk. Such an approach may provide one way of tiying to gauge on
which dimensions differences and similarities make a difference to the research
we conduct, and provides concrete examples of the process of 'Othering'. This
approach also allows the researcher to be reflexive in thinking about her own
position in the research, and about how researchers, as well as the researched,
construct sameness and difference. In reflecting on my identity in relation to my
participants, I have tried to subject my own comments to the same sort of
analysis which I have performed on participants' talk.
In sum, I have contributed to the research literature on focus groups by
considering the ways in which interaction between group members, the hallmark
of focus group research, can form an integral part of analysis. I have also
developed feminist discussions on research methods by exploring the potential of
focus groups as a feminist method, especially in relation to the issue of power
differences between the researcher and researched, and to the issue of context
stripping. I have also made some tentative suggestions for a different approach to
feminist debates on insider/outsider research.
7.6 Looking Back, Looking Forward
I started this research with the idea that young women are misrepresented as
passive and weak in both the popular media and in the social scientific literature.
Nowhere is this damning portrayal more apparent than in accounts of young
women's sexual refusals. According to the literature, young women are unable to
say 'no' either because they lack the necessary communication skills, or because
they are emotionally dependent on their partners. This is despite evidence which
suggests that young women are expected to say 'no'. In contrast to this I thought
that young women would be able to say 'no' loudly, proudly and with confidence
- and they do.
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Unlike the shy, easily startled, hesitant, young women portrayed in the media, I
wanted to show that young women are confident and assertive. What I found was
that young women talk about their sexual experiences in a whole range of
different ways: saying 'no' is easy and yet difficult; they can say 'no' but other
girls can't; sometimes they do say 'no', sometimes they don't say 'no'; saying
'no' is easy with some boys and not with others; saying 'no' can damage your
reputation but so can not saying 'no', and so on. Either young women don't
know whether they are coming or going and are a mass of contradictions, or
something more interesting is going on. Researchers who are trying to establish
the 'truth' about what young women 'really' think would be flummoxed by this
kind of 'messy' data. For me, this highlights the inadequacy of treating young
women's accounts as transparent data.
I think, at this point, that it is also appropriate to highlight some of the
limitations of this research. Feminists have welcomed those research methods
(usually qualitative) which 'give voice' to women's experience and which allow
women to explain their lives in their own terms (Du Bois, 1983; Reinharz, 1992).
Certainly qualitative methods, including focus groups, allow women to talk
about their lives, but focus groups also 'give voice' in a slightly different way. As
Michelle Fine coniments, feminists have "ignored, indeed misrepresented, how
well young women talk as subjects, passionate about and relishing their
capacities to move between nexus of power and powerlessness" (Fine, 1992:
178, emphasis in original). The focus groups I conducted are an ideal space in
which to hear young women talk, loudly and with laughter, about their lives. The
teasing, joking, laughing, sarcasm, passion, confusion, the silences and the
hesitancy, are all made visible in focus group research. Although I hope that my
analysis has gone some way towards capturing these aspects of young women's
talk, I fear that often these very features of focus group interaction, which make
the groups such a delight to be part of, are missed. I described (in section 2.2.2.),
how researchers have to make decisions when it comes to transcribing and
recording their data, in this research I chose to transcribe the tape-recordings
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verbatim, but I now feel that these transcripts do not always capture the tone of
the discussions. The tone of voice in which comments are made, the speed of the
deliveiy, the laughter are very difficult both to record in a transcript and relay to
the reader. However, it is in these details that we might be able to hear these
young women's voices ring out. I would urge researchers in future research to
attend to these aspects of 'girl talk' which often remain invisible.
Although I have demonstrated (in section 7.4) the ways in which the power and
control of the moderator is limited in focus group research, and although I have
claimed that this makes it an ideal choice of method for feminists, it would be
misleading to suggest that consequently this research is non-hierarchical.
Although in conducting research with a group rather than one-to-one I lose some
elements of control during the data collection stage, I retain control over many
other aspects of the research process including the initial choice of topic,
transcription, choice of data extracts, analysis etc. In many ways, and to my
regret, this has been a piece of 'hit and run' research. Out of necessity (theirs not
mine) I spent only a short time with the young women while I was collecting the
data and have not had the opportunity to contact them again regarding the
research. I would very much have liked the opportunity to 'give back' my
analyses to the women who took part, not to gain "a 'bumper sticker' to trumpet
the authenticity of the research" (Coyle, 1996: 74), but in order to have some
response to the two different analyses of their talk which I present Exploring our
disagreements and reactions would be another stage of analysis or reflection. Of
course, this would mean a considerably greater commitment of time and effort
both from myself and my participants. Such a commitment would have to be
agreed in advance and would represent quite a different kind of research project.
In addition, this research is not really for women in any straightforward sense. It
is not for either the young women who took part in the research, or for women
more generally, who are looking for advice and guidance about how to make
refusing sex easier. There are no policy recommendations or easily implemented
solutions to arise from this research. Rather, this thesis represents my journey
through psychology, through feminism and through questions of epistemology,
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and although it makes important contributions to feminist theoiy it has no direct
implications for women's lives.
It is also important to note that the research is limited to a fairly small and fairly
homogenous group of women. This thesis looked only at heterosexual women
saying 'no' to sex with men, only at young white women, and only at young
women who are in the position of considering staying on for higher education at
a university. So although the thesis is rich in depth, it is limited in scope to that
particular group of people. While I am sure that the things which these women
talk about will resonate with some women, I am just as sure that they will not
speak to or for all women. I have tried (in section 7.5) to show the ways in which
our similarities have obscured or precluded the necessity to speak about certain
aspects of sexual relationships. These are privileged silences which relate to
privileged aspects of our identities which afford us greater social power (i.e.
white, heterosexual, middle class). While heterosexuality is critically examined
within this thesis, other dimensions of power remain unchallenged both at the
time and in the analysis.
Despite these limitations, this thesis makes important contributions to feminist
psychology and opens up important questions for feminist researchers. In
particular, on an epistemological level, this thesis highlights the limitations of a
constructed approach to data analysis for feminist activism. While the researcher
who conducts a transparent analysis can make strong claims about the nature of
social reality and how to change it, the researcher who conducts a constructed
analysis is left with no firm ground on which to build intervention programs and
the like. However, I have also demonstrated how constructed analyses which
reveal important information about the investments that young women have in
describing.their sexual experiences in certain ways and how these investments
may undermine or curtail feminist activism. While feminists have called for
social change and have called for social constructionist ideas to be related to
social change (e.g. Crawford, 1995) there is little sense of what such a
relationship would look like. A social constructionist approach provides
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important insights into the limitations of existing approaches to social change but
what we need to do now is to consider how this knowledge might usefully be
implemented into alternative programs for changes. For example, in Mapping the
Language of Racism (1992), Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter use
discourse analysis to demonstrate the limitations of anti-racism, and suggest that
such an approach might point to new ways of moving forward:
an important part of anti-racist practice is identifiing the
forms [racist] legitimation takes, and charting also the
fragmented and dilemmatic nature of everyday discourse,
because it is at those points of fracture and contradiction
that there is scope for change and the redirection of
argument.
While I agree wholeheartedly with this, I would also point out that (like my own
research see, for example, Kitzinger and Frith, forthcoming), they do not go far
enough - what kinds of change and in what direction are we to move?
In addition to raising questions about feminist activism, this thesis also raises
questions about how to address women's victimization without presenting them
as victims. Debates about victimhood and agency have been key feminist
concerns both within and beyond this thesis. Often feminists start from the
assumption that women are victims and when data start to get problematic, when
women do not talk about themselves as victims, feminists address the ways in
which women resist oppression, or the ways in which their oppression is
obscured. The approach of this thesis has been to investigate those times when
young women can be seen as talking about things which oppress them (i.e.
miscommunication, emotion work) and then to look at how in talking about
these very things, they present themselves as powerftLl and in control, as
knowledgeable and sophisticated sexual actors. One way of approaching this
which would build on the contributions of this research is to look at those times
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when women present themselves as powerful and talk about their own power. An
ideal place to start such an investigation would be the phenomenon of GiriPower.
Celia Kitzinger has noted both the absence of overt discussions of power in
psychology and also the naiveté of such discussions when they do arise. She
argues that feminists need to "locate the different discourses in which power-talk
is embedded, to examine the rhetorical functions of different conceptualizations
of power, and their sociopolitical implications and effects" (Kitzinger, 1991:
114). Talk about GirlPower would seem an ideal place to begin just such an
investigation.
The phenomenon of GirlPower is interesting because not only it is about girls
being powerful (unusual in itself) but also because it has been hailed as the
nineties version of feminism. There is a concern that feminism is dying, losing
impetus, becoming unfashionable, and that young women are moving into a
postfeminist era. This has led to "sporadic soul searching" about why feminism
no longer appeals to young women (hines, 1995: 260). Young women apparently
see feminism as largely redundant, and although they may espouse feminist
views (known as the 'I'm not a feminist but ...' syndrome), they see feminists as
women with "extreme views" and as "anti-men" (Sharpe, 1994: 286, see also
Morgan, 1995; Spender, 1993). A recent edition of the (now defunct) British
feminist magazine Everywoman (1995) asked 'Is feminism dead?'. By contrast,
GiriPower is alive and kicking. GirlPower is a high powered, pouting, in your
face reaction to so-called anti-sex eighties feminism. What it offers, according to
journalist Kathy Acker, is a vision of young women who are "sexually curious,
certainly pro-sex" and who "do not feel that they are stupid or that they should
not be heard because they did not attend the right universities" (Acker, 1997).
GiriPower also marks a fierce rejection of a key aspect of feminist politics which
characterised the 1970's and 1980s - the critique of the 'beauty myth'. Instead,
tight tops, wonder bras, short skirts, eyeliner, lipstick, and 'inadvertent' flashes
of underwear are the hallmark of GirlPower. For the most part, feminists seem to
be at a loss as to know what to do with this new noise from young women. They
appear to be torn between, on the one hand, celebrating young women for being
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"cooler and wiser" (Bea Campbell, quoted in limes, 1995), for their "confidence
and sassiness" (IJsha Brown, quoted in hines, 1995), and, on the other,
expressing disappointment at young women's naïve assumptions of equality and
failure to challenge oppressive practices. There is an admission that (older)
feminists 'Just Don't Understand' (cf. Tannen, 1990) the new generation of
'feminist' thought. As Michelle Fine and Pat Macpherson say reflecting on their
research with four young women:
we began to recognise how old we were, how dated
the academic literatures were, how powerful feminism
had been in shaping their lives and the meanings they
made of them, and yet how inadequately their feminism
dealt with key issues of identity and peer relations.
(Macpherson and Fine, 1992: 175).
These authors report being faced with the inadequacy of their own feminism in
comprehending the issues with which these young women grapple, coupled with
their own incredulity that these young women "could call themselves feminist"
(1992: 175). In this thesis I have argued that there are many different feminisms
as well as many different kinds of feminist analysis. An examination of
GiriPower as a form of feminism would develop this idea by considering what (if
any) aspects of GiriPower are beneficial to feminism and what are the costs of
adopting GiriPower as a form of feminism. I have argued elsewhere (Frith, 1994)
that feminism is losing its appeal to young women; by rejecting the hugely
popular appeal of GirlPower we may risk alienating young women further. This
does not mean that we should adopt uncritically a media-induced fad, but rather
that we should take seriously the appeal that GiriPower holds for young women
and explore whether a greater understanding of GiriPower could inform feminist
theory and activism.
It only remains, then, for me to draw to a close to what has been an exhilarating
and eye-opening adventure through young women's accounts of sexual refusal.
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From the time when I responded with such affront to the patronising television
programme with which I opened this chapter, I have journeyed through different
theories which I have found both useful and frustrating; through different
epistemologies which have opened new paths through the data while
simultaneously closing others; and through different feminisms which have
caused me continually to question the utility of the analyses I produce. It is
armed with this new knowledge, gained from battling with competing theories,
epistemologies and feminisms, that I am ready to embark on new journeys and
new adventures.
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Appendix One -
Sample Consent Form
I ______________________(NAME) BEING OVER SIXTEEN
YEARS OLD, VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH
PROJECT PROPOSED BY HANNAH FRITH IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE
ISSUES OF COMMUTNTCATION AROUND SEXUALITY. SPECiFICALLY
THIS INVOLVES WATCHING PART OF A SEX EDUCATION VIDEO THAT
WAS PROPOSED FOR USE IN SCHOOLS. PARTICIPATION WILL TAKE
_____(TIME) TO COMPLETE.
THE VIDEO DEALS WITH SEXUAL ISSUES AND MAY CAUSE
EMBARASSMENT OR DISCOMFORT.
I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT HANNAH FRITH HAS EXPLAINED THE TASK
FULLY, AND HAS GIVEN FULL INFORMATION ABOUT HOW THE DATA
WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT I CAN
WITHDRAW FROM THE RESEARCH AT ANY TIME WITHOUT
PREJUDICE OR PENALTY. I UNDERSTAND THAT I AM FREE TO ASK
ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION WHICH WILL BE
ANSWERED IN FULL.
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT:
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCHER:
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Appendix Two
The Focus Group Participants
Group One: Seven participants - Charlotte, Tina, Sarah, Michelle, Linda, Kate
and Sharon. These women were all undergraduates with the exception of one
who was a postgraduate. The women all volunteered to take part in a discussion
about 'Saying "no" to Sex' over pizza in the author's own home.
Group Two: This is the second meeting of some of the participants of group one
(the women requested a second meeting). This time there were five participants -
Michelle, Sharon, Sarah, Tina, Linda. In order to focus the discussion on saying
'no' the author used a 'Story Completion' technique to stimulate discussion (see
Chapter Two for more details).
Group Three: This is the third meeting of the initial group. However, only three
of the original participants were involved - Sharon, Linda and Tina. After limited
success with the story completion task, the author used 'Memory Work'
technique to elicit discussion (again see Chapter Three for details).
Group Four: This groups consists of seven volunteers whose ages ranged from
between 18-24 approximately - Lisa, Carla, Mary, Sue, Carol, Judy and Maggie.
These women were brought together using snowball sampling, some of them
were undergraduates while others were recent graduates. The story completion
technique was used to elicit discussion.
Group Five: This is a group of four women aged between 16-18 who were
recruited via a sixth form conference held at Loughborough University - Lucy,
Sam, Lynn, and Becky. The participants were shown a short clip of a sex
education video and a semi-structured focus group schedule was used to
stimulate discussion.
Group Six: This is a group of two women aged 16-18 who were recruited via a
sixth form conference held at Loughborough University - Sara and Liz. The
participants were shown a short clip of a sex education video and a semi-
structured focus group schedule was used to stimulate discussion.
Group Seven: This is a group of three young women aged 16-18 who were
recruited via a sixth form conference held at Loughborough University - Lara,
Cath and. Helen. The participants were shown a short clip of a sex education
video and a semi-structured focus group schedule was used to stimulate
discussion.
Group Eight: This is a group of two women aged 16-18 who were recruited via a
sixth form conference held at Loughborough University - Jan and Rose. The
participants were shown a short clip of a sex education video and a semi-
structured focus group schedule was used to stimulate discussion.
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Group Nine: This is a group of three young women aged 16-18 who were
recruited via a sixth form conference held at Loughborough University - Pam,
Zoe and Rose. The participants were shown a short clip of a sex education video
and a semi-structured focus group schedule was used to stimulate discussion.
Group Ten: This is a group of three young women aged 16-18 who were
recruited via a sixth form conference held at Loughborough University - Deb,
Karen and Jill. The participants were shown a short clip of a sex education video
and a semi-structured focus group schedule was used to stimulate discussion.
Group Eleven: This is a group of three young women aged 16-18 who were
recruited via a sixth form conference held at Loughborough University - Rachel,
Ros and Wendy. The participants were shown a short clip of a sex education
video and a semi-structured focus group schedule was used to stimulate
discussion.
Group Twelve: This is a group of seven young women aged 16-18 who were
recruited via a sixth form conference held at Loughborough University Sophie,
Kim, Jan, Diane, Kylie, Mel and Cheryl. The participants were shown a short
clip of a sex education video and a semi-structured focus group schedule was
used to stimulate discussion.
Group Thirteen: This is a group of three women undergraduates recruited via a
snowball sample - Megan, Tara, Pat and Ellen.
Group Fourteen: This is a group of three female undergraduates recruited via a
snowball sample - Natalie, Janet and Susie.
Group Fifteen: This is a group of ten female undergraduates recruited via a
snowball sample - Kathy, Ashley, Caroline, Barbara, Alison, Tanya, Paula,
Vicki, Kirsty, and Louise.
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